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CHAPTER I 
 
COMPENSATION GAPS AMONG TOP EXECUTIVES:  
EVIDENCE OF TOURNAMENT INCENTIVES OR PRODUCTIVITY  
DIFFERENTIALS? 
 
Introduction 
Virtually every corporate decision requires the mutual efforts of the senior 
executive team to successfully implement it, rather than simply the efforts of the CEO. 
The fact that executives work in a team and their actions affect each other suggests that 
the compensation level of one executive is likely to alter the incentives of other top 
executives as well. Tournament theory is a good example of where this perspective is 
modeled. A majority of the current studies on executive compensation focus rather 
narrowly on CEO compensation and its impact on the incentives of the CEO alone. One 
important, but under-explored question is how CEO compensation relative to the 
compensation of other senior executives affects the incentives of these other executives. 
The compensation gaps between the CEO and the other top executives vary substantially 
across firms. In some firms, the CEO is paid about 10 times more than other top 
corporate executives, while in other firms senior executives are paid more equally, so that 
the compensation gaps between CEOs and their direct subordinates are much less 
extreme. By exploring the determinants of these compensation gaps, we shed new light 
on the important question of how this major financial incentive mechanism is structured 
in large public firms. 
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Based on classical marginal productivity theory of labor, differences in the 
compensation levels of CEOs and other senior executives can simply reflect differences 
in their marginal contributions to firm performance. Executives differ significantly from 
each other in their abilities, managerial skills, and position specific experience, which can 
all affect their overall productivity. An executive’s productivity is also strongly affected 
by their job responsibilities. Models of multiplicative productivity effects (e.g. Rosen 
1981, Rosen 1982, Gabaix and Landier 2008) suggest that higher level managers can 
have much higher productivity than lower level managers, even if their inherent abilities 
do not differ much. The reason is that a CEO affects the productivity of all levels of the 
organization and has indirect effects on the productivity of lower level executives. Thus, 
more talented CEOs (or other senior executives) are placed in charge of more resources 
and larger firms. Such talented executives are paid substantially more because their 
ability has a greater impact on their subordinates’ productivity.  
An alternative view of the compensation gap is that it represents a trophy awarded 
to the winning executive who gets promoted to the CEO position. This application of 
tournament theory was first developed by Lazear and Rosen 1981, Green and Stokey 
1983, Rosen 1986, among others. Tournament theory emphasizes that job hierarchy 
provides incentives to employees and firms use promotions as a mechanism of rewarding 
strong employee performance. Large pay increases induce employees to work hard to 
increase their chance of getting promoted. The key inference from tournament theory is 
that it is efficient to pay the winner considerably more than the losers in this internal 
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labor market competition, even if the winner is only marginally better than the losers.
1
 A 
few supportive empirical studies include Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993), Eriksson 
(1999), and Bognanno (2001), who find that the compensation gaps between a CEO and 
lower level executives increase with the number of potential competitors for the CEO 
position. Kale et al (2009) document that events lowering non-CEO executives’ 
promotion probabilities are associated with larger compensation gaps. 
Nevertheless, the few studies that empirically support the predictions of 
tournament theory in explaining compensation policies have come under strong criticism. 
Scholars in economics, law and management have pointed out that other plausible 
theories emphasizing relative productivity yield observationally equivalent predictions 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1988, Gibbs 1995, Prendergast 1999, Anabtawi 2005). For 
example, the widely documented positive association between the number of competitors 
and the promotion prize in the above mentioned empirical studies can be explained by a 
productivity model with multiplicative effect: CEOs in charge of more subordinates 
should be paid substantially more, because their productivity affects the productivity of a 
larger number of lower level executives. Some evidence in Kale et al (2009), while 
consistent with tournament theory predictions, can also be explained by productivity 
theories of compensation. For instance, they interpret evidence that hiring an outside 
CEO leads to a larger compensation gap as consistent with tournament theory.  Their 
rationale is that the appointment of a new CEO reduces the subsequent promotion 
probabilities of non-CEO executives and consequently, a larger compensation gap is 
                                                          
1
 The most controversial implication of tournament theory is that high CEO compensation does not 
necessarily reflect CEO performance, but rather it is chosen to motivate other senior executives in the 
corporation. 
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needed to keep the incentives of non-CEO top executives from weakening. Yet, this piece 
of evidence is also consistent with the predictions of productivity theory since a new 
CEO hired from outside tends to occur when a firm is performing poorly, so we should 
expect the new CEO to have better performance than the departing CEO, leading to an 
expected increase in the compensation gap as the CEO compensation rises. Thus, we are 
currently left without a clear understanding of whether tournament theory really has any 
empirical validity. 
In this study, we address this limitation in the existing literature by developing 
stronger tests of tournament theory where we differentiate its predictions from those of 
productivity theory in explaining the compensation gap. In the first test, we examine 
compensation gaps prior to a CEO turnover and test the predictions of the two theories. 
Tournament theory relies on the incentives provided by promotion opportunities and 
hence, its effect should be most pronounced when a “tournament is on”. If firms follow 
compensation schemes based on tournament theory, then we should expect the winning 
prize, measured by the compensation gap between the CEO and executives competing for 
the prize of CEO succession (hereafter we refer to Qualified Internal Candidates, or 
QICs), to be more sensitive to factors that markedly alter the odds of being promoted, i.e. 
the number of qualified candidates. Taking this implication one step further, this effect 
should be even stronger if CEO turnover is largely anticipated, such as planned or 
mandatory CEO retirement. Alternatively, if the compensation gap reflects superior CEO 
productivity and a multiplicative productivity effect on subordinates, then we should 
expect to find that the number of candidates, which also serves as a measure of a CEO’s 
span of control, has a weaker impact on the compensation gap around the time a CEO is 
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expected to step down.  The reason is that a CEO’s influence over subordinates is likely 
to weaken in the CEO transition period, so the CEO productivity effect on subordinates is 
likely to weaken, even if CEO ability and effort are unchanged.   
The second test involves selecting a group of firms most (least) likely to foster a 
CEO succession contest, and then testing the predictions of tournament pay arrangements 
for these particular firms.  The rationale for this approach is that a firm’s incentive 
mechanisms are heavily rooted in its contracting environment.
2
  Thus, one would expect 
that some firms would consider it more advantageous to implement a tournament 
incentive scheme and structure their promotion strategies and compensation 
arrangements in a framework consistent with tournament theory. For instance, Cichello et 
al (2009) finds that in firms with well-defined organizational structures and two large and 
similar size divisions, executive promotions appear to be based on a contest between the 
two senior executives.  Galanter and Palay (1991) document that tournament type 
competition is prevalent among lawyers in promotions to partner. We expect tournament 
pay arrangements to be most relevant in firms likely to use a succession contest to 
promote executives. Tournament pay arrangements are also more likely in large, multi-
segment firms that have a “deep bench” of high-capable senior executives. Finding 
significantly stronger effects of the tournament variables in explaining the compensation 
gap for the subsample of firms most likely to run succession contests (termed 
tournament-oriented firms) would then support the theory having empirical content. It 
could also explain why tests based on a broader sample of firms yield only weak support 
for tournament theory. 
                                                          
2
 This is known as the selection effect of compensation contracts in the labor economics literature. 
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We find similar evidence to prior studies when tournament theory is tested alone. 
However, the evidence supporting tournament theory is largely lost once we control for 
the confounding effects of productivity theory in our analysis.  Our findings that 
tournament theory predictions are not strengthened when we narrow our analysis either to 
periods prior to the departure of incumbent CEOs, or to firms most prone to succession 
contests, raise serious questions about the empirical validity of tournament theory. To be 
specific, we find that the effects of the variables capturing tournament intensity are 
actually weaker over the three years before CEO turnovers. The results are similar when 
we restrict CEO turnovers to planned retirements. Among the firms most likely to 
sponsor succession contests, we find the coefficients of the tournament intensity variables 
are insignificantly different from the coefficients estimated using the remaining firms. 
Furthermore, the overall explanatory power of those variables is much lower than that of 
variables measuring executive productivity in both tournament-oriented and non-
tournament-oriented firms.   
In contrast to these negative findings, our investigation finds that the cross-
sectional variation in the compensation gaps of top executives can largely be explained 
by optimal contracting based on the varying productivity of individual executives, which 
indicates that firms attempt to link executive compensation to an individual’s 
productivity. Using a set of variables that capture several dimensions of executive 
productivity, we find that the compensation gap between a CEO and QICs is lower as the 
average productivity of these QICs rises relative to that of the CEO.  
The measurement of executive productivity is perhaps the biggest challenge to an 
empirical examination of compensation arrangements implied by productivity theory: the 
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outputs of individual employees are largely unobservable, especially for those in senior 
managerial positions. Nevertheless, we can observe signals that capture different aspects 
of an agent’s productivity, including experience, past performance, job responsibilities, 
and external labor market certification. Mincer (1974) observes that employees 
voluntarily invest in increasing their human capital through on-the-job training
3
 as a 
means of enhancing the future rates of return to their employment. The theory predicts 
that productivity increases with greater work experience. Based on symmetric learning 
models (i.e. Jovanovic 1979), employers periodically update their beliefs about individual 
worker abilities based on their recent performance in their jobs or on specific assignments. 
Hence, individual worker’s past performance and achievements are positively related to 
productivity. Lastly, executives whose managerial ability is recognized by the external 
labor market are expected to exhibit higher productivity than executives whose abilities 
go unrecognized. Of course, the multiplicative effect of manager productivity can mean 
that higher level managers inherently have higher productivity given their positions of 
greater responsibilities. 
We construct four measures of individual non-CEO executive productivity based 
on the above perspective
4
 and find that they explain a significant portion of the cross 
sectional variation in the compensation gaps. More importantly, we find that prior to a 
CEO turnover senior executive productivity measures have a stronger ability to explain 
the observed reduction in the compensation gap. This is consistent with compensation 
being determined by executive productivity levels. In addition, we find clear evidence for 
                                                          
3
 Education is another means to improve human capital, although it is less relevant for seasoned employees, 
especially senior executives. 
4
 We do not use firm performance measures such as ROA or stock returns as proxies for an individual 
executive’s productivity because these firm level measures are the results of group efforts, and it is unclear 
how much each individual executive contributes to firm performance. 
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a productivity based explanation of the compensation gap, even among the tournament-
oriented firms. More specifically, all four of the managerial productivity measures are 
significantly correlated with the compensation gap in the directions predicted by theory. 
Productivity variables also have larger impacts on the model’s overall goodness of fit 
than do tournament variables: when we drop the productivity variables from the 
regression, the R-squared falls by 39 percent, whereas when we drop the tournament 
variables from the regression, the R-squared falls by only 5 percent.  
The absence of a significant tournament effect in determining the compensation 
gap is perhaps not that surprising. First of all, the various benefits of being a CEO, 
including the power, prestige, and the enormous private perks, already provide strong 
incentives to non-CEOs to compete for promotion to CEO. Thus, it is unclear why firms 
would find it necessary to structure executive compensation in such a costly way as 
modeled by tournament theory, i.e. to overpay the CEO to heighten the incentives of the 
lower level employees. Second, Lazear (1989) argues that a tournament compensation 
arrangement may actually be harmful to the firm when close collaboration among 
executives is critical. Aggressive competition among senior executives could lead to 
sabotage of a competitor’s initiatives or projects and could result in inefficient team 
coordination, which is detrimental to overall firm performance.  This is likely to be 
especially detrimental in technology intensive firms (i.e. Siegel and Hambrick 2005). 
Lastly, several studies (i.e. Parrino 1997, Frydman and Jenter 2010, Murphy and 
Zabojnik 2007) document a rising trend toward hiring CEOs from outside the firm, 
suggesting that the managerial labor market is gradually shifting its preferences to 
general managerial skills, which are transferable across companies. This increased 
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mobility of top executives can attenuate the tournament incentives associated with 
internal promotions, potentially weakening the importance of tournament incentives in 
recent years.  
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, this paper adds to a 
growing body of literature on the pay distribution among top executives, i.e. Anabtawi 
(2005), Kale et al (2009), Aggarwal et al (2010), Bebchuk et al (2011),  Chen et al (2011),  
Burns et al (2012), Kini et al (2012), and Coles et al (2012). Unlike these earlier studies, 
we simultaneously examine two major economic theories predicted to shape the 
hierarchical pay structure of top corporate executives, namely tournament theory and 
productivity theory.
5
 
Second, existing empirical tests of tournament theory are subject to the 
confounding effects of productivity differences among senior executives, which go 
uncontrolled for.  Not surprisingly, they report mixed results.  To address this weakness, 
we construct two new tests that enable us to distinguish between the predictions of these 
two important theories. By examining economic environments where the two theories 
have different implications, we find little evidence to support tournament theory, 
suggesting that prior studies reporting a tournament effect are capturing the effect of 
productivity differentials between a CEO and the other top executives.  
Third, this study adds to the literature that examines performance-based 
compensation of corporate executives, often associated with Jensen and Murphy (1990). 
In their study, Jensen and Murphy examine whether CEO compensation reflects changes 
                                                          
5
 Kale et al (2009) simultaneously consider the effects of tournament incentive and performance based 
incentives on firm performance. However, when examining the determinants of the compensation gap, they 
only test the tournament effect and ignore other performance incentives. 
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in firm performance, a crude measure of CEO productivity. We use four more refined 
measures of individual executive productivity, which allows us to control for productivity 
differences across top executives within the same firm.
6
 We find the compensation gap is 
linked to the differential productivity of senior executives and provide evidence which 
supports performance based explanation for executive compensation arrangements.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical design to 
differentiate the two theories and testable predictions. Section 3 describes the sample and 
variable construction. Section 4 reports the empirical results in terms of relative 
importance of tournament and productivity theories. Robustness analysis is presented in 
Section 5 and section 6 presents our conclusions. 
 
Empirical Strategy and Testable Hypothesis 
Prendergast (1999) points out a potentially serious identification problem faced by 
empirical studies of incentive contracts. The predictions of one specific model are often 
equally consistent with other plausible theories. Thus, many observed phenomena can be 
explained empirically by multiple theories. In this section, we propose two experiments 
which clearly differentiate and test the relative importance of two major theories of 
compensation, namely tournament theory and productivity theory that can both explain 
the hierarchical compensation gap in top management teams. We first briefly explain the 
                                                          
6 To be specific, we evaluate executives productivity based on: 1) their past performance inferred from their 
past compensation growth; 2) tenure at their current positions; 3) their estimated probability of being 
promoted to CEO, based on observable characteristics; and 4) external labor market certification 
represented by holding one or more outside directorships in unaffiliated firms. Further elaboration of the 
four measures is presented in section 3.3. 
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basic predictions of the two theories, and then sketch out two experiments where the two 
theories have potentially different empirical implications. 
Basic Predictions of Tournament Theory and Productivity Theory 
Tournament theory has two major empirical implications. First, when the 
promotion probability is low, a higher compensation gap is needed to provide sufficient 
incentives to lower level managers. Moreover, when the promotion probability is too 
small, the competing candidates have an incentive to “give up” and hence, an even larger 
pay increase is required to overcome this negative incentive. Therefore, the theory 
predicts a convex relationship between the compensation gap and the number of QICs 
competing for promotion. Second, the compensation gap is predicted to be larger when 
the firm’s operating environment is noisy and the random component of manager 
productivity is large. A noisy environment makes it more difficult to observe manager 
effort and effectiveness and hence, a larger incentive is needed to effectively reduce 
potential shirking behavior by managers. 
H1 a:  Under tournament theory, the compensation gap is increasing in the 
number of QICs and its squared term. The compensation gap is also increasing in the 
volatility of stock returns.  
The fundamental prediction of productivity theory is that employees are paid 
according to their contribution to firm output. Hence, better performing QICs should 
lower the observed compensation gap, everything else being equal. The large skewness 
observed in the distribution of compensation relative to the distribution of employee 
abilities can be explained by productivity theory with multiplicative effect (Rosen 1982). 
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This variant of productivity theory can also explain the phenomenon that compensation 
within a firm increases with positions of greater authority and control, although an 
individual executive’s ability cannot change overnight with a promotion. Higher level 
manager productivity can have indirect impacts on employee productivity at all lower 
levels, and hence more talented people can make larger contributions to firm performance 
if they are placed in higher positions with responsibilities over more resources. Therefore, 
this theory generates the same prediction as tournament theory, namely that the number 
of QICs underneath a CEO is positively associated with the compensation gap, because 
CEO productivity increases with his or her span of control. However, different from 
tournament theory, this productivity model with multiplicative effect predicts a concave 
relation between CEO productivity and a CEO’s span of control, due to the limited time a 
CEO can spend supervising subordinates. Therefore, the quadratic term on the number of 
QICs is negative under this theory. 
H1 b: Under productivity theory, the compensation gap is decreasing in a QIC’s 
productivity. Moreover, under the assumption of a multiplicative effect, the 
compensation gap is increasing in the number of QICs, but at a decreasing rate. 
Compensation Gap Prior to CEO Turnovers 
The first experiment we carry out to differentiate tournament and productivity 
effects is to test these two theories when there are promotion opportunities for QICs. The 
fundamental assumption of tournament theory is that employees are strongly motivated 
by promotion opportunities, and larger expected compensation gains on promotion 
induce greater effort on the part of employees. Intuitively, the tournament incentive 
13 
 
should be stronger and succession contests should be more common in firms that 
emphasize internal promotions. Therefore, an increasing occurrence of internal CEO 
appointments would suggest stronger tournament incentives. However, the CEO turnover 
literature documents an increasing rate of external CEO appointments in the US: 
Specifically, in 1970 only about 13% of CEOs are hired from outside the firm, while this 
rate increases to 34% in the 90s (Parrino 1997).  
More rigorously, we expect employees to be most motivated by tournament 
incentive when a promotion opportunity is near.  If QICs anticipate that the current CEO 
will remain in office for many years, then the incentives provided by the internal 
tournament are greatly reduced, simply because QIC efforts are almost irrelevant to their 
chance of being promoted. A potentially stronger experiment is to look for a tournament 
effect on the compensation gaps shortly before CEO turnover events, when QICs have 
the greatest incentives to compete with each other for promotion and their chance of 
winning largely depends on their own efforts.
 7
  Under tournament theory, we expect a 
much stronger impact of the succession contest on the compensation gap prior to CEO 
turnovers than in the other time periods. Specifically, the compensation gap should be 
more sensitive to the number of QICs and stock return volatility during this transition 
period. 
The tournament effect is likely to be more pronounced in shaping executive 
compensation when a CEO replacement is expected due to a planned retirement. 
Companies are most likely to have a well-planned CEO succession strategy and run a 
                                                          
7 In our main tests, we look at the compensation gaps within three years prior to a CEO turnover event, and 
we check the compensation gaps within five years prior to CEO turnover for robustness. 
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contest among potential candidates when the incumbent CEO is approaching mandatory 
retirement age. In situations where CEOs are forced to resign due to extremely bad 
performance, the hiring of new CEOs is less likely to depend on the result of such 
succession contest for two reasons. First, given the urgency associated with extremely 
bad firm performance, a board of directors has little time to select a new CEO. Thus, a 
non-CEO officer director or even the chair of the board may step in as an interim person. 
Second, bad firm performance is an indicator of a poorly performing management team, 
which means a board of directors would be more likely to seek an outsider as the CEO to 
turn around the current negative performance. Thus, we expect a stronger tournament 
effect on the compensation gap prior to a planned retirement than a forced CEO turnover 
due to bad performance. 
H2 a: Under tournament theory, the effect of the number of QICs and the 
volatility of stock returns should be stronger prior to CEO turnovers, especially for 
planned CEO retirements. 
Alternatively, productivity theory predicts that executive compensation 
differences between two adjacent levels of the managerial hierarchy reflect differences in 
average executive productivity. Prior to turnovers, CEO productivity is generally lower 
because of either declining incentives as a CEO retirement nears or other causes that lead 
to bad firm performance. Furthermore, the positive externality of CEO productivity on 
subordinates’ productivity is also likely to decline as a CEO’s influence over 
subordinates weakens near these major transition periods. Thus, productivity theory with 
multiplicative effect predicts that the impact of a CEO’s span of control, captured by the 
number of QICs, should decline prior to CEO turnovers. On the other hand, QIC 
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productivity is likely to rise prior to CEO turnovers, because QICs have greater 
incentives to reveal their true capabilities and to send stronger signals of their ability to 
the board of directors. As a consequence, before a CEO turnover, the variables measuring 
QIC productivity should have greater effects on reducing compensation gaps for two 
reasons. First, observed performance measures are likely to underestimate changes in 
QIC productivity, since the extra effort QICs exert to win a promotion is unlikely to 
reflect itself immediately in changes in observable performance measures. Second, a 
board of directors is likely to rely on observable and objective signals to evaluate QICs 
when choosing the next CEO, because these measures are easier to compare across 
candidates than more qualitative measures, which are particularly difficult for outside 
directors to observe. 
H2 b: Under productivity theory, the effect of the number of QICs on the 
compensation gap should be weaker prior to CEO turnovers.  In contrast, QIC 
productivity effects on reducing the compensation gap should be stronger before CEO 
turnovers. 
Tournament-Oriented Firms 
Executive compensation policy can have a selection effect in that it is designed 
partly to attract the type of managers that firms prefer based on their contracting 
environment. It is not surprising that some firms would find it more advantageous to 
choose tournament incentive plans over other alternative incentive structures. Thus, our 
second empirical approach involves identifying firms most likely to foster succession 
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contests, and test if tournament theory is more relevant in explaining the compensation 
policies across the top executive ranks of those firms.  
Although we can sometimes infer from news stories that firms have a list of 
candidates whom they are considering as a CEO’s successor, more generally succession 
plans are largely unobservable. This makes it difficult to clearly identify which firms are 
pursuing succession contest strategy (termed tournament-oriented firms hereafter). 
Studies of CEO succession plans suggest that one reasonable strategy for identifying 
tournament-oriented firms is to look for firms where the number of qualified internal 
candidates is greater than one, since a succession contest requires at least two inside 
QICs.
8
 The validity of this approach relies first, on whether the algorithm is effective at 
identifying inside candidates and second, on whether the succession contests are correctly 
timed. One challenge to identifying succession contests is that it is possible for a firm to 
currently have a single QIC because the succession contest occurred in a prior period and 
one candidate decisively won.
9
 In this study, we employ a new empirical strategy to 
identify tournament-oriented firms using publicly available data that overcomes the 
above mentioned challenge. 
Our approach to identify firms using succession contests relies on the 
characteristics of firm turnover decisions. The strategy behind our identification 
algorithm is to argue that appointing an insider as CEO suggests that some sort of 
competition among inside candidates was taking place before the CEO turnover date. In 
                                                          
8
 Mobbs and Raheja (2010). 
9
 One alternative approach to identifying tournament-oriented firms is to send out survey questionnaires on 
a firm’s current and past succession processes. However, given the large amount of time needed to obtain a 
relatively large sample, this approach is not easily pursued. Furthermore, a large portion of the sample 
would be lost due to non-responses, or we would then be forced to use a similar approach to the one for 
categorizing unresponsive firms. 
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cases where the CEO is replaced by an outsider, there are two possibilities. First, the 
recruiting plan may heavily favor an outsider so that the board of directors focuses its 
search on outside candidates, and not surprisingly, a qualified outsider is appointed to the 
position. Second, outside candidates are introduced into the competition together with 
inside candidates, and the outsider wins. In the first scenario, although a succession 
contest may take place among several outside candidates, it does not influence the 
compensation structure of the executives inside the firm. Hence, these firms are not 
classified as tournament-oriented for the purpose of testing the tournament effect on 
senior manager compensation. In the second scenario, insiders also compete for the CEO 
position, and tournament incentives do motivate inside candidates to seek the CEO prize. 
Therefore, we treat these firms as tournament-oriented. In examining firms where an 
outsider defeats the inside candidates (the second scenario), we look for appointments of 
external CEOs where at least one existing non-CEO officer is on the board. This 
approach relies on prior evidence that internal CEO candidates are likely to be inside 
directors. Realizing that succession contests can take place well before an actual CEO 
replacement, we look back as far as three years
10
 before the actual CEO turnover for each 
tournament-oriented firm in order to correctly time the occurrence of the succession 
contest. 
After identifying tournament-oriented firms based on the algorithm sketched 
above, we estimate a logit model to determine the factors that influence firms to self-
select into the tournament-oriented category. The relative importance of tournament and 
productivity theories in explaining the compensation gap is then examined for the 
                                                          
10
 We look back as far as five years in robustness test. 
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predicted tournament-oriented firms, where we explicitly control for the private 
information associated with the succession contest choice by adding the inverse Mill’s 
ratio obtained from the logit estimation.
11
 If tournament theory has a first order effect in 
determining the compensation gap in tournament-oriented firms, we should expect to find 
the tournament variables to be more important statistically in these firms than in the 
remaining firms. Alternatively, if productivity theory has a first order effect in 
determining the compensation gap, we should observe a strong productivity effect in both 
groups. 
H3 a:  Under tournament theory, the effects of tournament variables (i.e. the 
number of QICs and its squared term, and the volatility of stock returns) on the 
compensation gap should be larger in the subsample of predicted tournament-oriented 
firms than in the remaining subsample of firms. 
H3 b: Under productivity theory, the effects of tournament variables should at 
best have equally weak effects in both subsamples of firms. Moreover we should observe 
that QIC productivity has a strong effect on the compensation gap in both subsamples. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 We use predicted tournament-oriented firms based on the probability estimated from the logit model 
using 0.5 as the cutoff point. The reason to use predicted tournament-oriented firms instead of the identified 
tournament-oriented firms is to partly address the potential misspecification in our identification algorithm. 
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Data Source, Variable Construction and Sample Description 
 
Data Source 
We obtain top executive officers and their compensation data from Compustat’s 
Execucomp for the period from 1993 to 2005. Observations in year 1992 are excluded 
due to the database’s very incomplete coverage in that year. Since FAS123R significantly 
changed the reporting rule on equity based compensation starting in year 2006,
12
 our 
sample ends in 2005 so that equity-based compensation is estimated on a consistent basis. 
Identification of the CEO is primarily based on the Chief Executive Officer code 
(CEOANN=CEO). The sample only includes firms with a clearly identified CEO and at 
least three non-CEO senior executives reported in Execucomp. Firm accounting 
information and stock return information are taken from Compustat and CRSP 
respectively. Boards of directors and other corporate governance characteristics are 
obtained from RiskMetrics. Because RiskMetrics begins reporting board of director 
information in year 1996, our major tests are based on the 10-year period from 1996 to 
2005.  
Definition of Qualified Internal Candidates in the Tournament 
Although firms report at least top five executive in their proxy statements, not all 
of them are equally important. Hierarchical levels exist even among top management 
teams. For example, immediately below the CEO, there are usually one to four senior 
                                                          
12
 Specifically, the FASB began requiring that the public entities report the cost of all employee stock 
options and other equity based compensation based on their current fair value. 
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executives, followed by other executives further down the hierarchy. Only executives 
immediately below the CEO are treated as potential candidates for CEO succession. We 
define these executives as qualified internal candidates (QICs), where they must meet the 
following two criteria in order to be considered serious CEO candidates: (1) they must be 
younger than 65 years old;
13
 (2) they must either be an officer-director or have total 
compensation within 10 percent of the highest paid non-CEO executive.
 
In robustness, 
the definition of QICs is relaxed to include non-CEO executives whose total 
compensation is within 20 percent of the highest paid non-CEO senior executive. Officer-
directors generally have greater abilities and knowledge of a firm’s overall operations. 
Hence, they are more likely to be considered potential successors to the CEO. Also, the 
higher paid executives are likely to have greater responsibilities and report directly to the 
CEO.  
Former CEOs are eliminated from the pool of QICs, since they are less likely to 
be competing for the CEO position a second time. Other less qualified senior executives, 
who are one level lower in the hierarchy than the QICs, are termed level three managers. 
The three management levels in the executive team provide a rich setting to test 
tournament incentives. Table 1 Panel A summarizes the typical titles of the QICs. We 
find 11 percent of QICs are divisional heads. The remaining QICs are executives with 
major oversight responsibilities, including presidents and vice presidents (84.50 percent), 
COOs (21.66 percent), CFOs (18.61 percent), Vice Chairmen (11.24 percent), and others 
(3 percent).
14
 In terms of predictive power, this algorithm successfully identifies most 
new CEOs promoted internally: among the inside CEO appointments over the sample 
                                                          
13
 In robustness, I use 62 years old as the cutoff point. 
14
 The sum of these percentages exceeds 100 because many executives hold more than one title. 
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period, 80 percent are identified as QICs in the prior year, of which 63 percent were 
inside directors.  Moreover, a logistic regression of the probability of promotion to the 
CEO position suggests that QICs are 3.24 times more likely to be promoted than non-
QIC level three executives.
15
   
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of QICs 
 
Panel A 
    Total number of QICs  35518  
QIC titles 
  
Number Percentage 
Divisional managers 
 
3862 10.87% 
Oversight managers  31656 89.13% 
 
President and Vice President 26748 84.50% 
 
Vice Chair 3567 11.24% 
 
COO 
 
6857 21.66% 
 
CFO 
 
5909 18.67% 
 Other Chief Executives 953 3% 
 
 
 
Table 1 Panel B shows the distribution of the number of QICs in the sample under 
two alternative definitions. One notices that a large portion of sample firms (over 52%) 
                                                          
15
 The left-hand side of the logistic regression is a dummy indicating whether this executive is promoted to 
the CEO position in the future (within three years). The explanatory variables include an indicator variable 
that denotes whether this executive qualifies as QIC, executive age, and executive gender. 
Panel B 
    
 
Number of firm-year observations 
Number of QICs Definition 1 Robust Definition 
 
Freq Percentage Freq Percentage 
1 6998 52.18% 5298 39.51% 
2 4172 31.11% 4241 31.63% 
3 1678 12.51% 2514 18.75% 
4 514 3.83% 1229 9.16% 
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have only one QIC.  In these single candidate firms, a contest for the CEO succession is 
less likely to occur. However, it is also possible that a succession contest took place at an 
earlier stage, and the winner becomes the designated successor.  This designated 
successor usually has a much higher probability of being promoted and receives higher 
compensation than other non-CEO executives.
16
 In robustness test, we exclude firms with 
designated successors from the multiple QICs tests of tournament theory. More than 44 
percent of sample firms have two or three QICs, while firms having four or more QICs 
are very rare. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence on the size of CEO contests.
 17
 
Measure of the Compensation Gap 
The compensation gap between executives in adjacent hierarchical levels is based 
on each executive’s total compensation, including salary, bonus, other annual pay, the 
total value of current restricted stock grants, the Black-Scholes value of any current stock 
option grants, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation (as reported in 
Execucomp item TDC1). We further separate total compensation into short term (salary, 
bonus, and other annual pay) and long term compensation (all other components). The 
compensation gap between the CEO and the qualified QICs is measured by the logarithm 
of the ratio of CEO compensation to the median compensation of QICs. By using the 
ratio rather than dollar difference to measure the compensation gap, we control for the 
average compensation level of all the senior executives, a measure that is usually highly 
                                                          
16
 Studies of firm succession plans and potential candidate pools include Naveen (2006), Mobbs and Raheja 
(2010). 
17
 In GlaxoSmithKline’s 2007 CEO race, they announce three candidates. The incumbent CEO at that time 
commented that the number of candidates is larger than usual. 
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correlated with firm size.
18
 Moreover, taking logarithms of the ratios reduces the 
skewness of the dependent variable.
19
  It also helps to address the concern that the 
relationship between the compensation gap and some key explanatory variables might be 
non-linear.
20
 To summarize, we examine three measures of the compensation gap 
formally defined in the following equations.
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Nevertheless, we also use the log of dollar difference in compensation for robustness. To be specific, the 
compensation gap is defined alternatively as: 
Total Gap= Log(total CEO compensation – median total compensation of QIC) 
Short-term Gap = Log (short-term CEO compensation – median short-term compensation of QIC) 
Long-term Gap = Log (long-term CEO compensation – median long-term compensation of QIC) 
19
 The skewness of the distributions of the three compensation gap measures is -0.7, -0.6 and -1.7 
respectively.  
20
 For example, in Gabaix and Landier (2008) the CEO compensation is a power function of firm size.  
21 The compensation gaps between level 2 and level 3 managers are calculated in a similar manner. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Compensation Gap Measures 
  
Mean Median N 
Compensation variables 
    CEO total compensation  ($ 000) 
 
4426.29 2301.62 13410 
CEO short-term compensation ($ 000) 
 
1337.38 958.98 13410 
CEO long-term compensation ($ 000) 
 
3100.36 1193.01 13410 
Median QIC total compensation ($ 000) 
 
2371.47 1342.18 13410 
Median QIC short- term compensation ($ 000) 725.81 538.3 13410 
Median QIC long- term compensation ($ 000) 
 
1622.15 718.37 13410 
Annual CEO total compensation growth 
 
0.57 0.06 10916 
CEO alignment 
 
3.42 1.8 10548 
Median QIC alignment  1 0.55 11430 
Compensation gap between CEO and QICs 
    Total gap (dollar term, $ 000) 
 
1989.33 834.74 13410
Total  gap  (ratio) 
 
2.18 1.79 13410 
Short-term gap(dollar term,$ 000) 
 
599.27 385 13410 
Short- term  gap (ratio) 
 
2.01 1.77 13410 
Long -term gap (dollar term,$ 000) 
 
1406.3 386.12 13410 
Long -term  gap (ratio) 
 
3.78 1.84 13410 
Compensation gap between QICs and level 3 
managers 
    Total gap (dollar term, $ 000) 
 
1067.51 446.63 13410
Total gap  (ratio) 
 
2.1 1.03 13410 
Short- term gap(dollar term,$ 000) 
 
229.05 139.37 13410 
Short- term gap (ratio) 
 
1.45 1.34 13410 
Long- term gap (dollar term,$ 000) 
 
817.29 259.64 13410 
Long- term gap (ratio) 
 
5.95 1.87 13410 
 
 
Total Gap = Log (total CEO compensation / median total compensation of QICs) 
Short-term Gap = Log (short-term CEO compensation / median short-term 
compensation of QICs) 
Long-term Gap = Log (long-term CEO compensation / median long-term 
compensation of QICs) 
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Table 2 shows that non-CEO executives are generally paid less than CEOs. On 
average, a CEO’s total compensation is more than twice that of the median QIC. The 
long-term compensation gap ratio is even larger, which is on average 3.78, with a median 
value of 1.84. In terms of dollar amount, the average total compensation difference 
between the CEO and the median QIC is $1.989 million, and about two thirds of the 
difference comes from differences in long-term compensation. Our compensation gap is 
generally lower than that reported in Kale et al (2009). The reason appears to be that Kale 
et al (2009) treat all non-CEO executives reported in proxy statements as CEO candidates, 
while we only include those who have more important roles and are better paid and 
qualified to be CEO succession candidates. Figures 1 and 2 highlight the trends in CEO 
compensation, QIC compensation, and their compensation gap over the 1993-2005 period.  
Although the compensation of both CEO and non-CEO senior executives shows a 
significant rise over the 13-year period, CEO compensation exhibits a faster rise. Hence, 
the compensation gap also rises noticeably, where the average total compensation gap in 
dollars doubles, and the average long-term compensation gap triples in size. 
 
 
Figure 1a Median Total Compensation Year By Year ($000) 
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Figure 1b Median Short-Term Compensation Year By Year ($000) 
 
Figure 1c Median Long-Term Compensation Year By Year ($000) 
 
Figure 2a Median Total Gap Measured In Dollar Term and In Ratio 
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Figure 2b Median Short-Term Gap Measured In Dollar Term and In Ratio 
 
Figure 2c Median Long-Term Gap Measured In Dollar Term and In Ratio 
 
Productivity Variables 
The critical issue in testing productivity theory is that executive productivity is 
unobserved. What can be observed is a set of measures correlated with executive 
productivity. Based on prior theories and empirical evidence, we use four measures of 
executive productivity. First, human capital theories argue that worker productivity 
increases with work experience, but at a decreasing rate. Using personnel data within a 
firm, Gibbs (1995) shows that employee performance first increases, then decreases with 
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tenure. Therefore, we use an executive’s position tenure, measured by the number of 
years he or she spends in the current position as our first measure of productivity. To 
capture concavity in the relationship, we also include the position tenure variable squared. 
This is likely to be a conservative measure of QIC productivity, because we cannot 
observe how long the QIC stays in the position beyond our sample period. 
Baker et al (1994) document that employees with faster rates of growth in 
compensation are more likely to be promoted and receive promotions more rapidly, 
which is consistent with symmetric learning theory that employers primarily learn about 
worker productivity from their past performance (Jovanovic 1979). Thus, we use the 
average raise in compensation over the past three years as a second proxy for an 
executive’s short-term past performance.22 As a third proxy for a QIC’s expected 
productivity, we estimate the propensity to be promoted to CEO of this firm or another 
S&P 1500 firm over the next three years. The promotion propensity is estimated from a 
logit model, where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a QIC is promoted 
within three years and the explanatory variables include a COO indicator, a CFO 
indicator, a president indicator, a vice-president indicator, a vice-chairman indicator,  an 
inside director indicator, QIC’s current position tenure, and the log of QIC age. Our 
fourth measure is the number of independent directorships held by the QIC.
23
 Masulis 
and Mobbs (2011) document that non-CEO executives recognized by the external labor 
market for their managerial talent by outside board appointments at unaffiliated firms are 
more likely to become a CEO at their own or another firm than other non-CEO 
                                                          
22 If the executive has less than three years of annual compensation, we use all the available observations in 
Execucomp to compute his or her compensation growth rate.  If the executives has only one year of 
compensation, then we use the average compensation growth of other top executives in the same firm to 
proxy his or her compensation growth.  
23
 An independent directorship refers to an outside directorship in an unaffiliated firm.   
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executives. Table 3 reports summary statistics for these four productivity measures. QICs 
hold their current positions for an average of under 4 years. The median annual 
compensation growth of QICs is 16%. The mean and median promotion propensities are 
8% and 7% respectively. About 9% of firms have at least one QIC serving as an 
independent director of another firm. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of QIC Productivity Measures 
 
 
Identify CEO Turnovers 
CEO turnover is identified by a CEO name change from the prior year. Whether 
the new CEO is promoted from inside or outside the firm is determined by comparing the 
time this person joins the firm and the time that he or she is appointed as CEO. If he or 
she is a firm employee for more than one year prior to becoming CEO, then the CEO 
appointment is defined as an inside promotion, otherwise it is defined as an outside 
appointment. For new CEOs where we lack information on their prior tenure at the firm, 
we use the Forbes business profile and Marquis Who’s Who on the Web to determine if a 
new CEO is an inside or outside appointment. 
Productivity measures of QICs Mean Median N 
Tenure as QIC 
 
3.83 3.5 13410 
Compensation growth 
 
0.64 0.16 13410 
Promotion propensity 
 
0.08 0.07 13410 
Outside independent directorships   0.09 0 13410 
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Sample Description 
We report the descriptive statistics of our sample in Table 4 Panel A and B. The 
definition of each variable is given in Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 99 and one percent levels.  
Firms in our sample are relative large and complex, with average total assets of 
$4.714 billion and more than two business segments. The mean and median ROA is 3 
percent and 5 percent respectively. The average firm has 9 directors on its board and 
more than 60% are classified as independent directors. About 8% of CEOs are firm 
founders and another 3% of CEOs belong to founding families.  The average CEO in our 
sample is 55 years old and has held the position for 7 years.  Lastly, 63% of CEOs also 
serve as the board’s chairperson. We find that executive pay-for-performance sensitivity 
of our sample is similar in magnitude to prior work.
24
 A hundred dollars increase in 
shareholder value leads to $3.42 and $1 increases in a CEO’s and QIC’s personal wealth 
respectively. This is comparable to Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), who find that pay-
for-performance sensitivity is higher for CEOs than non-CEO executives. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 The calculation of pay-for- performance sensitivity is explained in Appendix B. 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics of the Sample Firms 
 
 
 
  
Panel A 
    Firm characteristics 
 
Mean Median N 
Total assets ($ million) 
 
4714 1022 13406 
Firm age 
 
21.04 15 12975 
Number of business segments 
 
2.41 2 12472 
Leverage 
 
0.16 0.12 12180 
ROA 
 
0.03 0.05 13007 
Market to book ratio 3.17 2.23 13312 
Stock returns 
 
0.016 0.014 12735 
Volatility of stock returns  0.139 0.12 12774 
 
Panel B 
    Governance variables 
 
Mean Median N 
Board size 
 
9.14 9 10503 
Pct of independent directors 
 
0.64 0.66 10503 
Pct of busy independent directors 
 
0.10 0 10473 
IDB dummy 
 
0.13 
 
10503 
Non-CEO officers ownership  1.76% 0.27% 12933 
CEO age 
 
55.38 55 12649 
CEO tenure 
 
7.1 5 12545 
CEO chairman duality 
 
0.63 1 13410 
CEO ownership 
 
3.07% 0.34% 11246 
CEO is the founder 
 
0.08 
 
13410 
CEO belongs to founder family 
 
0.03 
 
13410 
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Table 5 Trend of Compensation Gap Prior to CEO Turnovers 
    No CEO Turnover   
Forced CEO 
Turnover   CEO Retirement 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
    Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Change of Dollar Term Total Compensation Gap 
($000) 303.69 92.46 
 
-239.96 -90.16 
 
-276.89 -59.56 
Change of Total Compensation Gap Ratio 
 
0.07 0.02 
 
-0.1 -0.07 
 
-0.17 -0.09 
Change of CEO Total Compensation($000) 
 
378.11 145.04 
 
-59.09 0 
 
134.27 46.57 
Change of Median QIC Total Compensation ($000) 81.5 57.62 
 
176.1 26.07 
 
411.49 132.29 
Percentage of QICs as Officer Director   39.62% 
  
55.04% 
  
68.58% 
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Horse Race between Tournament Theory and Productivity Theory: Empirical 
Results 
 
Testing Competing Contracting Theories Prior to CEO Turnovers 
When no CEO turnover is foreseen in the near term, we observe an upward trend 
in the compensation gap between the CEO and QICs as reported in Table 5: the 
compensation gap increases on average by $303,696 every year, with a median value of 
$92,467; the ratio of CEO total compensation over median QIC compensation on average 
also increases by 35% with a median of 1.2%. The growth in compensation gap is a result 
of relatively faster growth in CEO compensation compared to that of the QICs. The 
compensation gap starts to fall three years prior to CEO turnover, especially when a firm 
experiences a string of poor performance. For the median firm, the total annual 
compensation gap falls by $90,159. This largely reflects negative growth in CEO 
compensation.
25
 In contrast, although the compensation gap also narrows three years 
prior to CEO retirements, it is mainly because QICs’ annual compensation increases 
much more than CEO compensation does. The average (median) yearly compensation 
increase is $411,000 ($132,000) for the QICs and $134,276 ($46,572) for the CEO. The 
faster rise in QIC compensation prior to CEO retirements can partly be explained by the 
fact that QICs start to take on more responsibilities in this transition period. For example, 
about 48 percent of QICs that are not officer-director are appointed to the board within 
three years prior to CEO retirements. The ratio is 25 percent when the CEO is forced out 
                                                          
25
 CEO annual compensation falls by $59,090 annually on average three years prior to forced turnover due 
to bad performance. The annual compensation growth of QIC, although not negative, is much slower than 
in other time periods ($26,069 increase prior to forced turnovers versus an average increase of $57,627 
when there is no near term forced CEO turnover). 
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due to bad performance. This result is consistent with productivity based compensation 
policies where QICs get paid more when they take on more job responsibilities. 
Testing Tournament Predictions 
Table 6 presents multivariate tests of the ability of tournament theory to explain 
the total compensation gap, short-term compensation gap and long-term compensation 
gap.
26
 We then examine the explanatory power of tournament theory prior to a CEO 
turnover by interacting the tournament variables with an indicator variable for firms that 
experience CEO replacements in the following three years.
27
 As discussed earlier, 
tournament theory (H1a) predicts a convex relationship between the number of QICs and 
the compensation gap. Empirically, we find that the number of QICs has a significant 
positive association with all three forms of the compensation gaps, consistent with the 
findings in prior work.
28
 But, the negative coefficient on the quadratic term of the number 
of QICs suggests that its effect on the compensation gap diminishes and may even 
reverse when the number of QICs is large. We find similar results even when we limit 
our analysis to firms that have more than one QIC as reported in regression 4 of Table 6. 
Bognanno (2001) also finds a similar result. This evidence clearly contradicts the 
tournament prediction, but is in line with the predictions of productivity theory with 
multiplicative effect. The diminishing return on CEO time and energy in supervising their 
subordinates creates a concave relation between CEOs productivity and the number of 
subordinates they supervise. Firm performance volatility measured by the stock return  
                                                          
26
 We use OLS regression with year and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are cluster at firm level. 
27
 We also look at CEO turnovers in the next five years for robustness. 
28
 In unreported regressions, we find that the number of candidates increases the compensation gap by 
lowering the median pay of QICs rather than inflating CEO compensation. 
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Table 6 Tournament Effect on the Compensation Gap 
  Total Gap Short-Term Gap 
Long-Term 
Gap 
Total Gap 
Number of QICs 0.26 
***
 0.11 
***
 0.28 
***
 0.31 
***
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(Number of QICs)
2
 -0.03 
***
 -0.01 
*
 -0.02 
 
-0.04 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.014) 
 
Volatility of stock returns -0.68 
***
 -0.50 
***
 -0.50 
 
-0.47 
*
 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.28) 
 
Log (board size) 0.12 
**
 -0.01 
 
0.40 
***
 0.12 
*
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.07) 
 
Board independence -0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.013 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.027) 
 
Pct of busy ind. Directors -0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.07 
 
0.03 
 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.27) 
 
IDB indicator -0.09 
***
 -0.02 
 
-0.20 
***
 -0.10 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.03) 
 
CEO ownership -0.03 
***
 -0.02 
***
 -0.04 
***
 -0.03 
***
 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.005) 
 
E index 0.02 
**
 0.005 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
CEO Chairman 0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.03 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
 
CEO is the only officer director 0.16 
***
 0.14 
***
 0.17 
***
 0.28 
***
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
 
CEO is the founder -0.04 
 
-0.07 
*
 0.01 
 
-0.11 
**
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.05) 
 
CEO belongs to founder family -0.15 
***
 -0.15 
***
 -0.21 
*
 -0.15 
**
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.07) 
 
CEO alignment 0.03 
***
 0.01 
 
0.04 
***
 0.02 
**
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.008) 
 
QIC alignment -0.05 
*
 -0.03 
 
0.09 
 
-0.07 
*
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.038) 
 
Probability of VP resigning -0.10 
**
 -0.02 
 
-0.28 
**
 0.10 
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.09) 
 
Log (CEO tenure) -0.04 
***
 -0.02 
 
-0.13 
***
 0.03 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Log( industry median gap) 0.36 
***
 0.13 
***
 0.64 
***
 0.35 
***
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.028) 
 
Herfindahl index -0.09 
 
0.36 
 
0.99 
 
1.19 
 
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(1.77) 
 
(1.09) 
 
Industry homogeneity -0.58 
***
 -0.07 
 
-0.97 
**
 -0.16 
 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.26) 
 
Log ( lag total assets) 0.02 
**
 0.02 
**
 0.03 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.015) 
 
Lag (MTB) 0.001 
 
-0.007 
 
0.015 
 
-0.01 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
R&D Intensive Indicator -0.07 
***
 -0.006 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.03 
 
 (0.027)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.03)  
Number of business segments 0.000 
 
0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.007) 
 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of Observations 9366 
 
9366 
 
9366 
 
4155 
 
R-squared 0.21   0.19   0.15   0.31 
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standard deviation is negative and significantly associated with the total compensation 
gap (both in full sample and in the firms having more than one QIC) and the short-term 
compensation gap, again contradicting the tournament theory prediction in H1a.
29
 This 
observed association could alternatively be explained by a firm lowering pay disparity in 
an effort to retain talented managers by maintaining a lower pay disparity, especially 
when a firm is operating in a more volatile economic environment.
30
 However, this 
argument is not part of tournament theory. In summary, the results in Table 6 are 
inconsistent with hypothesis H1a of tournament theory.  
We next examine the tournament effect on the compensation gap of firms prior to 
CEO turnovers, reported in the Table 7 regressions estimates. In contrast to hypothesis 
H2a, we do not find that the effects of tournament variables become stronger in the CEO 
transition period when a succession contest is most likely to take place. The interaction 
term of the turnover indicator and the number of QICs is significantly negative, 
suggesting that the total compensation gap is less sensitive to the intensity of the 
succession contest. Moreover, the coefficient of squared number of QICs remains 
negative and significant prior to a CEO turnover, failing to support the tournament 
prediction that the compensation gap increases at an increasing rate with the size of the 
tournament. On the other hand, the finding that the curvature between the compensation 
gap and the number of QICs flattens prior to CEO turnovers can be interpreted as 
consistent with productivity theory with multiplicative effect as predicted by hypothesis 
                                                          
29
 Stock return volatility is measured from monthly returns over the prior 5 years. Similar results are 
obtained using abnormal returns based on either 1) a one-factor market model or 2) a two-factor market 
model where the second factor is the industry return. 
30
 Indeed, Bloom and Michel (2002) find that large compensation gap is associated with higher manager 
turnover and shorter manager tenure, and this impact can be exaggerated under more volatile operating 
conditions. 
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H2b: the positive externality of CEO productivity on subordinates’ productivity declines 
as a CEO approaches replacement. Additionally, the negative impact of stock return 
volatility on the compensation gap becomes stronger prior to CEO turnover, indicating 
that firms put more emphasis on retaining talented VP executives by lowering the 
compensation gap in CEO transition periods. This evidence again strongly contradicts the 
tournament theory prediction of hypothesis H2a.  
 
Table 7 Tournament Effect Prior to CEO Turnovers 
  Dependent Variable: Total Compensation Gap 
 
(1)  
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Number of QICs 0.23 
***
 
 
0.23 
***
 
 
0.19 
***
 
 
0.22 
***
 
 
(0.04) 
  
(0.036) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
 (Number of QICs)
2
 -0.024 
***
 
 
-0.024 
***
 
 
-0.07 
***
 
 
-0.024 
***
 
 
(0.008) 
  
(0.007) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.008) 
 Volatility of stock returns -0.45 
**
 
 
-0.60 
***
 
 
-0.50 
**
 
 
-0.45 
**
 
 
(0.19) 
  
(0.2) 
  
(0.21) 
  
(0.22) 
 CEO Turnover Indicator -0.35 
***
     -0.28 
***
    
 (0.09)      (0.11)     
CEO Retirement Indicator    -0.37 
***
     -0.43 
** 
    (0.12)      (0.18)  
Interactions of CEO Turnover 
Indicator 
           with Number of QICs -0.17 
**
 
    
-0.14 
*
 
   
 
(0.081) 
     
(0.076) 
    with (Number of QICs)
2
 0.018 
***
 
    
0.019 
**
 
   
 
(0.003) 
     
(0.01) 
    with Volatility of stock returns -0.75 
**
 
    
0.58 
    
 
(0.36) 
     
(0.40) 
    Interactions of CEO Retirement 
Indicator 
           with Number of QICs 
   
-0.15 
* 
    
-0.16 
*
 
    
(0.09) 
     
(0.09) 
 with (Number of QICs)
2
 
   
-0.02 
     
0.01 
 
    
(0.02) 
     
(0.03) 
 with Volatility of stock returns 
   
-1.71 
***
 
    
-0.97 
 
    
(0.6) 
     
(0.84) 
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Table 7, continued 
  (1)    (2)   (3)   (4) 
Log (board size) 0.10 
**
 
 
0.11 
**
 
 
0.12 
**
 
 
0.12 
**
 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.06) 
  
(0.06) 
 Board independence 0.00 
  
0.00 
  
-0.01 
  
-0.01 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
 Pct of busy ind. Directors 0.01 
  
-0.01 
  
-0.11 
  
-0.11 
 
 
(0.07) 
  
(0.07) 
  
(0.08) 
  
(0.08) 
 IDB indicator -0.08 
***
 
 
-0.09 
***
 
 
-0.05 
*
 
 
-0.05 
*
 
 
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
 CEO ownership -0.03 
***
 
 
-0.03 
***
 
 
-0.02 
***
 
 
-0.02 
***
 
 
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
 E index 0.02 
***
 
 
0.02 
**
 
 
0.01 
*
 
 
0.01 
*
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 CEO Chairman 0.01 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
 CEO is the only officer director 0.13 
***
 
 
0.15 
***
 
 
0.16 
***
 
 
0.16 
***
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
 CEO is the founder -0.05 
  
-0.04 
  
-0.02 
  
-0.02 
 
 
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.05) 
 CEO belongs to founder family -0.16 
***
 
 
-0.15 
***
 
 
-0.13 
***
 
 
-0.13 
***
 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.05) 
 CEO alignment 0.02 
***
 
 
0.02 
***
 
 
0.02 
***
 
 
0.02 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 QIC alignment -0.07 
**
 
 
-0.06 
*
 
 
-0.11 
***
 
 
-0.11 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
 Probability of VP resigning -0.10 
**
 
 
-0.10 
**
 
 
-0.15 
***
 
 
-0.15 
***
 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.06) 
  
(0.06) 
 Log (CEO tenure) -0.03 
**
 
 
-0.04 
***
 
 
-0.04 
**
 
 
-0.04 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
 Log( industry median gap) 0.35 
***
 
 
0.36 
***
 
 
0.23 
***
 
 
0.23 
***
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
 Herfindahl index -0.13 
  
-0.05 
  
-1.09 
  
-1.10 
 
 
(0.73) 
  
(0.73) 
  
(0.88) 
  
(0.88) 
 Industry homogeneity -0.53 
***
 
 
-0.56 
***
 
 
-0.42 
*
 
 
-0.44 
**
 
 
(0.18) 
  
(0.18) 
  
(0.22) 
  
(0.22) 
 Log ( lag total assets) 0.03 
**
 
 
0.02 
**
 
 
0.02 
  
0.02 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 Lag (MTB) 0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.01 
  
0.01 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 R&D Intensive Indicator -0.06 
*
  -0.07 
*** 
 -0.06 
** 
 -0.06 
** 
 (0.038)   (0.027)   (0.03)   (0.031)  
Number of business segments -0.003 
  
-0.001 
  
-0.03 
  
-0.03 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 Number of Observations 9366 
  
9366 
  
9366 
  
9366 
 R-squared 0.22 
 
   0.21 
 
   0.15 
 
   0.15 
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We draw similar conclusions when we focus only on periods prior to planned 
CEO retirements, when a board of directors is most likely to evaluate QICs for promotion 
by running a competition.
31 
Yet, there is no evidence that tournament effects become 
more important prior to CEO retirements. Rather, the results are more in line with 
productivity theory, where firms endeavor to retain QICs by raising their compensation 
and thus, lowering the compensation gap. In untabulated regressions, we undertake the 
same analysis for only firms that have more than one QIC. We continue to uncover no 
significant evidence consistent with tournament theory. 
One concern with this experiment is that the compensation gap generally falls 
prior to CEO turnovers, which would bias us against finding a strong tournament theory 
effect. To address this potential bias, we use the compensation of the new replacement 
CEO to calculate the compensation gap for firms which experience a CEO replacement 
over the next three years. The motivation for using a future compensation gap is that the 
compensation of a new CEO provides a better approximation of what the QIC can earn 
should he or she win the succession contest. Therefore, the compensation gap between 
QIC’s current compensation and the future new CEO’s compensation is a better measure 
of the CEO prize. Regression 3 and 4 in Table 7 test the tournament effect using this 
alternative compensation gap measure. However, we again find that the effect of 
tournament variables falls both prior to all CEO turnovers and planned CEO retirements, 
which is again inconsistent with the tournament theory prediction in hypothesis H2a. The 
                                                          
31
 A turnover is defined as CEO retirement when the CEO is over 62 years old three years prior to the 
turnover and the firm is not in the bottom quartile among its industry peers (based on 2-digit SIC code) 
based on  two-year ROA and  ROE. 
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results are qualitatively the same, even if we restrict our analysis to firms that have 
multiple QICs. 
Testing Productivity Theory 
Table 8 shows the effects of QIC productivity on our three compensation gap 
measures.
32
 The results are consistent with the prediction of hypothesis H1b that more 
productive QICs lower the compensation gap. Our four measures of QIC productivity are 
all significantly correlated with the three compensation gap measures and have the 
predicted signs, except that QIC compensation growth does not significantly affect the 
short-term gap and QIC outside independent directorships do not significantly affect the 
long-term gap. Considering the possibility that the four proxies of productivity can be 
correlated with each other, we test the four measures individually and obtain similar 
results in unreported regressions. Additionally, we use principle component analysis to 
create two orthogonal factors based on the four productivity measures in order to address 
a potential multicollinearity problem. Both factors have significant negative relations to 
the total compensation gap, the short-term compensation gap and the long-term 
compensation gap.  
We further test the impact of QIC productivity on the compensation gap prior to a 
CEO turnover by interacting the turnover indicator with the four productivity measures. 
The results reported in Table 9 suggest that the QIC productivity effect is particularly 
strong in reducing the compensation gap over the three years prior to a CEO turnover 
event, supporting the productivity prediction of hypothesis H2b. Furthermore, the 
                                                          
32 
The standard errors of the regressions are adjusted based on Murphy and Topel (1985), because the QIC 
promotion probability is a generated regressor. 
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Table 8 Productivity Effect on the Compensation Gap 
  Total Gap   Short Term Gap   Long Term Gap 
QIC compensation growth rate -0.08 *** 
 
-0.001 
  
-0.16 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.01) 
 QIC promotion propensity -2.69 *** 
 
-1.81 *** 
 
-2.74 *** 
 
(0.18) 
  
(0.14) 
  
(0.4) 
 QIC outside independent directorship -0.04 ** 
 
-0.05 *** 
 
-0.03 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.04) 
 Log (QIC tenure) -0.36 *** 
 
-0.12 ** 
 
-0.71 *** 
 
(0.07) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.16) 
 (Log QIC tenure)2 0.11 *** 
 
0.03 * 
 
0.25 *** 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.06) 
 Log (board size) 0.12 ** 
 
0.04 
  
0.35 *** 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.1) 
 Board independence -0.02 
  
-0.02 
  
-0.03 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.05) 
 Pct of busy ind. directors 0.03 
  
-0.01 
  
0.10 
 
 
(0.06) 
  
(0.05) 
  
(0.16) 
 IDB indicator -0.07 *** 
 
-0.01 
  
-0.14 ** 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.06) 
 CEO ownership -0.03 *** 
 
-0.01 *** 
 
-0.04 *** 
 
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.01) 
 E index 0.02 *** 
 
0.01 
  
0.04 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 CEO Chairman 0.06 *** 
 
0.04 ** 
 
0.13 *** 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.05) 
 CEO is the only officer director 0.02 
  
0.04 ** 
 
0.07 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.05) 
 CEO is the founder -0.10 ** 
 
-0.11 *** 
 
-0.14 
 
 
(0.04) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.1) 
 CEO belongs to founder family -0.12 ** 
 
-0.12 *** 
 
-0.16 
 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.11) 
 CEO compensation growth 0.03 *** 
 
0.00 
  
0.06 *** 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.02) 
 Log (CEO tenure) 0.01 
  
0.05 *** 
 
-0.06 ** 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
 CEO alignment 0.02 *** 
 
0.01 
  
0.03 ** 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.01) 
 QIC alignment -0.03 
  
0.00 
  
0.11 
 
 
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.07) 
 Probability of VP resigning -0.07 
  
-0.03 
  
-0.16 
 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.11) 
 Log( industry median gap) 0.36 *** 
 
0.12 *** 
 
0.66 *** 
 
(0.03) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.07) 
 Herfindahl index -0.49 
  
0.24 
  
0.15 
 
 
(0.66) 
  
(0.6) 
  
(1.66) 
 Industry homogeneity -0.26 
  
0.00 
  
-0.41 
 
 
(0.17) 
  
(0.14) 
  
(0.39) 
 Log ( lag total assets) 0.04 *** 
 
0.04 *** 
 
0.02 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
 Number of business segments 0.00 
  
0.00 
  
0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0) 
  
(0.01) 
 Lag (MTB) 0.00 
  
-0.01 
  
0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
 R&D Intensive Indicator -0.06 **  -0.028   -0.04 
 (0.026)   (0.019)   (0.05)  
Number of Observations 8802 
  
8802 
  
8671 
 
R-squared 0.31     0.24     0.21   
 
42 
 
productivity effect is stronger when the CEO is near retirement, suggesting that even in 
the scenarios where the board of directors is most likely to foster a succession contest to 
select the next CEO, they still set compensation policy to be closely tied to executive 
productivity levels. 
Alternatively, we use the estimated CEO turnover probability
33
 within three years 
and then interact it with the tournament variables and productivity variables. We obtain 
qualitatively similar results.  
Testing Competing Contracting Theories in Tournament-Oriented Firms 
Firm Selection of Its Executive Compensation Regime 
Tournament theory predicts that executive competition is particularly beneficial 
when it is very costly to monitor and evaluate employee efforts. For example, in firms 
with volatile stock returns, individual executive performance is more difficult to isolate 
from random exogenous factors. Hence, a compensation scheme that is based on relative 
performance, modeled in tournament theory, becomes more attractive to the boards of 
these firms. Similarly, firms are more likely to use tournament incentives when it is 
difficult to construct a peer group of comparable firms to benchmark executive 
performance against, such as those in highly heterogeneous industries. Finally, the 
likelihood of running a tournament contest may also be higher when the firm is large and  
                                                          
33
 The CEO turnover probability within three years is estimated using a logit model. The dependent 
variable equals one if a firm experience CEO turnover in the next three years. The independent variables 
include log (total assets), log(firm age), volatility of stock returns, market to book ratio, R&D to total assets 
ratio, a poor performance indicator, log(CEO tenure), a CEO above 62 indicator and year fixed effects. In 
the second step regression, we interact this estimated CEO turnover probability with tournament variables 
and productivity variables, and the standard errors are adjusted using the methodology in Murphy and 
Topel (1985). 
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Table 9 Productivity Effect Prior to CEO Turnovers 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
QIC Productivity = 
Compensation Growth  
QIC Productivity = 
Promotion Propensity  
   
 
(1)   (2)   
 
(3)   (4)   
 QIC Productivity -0.02 
***
 -0.025 
***
 -2.19 
***
 -2.46 
***
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.23) 
 
(0.21) 
  QIC Productivity * Turnover Indicator -0.05 
***
 
  
-0.84 
***
 
  
 
(0.007) 
    
(0.32) 
    QIC Productivity * CEO  Retirement 
Indicator 
  
-0.06 
***
 
  
-0.47 
**
 
   
(0.01) 
    
(0.19) 
  Turnover Indicator -0.15 
*** 
   -0.13 
*** 
   
 (0.02)     (0.04)     
CEO Retirement Indicator   -0.09 
***
    -0.09 *  
   (0.028)     (0.05)   
Control variables  Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  Number of observations 9374 
 
9374 
  
9360 
 
9360 
  R-Squared 0.24   0.23     0.24 
 
 0.24     
 
QIC Productivity = Ind. 
Outside Directorship  
QIC Productivity = Log -
(Tenure) 
  
 
(5)   (6)   
 
(7)   (8)   
QIC Productivity -0.06 
***
 -0.06 
***
 -0.32 
***
 -0.36 
***
 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.067) 
 QIC Productivity * Turnover Indicator 0.04 
   
-0.25 
***
 
 
 
(0.05) 
    
(0.09) 
   QIC Productivity * CEO  Retirement 
Indicator 
  
-0.04 
    
-0.35 
**
 
   
(0.05) 
    
(0.14) 
  
 
 
 
(Log QIC Tenure) 
2
 
     
0.09 
***
 0.09 
***
 
      
(0.019) 
 
(0.02) 
 (Log QIC Tenure) 
2
 * Turnover Indicator 
     
0.07 
**
 
 
      
(0.03) 
   (Log QIC Tenure) 
2
 * CEO  Retirement 
Indicator 
       
0.10 
*
 
        
(0.059) 
 Turnover Indicator -0.24
***
 
 
-0.41
***
  
 
 (0.02)     (0.06)    
CEO Retirement Indicator   -0.16 
*** 
   -0.41 
*** 
   (0.29)     (0.09)  
Control variables  Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of observations 8802 
 
8802 
  
9360 
 
9360 
 R-Squared 0.22  0.21   0.21  0.22  
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has multiple segments and hence employs a larger number of high-quality senior 
executives. 
Logit model estimates are reported in Table 10, Panel A on the factors that 
influence firm decisions to self-select into tournament-oriented group. The dependent 
variable equals one if the firm is classified as tournament-oriented based on the criteria 
outlined section 2.3, and zero otherwise. Consistent with the prior predictions, we find 
that stock return volatility has a significant positive association with the probability of 
being tournament-oriented, while industry homogeneity has a significant negative 
association. Moreover, we find that a firm is more likely to use a succession contest in 
industries that tend to appoint internal candidates as CEOs. This is consistent with the 
evidence in Cremers and Grinstein (2011), where they document a weak tendency of 
CEO compensation to benchmarking industry peers in such industries. Large and 
complex firms are more likely to run a succession contest among inside candidates.
34
 A 
succession contest is more likely to take place when there are several qualified internal 
candidates, and a long serving CEO near retirement age. CEO power significantly alters 
firm succession strategies. When CEOs have stronger power relative to their board of 
directors, they are harder to replace in the first place and hence, these firms are less likely 
to have any meaningful succession plan. Consistent with this prediction, we find that 
CEO-Chairman duality, founder-CEOs, and less independent boards are all associated 
with a low probability of a firm sponsoring a succession contest.  
 
                                                          
34
 Cichello et al (2009) also find evidence that multi-segments firms promote executives using tournament 
style competition. 
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Table 10 Panel A Selection Model Predicting Tournament-Oriented Firms 
Constant -1.06 
***
 
 
(0.15) 
 Number of QICs 0.15 
***
 
 
(0.05) 
 Volatility of stock returns 0.53 
**
 
 
(0.23) 
 CEO above 62 0.42 
***
 
 
(0.04) 
 CEO Chairman -0.30 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
 CEO is the founder -0.30 
***
 
 
(0.05) 
 CEO belongs to founder family 0.16 
**
 
 
(0.07) 
 CEO ownership -0.01 
***
 
 
(0.00) 
 Log (CEO tenure) -0.04 
***
 
 
(0.00) 
 E index 0.09 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 IDB indicator 0.01 
 
 
(0.04) 
 Log(board size) 0.22 
***
 
 
(0.06) 
 Board independence -0.04 
 
 
(0.03) 
 Log (total asset) 0.09 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 Number of business segments 0.02 
*
 
 
(0.01) 
 Poor performance indicator 0.05 
 
 
(0.04) 
 Industry Homogeneity -0.54 
 
 
(0.18) 
*** 
Number of industry inside turnovers 0.02 
***
 
 
(0.00) 
 Number of observations 9443 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.11   
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Determinants of the Compensation Gaps in Tournament-Oriented Firms  
With the selection equation estimated in the first step, we can test the effects of 
tournament and productivity theories on the compensation gap, while explicitly 
controlling for the private information embedded in a firm’s decision to implement a 
specific compensation scheme. Recognizing that true tournament firms are not directly 
observable and the identification mechanism we use is imperfect, we test hypotheses H3a 
and H3b on the subsample of firms predicted to be tournament-oriented. As shown in 
Table 10 Panel B, the total compensation gap, short-term compensation gap, and long-
term compensation gap are larger for predicted tournament firms than non-tournament 
firms, both in dollar terms and in ratios. The predicted tournament-oriented firms also 
have more QICs. 
 
Table 10 Panel B Tournament-Oriented Firms vs. Non-Tournament Firms 
  Predicted tournament firms   
Predicted non-tournament 
firms 
 
(N=4851) 
 
(N=4592) 
  Mean Median   Mean Median 
Number of  QICs 1.7 1 
 
1.6 1 
Total gap (dollar term, $ 000) 2565.79 1290.59 
 
1733.73 730.53 
Short-term gap (dollar term, 
$ 000) 
768.24 514.89 
 
574.41 373.69 
Long-term gap (dollar term, 
$ 000) 
1825.78 699.68 
 
1191.57 289.17 
Total gap (ratio) 2.19 1.93 
 
2.05 1.7 
Short- term gap (ratio) 2.02 1.85 
 
1.95 1.74 
Long- term gap (ratio) 9.75 1.99   4.19 1.66 
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To the extent that the compensation gap is shaped by tournament theory, we 
expect to find a stronger relation between the compensation gap and the tournament 
variables in the subsample of predicted tournament-oriented firms. Regressions 1 and 2 
of Table 11 test the tournament theory predictions after estimating which firms are 
tournament oriented. The coefficient estimates of the squared number of QICs and stock 
return volatility remain negative and significant, contradicting the tournament predictions. 
This result even holds in the subsample of tournament-oriented firms. More importantly, 
the marginal impacts of the tournament variables on the compensation gap are slightly 
lower in the predicted tournament-oriented firms than they are for the remaining firms, 
although the differences are for the most part statistically insignificant.
35
 Finding that the 
tournament effect is not significantly stronger in firms that are more likely to utilize a 
succession contest raises serious questions about the empirical validity of tournament 
theory in explaining the hierarchical compensation gaps among top executives. 
On the other hand, the variables capturing the productivity effects are 
significantly associated with the compensation gap in both subsamples of firms. 
Furthermore, the incremental explanatory power of the productivity variables is much 
larger than that of the tournament variables: specifically if we exclude the productivity 
variables from the regression model, it reduces the R-squared by 39 percent (from 0.36 to 
0.22) in the predicted tournament-oriented firms, while if we exclude the tournament 
variables from the regression model, it only lowers the R-squared by 5 percent (from 0.36 
to 0.34). The results in Table 11 again suggest that tournament theory is less important 
                                                          
35
  We test the statistically significance of coefficient difference across two regressions using the Z-
statistics proposed in Clogg et al (1995) and Paternoster et al (1998). 
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empirically than productivity theory, even in firms most likely to employ a succession 
contest. 
Other Control Variables 
In terms of control variables, we find that the potential threat of being fired 
provides another effective incentive mechanism, and works as a substitute for promotion 
incentives: the probability that QIC will leave the firm in the next five years is negatively 
associated with the compensation gap when we only consider the tournament effect. 
However, the effect of dismissal becomes insignificant once we control for QIC 
productivity, probably because the chance of being dismissed is highly correlated with 
productivity. Moreover, we find that firms in highly homogenous industries tend to have 
lower compensation gaps, consistent with the idea that the promotion effect becomes 
weaker when the QICs have more outside job opportunities. In addition, we find that 
large firms have higher compensation gaps. Firms with high growth opportunities, 
measured by their market-to-book ratio, on average have higher compensation gaps. On 
the other hand, R&D intensive firms on average have lower compensation gaps. The 
industry median compensation gap is also positive and significant, indicating that firms 
tend to benchmark to their industry peers when setting executive compensation. In 
unreported regressions, we find CEO tenure is positively associated with both CEO and 
QIC compensation levels. However, CEO tenure is negatively associated with the three 
measures of compensation gaps in most cases, suggesting that CEOs who remain in their 
positions longer tend to pay subordinates more, which results in a lower compensation 
gap. 
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Table 11 Tournament Effect and Productivity Effect in Tournament-Oriented and Non-Tournament Groups 
  Tournament Effects   Productivity  Effects   All Together 
 
Tournament-
Oriented 
Group 
 
Non-
Tournament 
Group 
 
Tournament-
Oriented 
Group 
 
Non-
Tournament 
Group 
 
Tournament-
Oriented 
Group 
 
Non-
Tournament 
Group 
      
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Tournament Variables 
                 Number of QICs 0.23
***
 
 
0.35
***
 
       
0.21
***
 
 
0.26
***
 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.06) 
        
(0.04) 
  
(0.05) 
 (Number of QICs)
2
 -0.02 
**
 
 
-0.05 
***
 
       
-0.03 
***
 
 
-0.04 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
        
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 Volatility of stock returns -0.61 
*
 
 
-0.81 
**
 
       
-0.29 
  
-0.93 
***
 
 
(0.35) 
  
(0.37) 
        
(0.25) 
  
(0.33) 
 QIC Productivity Variables 
                 QIC compensation growth rate 
      
-0.07
***
 
 
-0.09
***
 
 
-0.06
***
 
 
-0.09
***
 
 
      
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
 QIC promotion propensity 
      
-3.83 
***
 
 
-1.96 
***
 
 
-3.13 
***
 
 
-1.41 
***
 
 
      
-0.30 
  
(0.26) 
  
-0.32 
  
(0.29) 
 QIC outside independent directorship 
      
-0.05 
*
 
 
-0.01 
  
-0.05 
*
 
 
0.01 
 
 
      
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
 Log (QIC tenure) 
      
-0.37 
***
 
 
-0.37 
***
 
 
-0.37 
***
 
 
-0.45 
***
 
 
      
(0.09) 
  
(0.1) 
  
(0.09) 
  
(0.1) 
 (Log QIC tenure)2  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 0.10 
***
 
 
 0.15 
***
 
 
 0.11 
***
 
 
 0.16 
***
 
  
  
 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.04) 
 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.35 **  0.22 **  -0.01   0.12   0.12   0.14  
 (0.14) 
  
(0.11) 
  
(0.12) 
  
(0.10) 
  
(0.12) 
  
(0.11) 
 
Control Variables and Governance Variables Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Number of Observations 3916   3951   3613   3745   3610   3743 
 
R-Squared 0.22     0.27     0.34     0.36     0.36     0.37 
 
Z-statistics testing the difference of coefficients across two regressions 
             Number of QICs -1.54 
                (Number of QICs)
2
 2.12 
**
 
               Volatility of stock return 0.39                  
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Additional Tests and Robustness 
 
The Economic Impact of Productivity and Tournament 
The economic impacts of QIC productivity measures on the total compensation 
gap are larger than that of the tournament incentive measures. We calculate the 
percentage change in the compensation gap (i.e. the ratio of CEO total compensation to 
median QIC total compensation) by increasing the executive productivity variables by 
one standard deviation from their means while holding the other variables at their mean 
values. The QIC productivity measures exhibit stronger economic impacts on the total 
compensation gap: a one standard deviation increase in QIC compensation growth, 
promotion probability and tenure all lower the total compensation gap by substantial 
amounts, namely 17 percent, 11 percent and 4 percent, respectively. The economic 
impacts of tournament variables are smaller: the net impact of adding one more QIC to 
the tournament is 4.6 percent; the economic influence of stock return volatility is -4.5 
percent, but the sign is opposite the tournament theory prediction. 
Tests for Convexity in Pay Structure 
Rosen (1986)’s tournament model predicts that pay grows in a "convex" manner 
with hierarchical levels, and greater weight is required on the final top-ranking prize to 
motivate lower level executives to put in greater effort, independent of past 
achievements.
36
  Due to the lack of detailed compensation records for most corporate 
                                                          
36
 Rosen (1986) argues that employees are motivated by not only the pay increase associated with the 
current promotion possibility, but also the option value of future promotions. As the employee “climbs” up 
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positions, we cannot test the convexity prediction within a firm. Nevertheless, we are able 
to explore if convexity exists among top executives using the top three levels of managers 
identified in section 3.2. To be specific, we expect the compensation increase on being 
promoted from a level three manager to a level two manager to be less than the 
compensation increase on being promoted from a level two manager position to the CEO 
position. 
We find little evidence supporting Rosen (1986)’s tournament theory prediction 
that pay grows in a “convex” manner with the hierarchical levels of senior managers. As 
shown in Table 1 Panel C, an executive’s total compensation on average increases by 
2.10 times on being promoted from level three to level two (the median is 1.03 times). 
While the total compensation increases by 2.18 times on average if a level two senior 
manager is promoted to the CEO position (the median is 1.79 times). Although the latter 
compensation increase is larger, it is not statistically different from the former. In terms 
of short-term compensation, the mean increase is 145% on being promoted to level two, 
and the mean increase is 201% on becoming CEO. Considering long-term compensation, 
the mean and median increases on being promoted to a level two management position 
are both larger than those observed on being promoted from a level two manager to CEO, 
which runs counter to the tournament prediction.  
Table 12 tests the convexity of pay growth in multivariate regressions. After 
controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the “L1L2” indicator (which equals one for 
the compensation gap between the CEO and the level two QICs and zero for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the corporate ladder, the promotion option become less valuable and therefore, a higher compensation gap 
is required to keep the incentive constant. 
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compensation gap between the level two and level three managers) is negative and 
significant, suggesting that the total compensation gap between the CEO and level two 
managers is lower than the total compensation gap between level two and level three 
managers. We find similar result for the long-term compensation gap. These results are 
again inconsistent with the convexity prediction of tournament theory. However, we find 
some supportive evidence for this prediction when evaluating the short-term 
compensation gap: this gap is larger between the CEO and level two managers after 
controlling for other factors that may affect the compensation gap. We realize that the 
results in this section only hold when we focus on top executives and cannot be 
generalized to the whole organization. 
Compensation Gaps in Firms with Different Characteristics 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that when both the level of effort and output of 
employees are hard to monitor, it is optimal to use rank ordering, as in tournament based 
compensation schemes. Therefore, we expect tournament variables to have a stronger 
impact on the compensation gap in large and complex firms if tournament theory is 
empirically valid.  
On the other hand, Lazear (1989) argues that aggressive competition and large 
compensation gaps between hierarchical levels also have potential negative effects, 
because they discourage cooperation among competing managers and in the extreme can 
lead to outright sabotage. Therefore, Lazear argues that firms that require close teamwork 
and cooperation may find tournament pay arrangements less beneficial. Siegel and 
Hambrick (2005) argue that firms that are technological intensive generally need  
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Table 12 Convexity of Hierarchical Pay Structure among Top Executives 
  Total Gap   Short Term Gap   Long Term Gap 
L1L2 indicator -0.025 
*
 
 
0.277 
***
 
 
-0.205 
***
 
 
(0.013) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.04) 
 Log (board size) -0.039 
  
-0.039 
  
0.038 
 
 
(0.03) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.07) 
 Board independence 0.014 
  
0.016 
  
0.087 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.03) 
 Pct of busy ind. Directors 0.026 
  
-0.020 
  
-0.017 
 
 
(0.04) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.1) 
 IDB indicator -0.019 
  
-0.011 
  
-0.043 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.04) 
 CEO ownership -0.019 
***
 
 
-0.010 
***
 
 
-0.031 
***
 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.01) 
 E index 0.010 
***
 
 
0.005 
*
 
 
0.008 
 
 (0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.01) 
 CEO Chairman 0.045 
***
 
 
0.036 
***
 
 
0.056 
*
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.03) 
 CEO is the only officer director 0.037 
***
 
 
0.033 
***
 
 
0.031 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.03) 
 CEO is the founder -0.068 
***
 
 
-0.071 
***
 
 
-0.118 
*
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.06) 
 CEO belongs to founder family -0.051 
**
 
 
-0.031 
  
-0.052 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.07) 
 CEO alignment 0.021 
***
 
 
0.009 
***
 
 
0.032 
***
 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.01) 
 QIC alignment -0.068 
***
 
 
-0.064 
***
 
 
-0.146 
***
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.05) 
 Probability of VP resigning -0.006 
  
-0.010 
  
0.016 
 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.06) 
 Log (CEO tenure) 0.001 
  
0.028 
***
 
 
-0.050 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
 Log( industry median gap) 0.035 
***
 
 
0.012 
***
 
 
0.063 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.02) 
 Herfindahl index 0.216 
  
0.110 
  
1.496 
 
 
(0.35) 
  
(0.36) 
  
(1.23) 
 Industry homogeneity 0.027 
  
0.002 
  
0.133 
 
 
(0.09) 
  
(0.08) 
  
(0.29) 
 Log ( lag total assets) 0.031 
***
 
 
0.016 
***
 
 
0.025 
 
 
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.02) 
 Lag (MTB) 0.007 
  
-0.002 
  
-0.023 
*
 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.01) 
 R&D Intensive Indicator -0.02 
*
 -0.006 -0.023 
*
 
 (0.013)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Volatility of stock returns 0.044 
  
-0.108 
  
-0.103 
 
 
(0.09) 
  
(0.11) 
  
(0.22) 
 Number of business segments 0.000 
  
0.000 
  
0.001 
 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.01) 
 Number of Observations 15174 
  
15174 
  
15174 
 R-squared 0.15 
 
 
 
 0.16 
 
 
 
 0.14 
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considerable cooperation among executives, as part of their efforts to manage the design, 
production, and selling of their high-tech products. Hence, we expect tournament theory 
to be less relevant in explaining compensation gaps in high-tech firms. 
We find little evidence that the tournament effect varies across firms with 
different characteristics as reported in Table 13. The interaction terms of tournament 
variables with the number of business segments and firm size are not significant. 
Similarly, the tournament effect on the compensation gap is also indistinguishable across 
high tech and non-high tech firms. These pieces of evidence fail to support tournament 
theory. 
Executive Productivity and the Size of Tournament Competition 
In this section, we examine if the effect of executive productivity on 
compensation gap changes with the number of potential non-CEOs competing for the 
CEO position. We expect that when there are several capable candidates to be the CEO’s 
successor that the board of directors is more likely to evaluate QICs productivity in 
making its selection. Hence, we may observe a stronger productivity effect when the size 
of succession contest is large. To test this hypothesis, we interact the four productivity 
measures with the size of competition, measured by the number of QICs.  Our results in 
Table 14 are largely consistent with this prediction. The interaction terms of number of 
QICs with QIC promotion propensity and QIC compensation growth rate are both 
negative and significant. The effect of QIC tenure on the compensation gap also becomes 
stronger if there are more QICs in the firm. However, the interaction of the indictor for a 
QIC with an outside independent directorship and the number of QICs is positive, 
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contradicting our prediction. Overall, the results using three of the four productivity 
measures suggest that high QIC productivity lowers the compensation gap even further 
when there are more QICs in competition to be promoted to CEO.  
 
Table 13 Tournament Effect on the Compensation Gap Conditional on Firm 
Characteristics 
 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Number of QICs 0.26 
***
 0.37 
**
 0.35 
***
 0.28 
***
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.04) 
 (Number of QICs)
2
 -0.03 
***
 -0.03 
 
-0.05 
***
 -0.03 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 Volatility of stock returns -0.57 
***
 0.06 
 
-0.89 
**
 -0.45 
**
 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.77) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.22) 
 Interaction of  Multi-Segment Indicator 
       with Number of QICs 0.04 
       
 
(0.04) 
       with (Number of QICs)
2
 -0.01 
       
 
(0.01) 
       with Volatility of stock 
returns -0.31 
       
 
(0.24) 
       Interaction of Firm Size 
         with Number of QICs 
  
-0.01
     
   
(0.02) 
     with (Number of QICs)
2
 
  
0.001 
     
   
(0) 
     with Volatility of stock returns 
 
-0.12 
     
   
(0.11) 
     Interaction of Industry Homogeneity 
       with Number of QICs 
    
-0.32
   
     
(0.36) 
   with (Number of QICs)
2
 
    
0.08 
   
     
(0.07) 
   with Volatility of stock returns 
   
1.21 
   
     
(1.84) 
   Interaction of Hi-Tech Indicator 
       with Number of QICs 
      
0.02
 
       
(0.07) 
 with (Number of QICs)
2
 
      
0.00 
 
       
(0.02) 
 int with Volatility of stock returns 
     
-0.49 
 
       
(0.34) 
 Governance variables Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes 
 Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of observations 9366 
 
9366 
 
9366 
 
9366 
 R-Squared 0.21 
 
 0.21 
 
 0.21 
 
 0.21 
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Table 14 Interaction of QIC productivity and the Size of CEO Contest 
  Total Gap Total Gap Total Gap Total Gap 
QIC Productivity Variables 
     
   QIC compensation growth rate -0.01 
    
   
 
(0.008) 
    
   QIC promotion propensity 
  
-1.27 
***
 
 
   
   
(0.35) 
  
   QIC outside independent 
directorship     
-0.02 
  
 
     
(0.02) 
 
 
 
Log (QIC tenure) 
      -0.49 
***
 
       (0.08)  
(Log QIC tenure)
2
 
      0.11 
***
 
       (0.03)  
Interactions of Number of QICs 
with 
 
 
  
  
 
 
QIC compensation growth rate -0.01 
***
 
  
  
 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
 
   
 
 
QIC promotion propensity 
 
 
-0.50 
***
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(0.21) 
   
 
 
QIC outside independent 
directorship 
 
 
 
 
0.19 
***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.07) 
   
Log (QIC tenure) 
 
 
 
   
-0.14 
***
 
 
 
 
 
   
(0.05) 
 
(Log QIC tenure)
2
 
 
 
 
   
0.04 
*
 
 
 
 
 
   
(0.02) 
 
Size of Contest 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Number of QICs 0.13 
***
 0.14 
***
 0.16 
***
 0.25 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
Governance variables Yes  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of observations 8913 
 
8347 
 
8899 
 
8913 
 R-Squared 0.23   0.26   0.24   0.25   
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Compensation Gaps in Firms with Strong Corporate Governance  
One potential reason that we do not find evidence supporting tournament theory is 
that the agency problems at these firms are so severe that they undercut the effectiveness 
of tournament incentives. A number of influential scholars have argued that agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers can significantly influence executive 
compensation arrangement.
37
  We test this proposition by adding controls for major 
internal governance mechanisms. Empirically, we find that the presence of independent 
director blockholders (IDB)
38
 significantly lowers the total compensation gap and the 
long term compensation gap, probably due to the reason that IDBs have a strong 
incentive to closely monitor a CEO. CEO ownership has significant negative associations 
with all three forms of the compensation gap, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
higher CEO ownership improves CEO alignment with shareholders and strengthens 
overall firm governance. We find that firms with a high E-index,
39
 which reduces the 
threat from the market for corporate control, have higher compensation gaps. CEOs who 
chair the board, or who are the board’s only officer-director, are associated with higher 
compensation gaps.  These two results suggest that more entrenched CEOs have higher 
pay gaps. On the other hand, founder-CEOs and CEOs belonging to the founding family 
decrease the compensation gap, which is consistent with there being less agency 
problems in these firms. A large board is associated with higher gap, though board 
                                                          
37
 Studies in this vein include, but not limit to , Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004), Borokhovich, Brunarski 
and Parrino (1997), Core, Holthausen and Lacker (1999), Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002), Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009). 
38
 Independent Director Blockholder is defined following Agrawal and Nasser (2010). They find that these 
independent director blockholders help to improve firm governance and lower CEO entrenchment since 
they have strong financial incentives to monitor CEO and firm performance. 
39
 Entrenchment Index is proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell (2009). 
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independence and the percentage of busy independent directors, surprisingly, often do not 
have significant impacts on the compensation gap measures.  
Furthermore, given the evidence of agency problems on firms’ compensation 
policy in both earlier studies and this study, we do not expect the primary economic 
factors to have homogeneous effects on the compensation gaps of firms facing varying 
degrees of agency problems. Rather, compensation policies are more likely to be shaped 
by economic theories of incentives when firms are reasonably well governed. We expect 
that the effectiveness of the two optimal contracting mechanisms should be stronger in a 
strong corporate governance environment and weaker in a poor corporate governance 
environment.  
 
Table 15 Indirect Effect of Agency Problems on the Compensation Gap 
    
Dual Class 
Firms 
  
Single Class 
Firms 
  
Z-statistics of 
difference 
QIC Productivity Measures 
 
        QIC compensation growth 
rate  
-0.02 
**
 
 
-0.04 
**
 
 -1.85 
*
 
QIC promotion propensity 
 
-1.69 
***
 
 
-2.81 
***
 
 -2.00 
**
 
QIC outside independent 
directorship  
0.014 
  
-0.06 
***
 
 -1.37  
QIC tenure 
 
0.19 
  
-0.48 
***
 
 -3.40 
***
 
(QIC tenure)2 
 
-0.05 
  
0.14 
***
 
 3.00 
***
 
Tournament Variables 
       
  Number of QICs 
 
0.23 
*
 
 
0.31 
***
 
 -0.63 
 (Number of QICs) 2 
 
-0.02 
  
-0.04 
***
 
 -0.915 
 Volatility of stock returns   -1.3 
**
 
 
-0.63 
**
 
 1.24 
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We further test the robustness of our results by controlling for one clear measure 
of weak governance, which is CEO entrenchment facilitated by having dual class shares 
(i.e. Masulis, Wang and Xie 2009). We find in Table 15 that the relationship between 
QIC productivity and the compensation gap is stronger in single-class share firms than in 
dual-class firms. This is consistent with better governed firm having their compensation 
gaps that are better explain by productivity differentials between the CEO and QICs.  
However, we still do not find evidence supporting tournament theory, even when agency 
problems are relatively less severe.  Specifically, we continue to find that the 
compensation gap is not related to the number of QICs in a convex manner, and that the 
compensation gap is negatively, rather than positively associated with the volatility of 
firms’ stock returns, contracting the two major tournament theory predictions. 
Alternative Compensation Gap Measures 
Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1993) argues that “for the typical VP, the result of 
winning the tournament and becoming CEO is to enjoy an increased salary for as long as 
he subsequently remains CEO”.  The compensation gap we use in prior sections only 
captures part of the prize of winning the tournament and becoming CEO, since it 
measures compensation differences only over a single year. Hence, in robustness analysis, 
we replace the earlier compensation gaps with expected cumulative compensation gaps 
approximated by the product of the one-year compensation gap and the expected number 
of years a winning QIC remains CEO. The expected CEO tenure is estimated based on 
the industry’s median length of CEO tenure and the tenure of the prior CEO in the firm.40  
                                                          
40
An OLS model is estimated with the CEO tenure as the left –hand side variable.  For CEOs that stay 
beyond the end of our sample period (2005), we track their career path using post-2005 data to determine 
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Another potential concern with using the compensation gap between the CEO and 
the median QIC as the winning prize is that it may partially reflect the job title and job 
responsibility of the median QIC. To address this issue, we use the compensation gap 
between the CEO and the COO as a proxy for the size of the winning prize. There are 
two reasons for using this measure: first, the COO is usually the second most important 
corporate officer and has the highest probability of succeeding to the CEO position 
(Mobbs and Raheja 2010); second, by requiring an executive to have only the title of 
COO and no other titles, we are able to minimize the impact of heterogeneous QIC work 
responsibilities across firms with different organizational structures and thereby obtain a 
cleaner measure of the compensation gaps across firms.  
We conduct all our experiments using these two alternative measures of the 
compensation gap. Reassuringly, we find that our conclusions remain unchanged. We 
find no strong evidence in favor of a tournament effect, while the productivity 
differentials remain the most important factors in explaining the compensation gap. 
Other Robustness Tests 
Timing the occurrence of a succession contest for the CEO’s position can be 
difficult for very long-tenured CEOs.  Some long tenured CEOs are apt to have their 
succession carefully planned before they leave. One famous case is Jack Welch who 
started to select his successor 7 years before his retirement from GE. The possibility that 
succession competition can occur long before CEO replacement should bias the estimates 
                                                                                                                                                                             
their tenure. For CEOs who stay in their  positions beyond 2010 ( the latest year in Execucomp with 
complete data that we have access to), we use 2010 as their last year in office, and we acknowledge that 
there is a downward bias in measuring CEO tenure for that group of CEOs.  The explanatory variables are 
the tenure of the previous CEO and the median tenure of CEOs in the same 2-digit SIC industry 
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against finding evidence supportive of tournament theory. To address this potential bias, 
we analyze two experiments that exclude firms whose CEO tenure is longer than 16 years 
(the 90 percentile of the sample), and we use an alternative cut-off of 10 years (the 75 
percentile of the sample). Our main results continue to hold and more importantly, we 
still fail to uncover any supportive evidence for tournament theory. 
We also employ the following battery of sensitivity tests: 1) relax the second 
restriction in the definition of QICs, and allow executives whose compensation is within 
20 percent of the highest paid non-CEO executive to be classified as a QIC; 2) require the 
QICs to be younger than 62 years old rather than 65; 3) redefine the compensation gap to 
be the logarithm of dollar compensation difference between the CEO and the median QIC; 
4) delete firm-year observations where the CEO only serves in the position for less than 
one year; 5) delete firm-year observations where the CEO is also a founder or is a 
member of the founder’s family; 6) use median regressions to eliminate the potential 
impact of extreme outliers. Under all of these alternative specifications, the earlier results 
continue to hold.  
 
Conclusion 
One serious drawback of much of the existing empirical work on the 
compensation of top executives is a failure to test against plausible alternative models. 
For example, studies that examine performance based pay arrangements are silent when it 
comes to the relevance of promotion incentives, while studies that test tournament theory 
and promotion incentives fail to explicitly recognize that their evidence is frequently 
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consistent with productivity theory models. Unfortunately, single theory tests tend to be 
less powerful. In contrast to much of the extant literature, we compare and differentiate 
two types of compensation incentives, namely output-based productivity theories and 
promotion-based tournament theory to provide new insights into the determinants of the 
compensation gaps among top corporate executives. 
We find that productivity theory is more relevant than tournament theory in 
explaining compensation gaps among top executives in the US. Qualified internal non-
CEO candidates (QICs) with better performance, such as candidates with track records of 
rapid compensation growth, high promotion probabilities, extensive managerial skills and 
experience developed from their tenure in their existing positions and outstanding 
managerial talent recognized by outside directorship appointments, all tend to exhibit 
lower compensation gaps.  In contrast, we find little evidence to support tournament 
theory predictions that the compensation gap increases at an increasing rate with the size 
of a succession contest, and that the compensation gap increases with the noisiness of the 
operating environment. 
Further investigation of the situations where tournament theory should be most 
relevant also fails to provide supportive evidence of the importance of tournament theory. 
We find the compensation gap is less sensitive to tournament factors prior to CEO 
departures and retirements. We also fail to find strong evidence for a tournament effect in 
explaining the compensation gap, even in firms that are most likely to foster a succession 
contest. Both results go against the tournament predictions. On the other hand, 
productivity theory predictions are confirmed for firms in various circumstances. For 
example, QICs are promoted to the board and their compensation grows faster than the 
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CEO when the CEO is about to retire. Moreover, QIC productivity has a more 
pronounced effect on reducing the compensation gap prior to CEO turnovers, consistent 
with the prediction of productivity theory. Lastly, we find the productivity theory is more 
important in explaining compensation than tournament theory, even among tournament-
oriented firms. The above evidence suggests that despite the fact that some firms appear 
to have characteristics that encourage the use of a succession contest for executive 
promotion decisions (Cichello et al 2009, Mobbs and Raheja 2010), these firms appear to 
only infrequently determine executive compensation based on a tournament “winner 
takes all” regime. Rather, the compensation of senior executives is closely tied to their 
productivity or performance level. 
Empirical studies of executive compensation theories generally take two 
approaches. The first approach is to examine whether the observed compensation 
arrangements are consistent with the basic properties of the posited theory and that they 
consistent with the key predictions derived from the theory. The second approach is to 
test whether the agents respond to a specific compensation arrangement by examining the 
impact of a compensation arrangement on subsequent firm performance.  We take the 
first approach in this study and explore the question of how firms distribute compensation 
among top executives. In a separate study, we take this second approach and ask the 
question of how executive compensation arrangements and compensation gaps alter 
manager incentives and in turn, affect managerial decisions, firm policies and shareholder 
value. Answers to these questions are likely to provide further insights into the 
consequences of alternative executive compensation choices.     
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APPENDIX A Variable Definition 
Compensation Variables: 
 
Total gap 
Log (total CEO compensation/ the median total compensation of QICs) 
Short- term gap 
Log (short term CEO compensation / the median short term compensation 
of QICs) 
Long- term gap 
Log (long term CEO compensation  / the median long term compensation 
of QICs) 
Tournament Variables: 
 
QIC 
“Qualified internal candidates”, refers to non-CEO senior executives who 
serve on the board or have total compensation within 10 % (20%) of 
highest paid non-CEO senior executive 
Number of  QICs 
The number of non-CEOs that are qualified as internal CEO successor 
candidates 
Volatility of stock returns 
The standard deviation of monthly stock returns five year prior to the 
sample year 
Tournament-oriented firms 
Firms are classified as tournament-oriented, if we observe they hire a 
CEO internally, or in the situations where an outsider is hired as the CEO 
but we observe several internal candidates before the CEO succession. 
Productivity Variables: 
 
QIC tenure 
The number of years the executive has been stayed on the current position 
QIC compensation growth 
The average compensation growth over the past three years 
 
QIC  promotion propensity 
The probability of being promoted to the CEO  position in the next three 
years. The probability is estimated by running a logit regression, and the 
explanatory variables are a COO indicator, a CFO indicator, a president 
indicator, a vice-president indicator, a vice-chairman indicator,  an inside 
director indicator, QIC’s current position tenure, and the log of QIC age 
Number of independent boards 
held by QIC 
 
Number of outside independent directorships held by this executive in an 
unaffiliated firm 
Other Incentive Variables 
 
Probability of VP resigning 
Estimated probability that the VP will resign in the next five years. The 
probability is estimated using a logit model, and the explanatory variables 
are: board of director indicator, executive’s age, and a poor performance 
indicator 
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CEO alignment 
(Number of CEO shares+ option’s delta * number of CEO held 
options)/total number of shares outstanding *100 
QIC alignment 
(Number of shares held by the QIC+ option's delta * number of options 
held by the QIC)/total number of shares outstanding * 100 
Industry median gap 
The median total gap of firms in the same industry (exclude the own 
firm). Industry is defined using 4-digit SIC code if it has more than five 
companies; if 4-digit SIC industry has less than five companies, I use 3-
digit SIC to define industry;  if 3-digit SIC industry has less than five 
companies, I use 2-digit SIC to define industry 
Accounting Variables 
 
Log (lag total assets) 
Logarithm of lag total assets 
Log (firm age) 
Logarithm of the number of years the firm is being listed 
Lag ROA 
ROA= Income before extraordinary items/lag total assets 
Lag MTB 
MTB =(Total assets-book equity + market value of equity)/Total assets 
R&D Intensive Indicator 
A dummy variable equals one if a firm’s R&D/total assets ratio is above 
0.04, the 75 percentile of the sample 
Lag stock returns 
The average monthly stock returns of the last 12 months 
Poor performance dummy  
A dummy variable equals one if either the firm’s industry adjusted ROA  
or industry adjusted ROE is in the bottom quartile in the industry  
Governance and CEO Power 
Variables 
 
Entrenchment index ( E index) 
Entrenchment Index constructed in Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell 2009 
Board independence dummy 
Equals one if more than 60 percent of directors are independent, and 
equals zero otherwise 
Percentage  of busy independent 
directors The number of independent directors holding more than three 
directorships as a percentage of the total number of independent directors 
CEO-Chairman 
Equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and equals zero 
otherwise 
CEO ownership 
The percentage of stocks held by the CEO 
Officer ownership 
The percentage of stocks held by all non-CEO executives 
CEO is the founder 
Dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also the founder 
CEO belongs to founder family 
Dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is a member of the founder 
family 
Independent director blockholder  
(IDB) indicator Equals one if one or more independent directors hold more than one 
percent of shares or voting power, and equals zero otherwise 
Log (CEO tenure) 
Logarithm of the number of years he or she has been served as the CEO 
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Log (CEO age) 
Logarithm of the age of the CEO 
Industry Homogeneity 
Mean partial correlation between firm’s returns and an equally weighted 
industry index, for all firms in the same two-digit industry code, holding 
market return constant (see Parrino 1997). Estimated based on 60 
monthly returns prior to sample year 
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APPENDIX B the Construction of CEO and QIC Alignment 
 
The portion of executive compensation that improves alignment with shareholder 
interests is measured by pay-for-performance sensitivity: the sum of stock and option 
sensitivities to a $100 change in shareholder wealth. Following Kale, Reis and 
Venkateswaran (2009), I construct the shareholder alignment incentives as follows: 
CEO alignment = 100 * (Number of CEO held shares + option’s delta * number 
of CEO held options) / total number of shares outstanding 
QIC alignment = 100 * (Number of QIC held shares + option’s delta * number of 
QIC held options) / total number of shares outstanding  
Following Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran (2009), we use the percentage of stock 
ownership at the beginning of the year for each executive to obtain the stock-based 
sensitivity of an executive's equity portfolio. For option holding, we use the number of 
options held by each executive at the beginning of the year. An option’s delta is 
calculated following Murphy (1999): all options held at the beginning of the year are 
treated as a single grant with a five-year time to maturity; the average exercise price is 
determined based on the year end intrinsic value and year end stock price; the interest 
rate is the five-year constant-maturity Treasury bill from Federal Reserve; the annualized 
dividend yield is obtained from Execucomp; stock return volatility is calculated as the 
annualized standard deviation of the most recent 60 monthly total stock returns to 
shareholders prior to the sample year. Delta is calculated based on the above information 
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using a modified Black-Scholes formula modified to incorporate continuous dividend 
payments: 
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    P = Grant-date stock price 
    X = Exercise price 
    T = Expiration term (years) 
    d = Annualized dividend yield 
    s = Annual stock-price volatility 
 r = Risk-free interest rate  
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N ( ) = Cumulative normal distribution function 
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CHAPTER II 
 
PAY GAP AMONG EXECUTIVES AND FIRM VALUE 
 
Introduction 
The compensation of corporate CEOs has been studied extensively in the past two 
decades, but few studies have explored the compensation arrangements of other top 
executives or the pay distribution of the corporation’s top executive team.41  Bebchuk, 
Cremers and Peyer (2011) study the pay gap from corporate governance perspective, and 
they view the slice of CEO pay over the aggregate compensation of the top five 
executives as a manifestation of CEO power and document a negative relation between 
pay gap and firm performance. Aggarwal, Fu and Pan (2010) empirically test the bottom-
up incentives (referred as internal governance) modeled in Acharya, Myers and Rajan 
(2010), and they find a hump-shape relation between pay gap and firm investment.
42
 Kale, 
Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) view the pay gap as an incentive mechanism to solve the 
moral hazard problem as modeled in Lazear and Rosen (1981): large pay gap motivates 
non-CEO executives to work hard for promotion and reduces managerial shirking. They 
                                                          
41
 Such studies include but not limit to Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran 
(2009), Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (forthcoming),  Aggarwal, Fu, and Pan (2010), Chen, Huang, and Wei 
(2011), Kini and Williams (2012). 
42
 The intuition is that when the CEO is paid less than managers, managers have little incentive to learn or 
exert effort and CEO has little incentive to invest for the long-run. On the other hand, when the CEO is 
paid quite high relative to the managers and the CEO is dominant, then CEO then again has little incentive 
to invest for the long-term. They measure the pay gap as the difference in abnormal compensation between 
the CEO and non-CEO executives. 
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find that firm value increases in pay gap. Thus, the effects of pay gap on firm value are 
currently in dispute. 
In this study, we consider a neglected perspective in empirical studies— the 
collaboration among executives and the efficiency of management team production. 
Lazear (1989) points out that large pay gaps potentially undermine collaboration among 
senior executives and lead to value-destroying office politics and even conscious 
sabotage. More specifically, non-CEO executives may have incentives to devote effort in 
damaging their competitors’ performance in order to inflate their own chances of being 
promoted to the CEO position, when the pay increase upon promotion is relatively high. 
Given the fact that the executive responsibilities are invariably shared and firm decisions 
embody the mutual agreement of the senior executive group, a properly designed 
incentive mechanism should minimize managerial moral hazard, while maximizing 
executive cooperation, so as to attain high overall management team productivity. 
We examine the pay gap through the lens of a simple principal-agent framework. 
Modifying the Lazear (1989) model, we add governance mechanisms that mitigate the 
moral hazard problem, i.e. equity-based executive compensation. The principal in the 
corporate context is its shareholders and the agents are the CEO and two senior 
executives who are competing to be the next CEO. The pay gap derived from the model 
is jointly determined by the expected marginal benefit of improving managerial 
incentives by linking their chances of promotion to the effort they put in and the expected 
marginal cost of inducing counterproductive rivalries (sabotage) among senior executives. 
Rivalries or sabotage refers to the general behavior that reduces co-worker productivity 
while not improving one’s own productivity. This stylized model also predicts that the 
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pay gap level depends negatively on agents’ equity deltas: the marginal benefit of having 
a large pay gap to lower moral hazard problems (including shirking) is reduced when 
other governance mechanisms exist to align manager and shareholder interests. In other 
words, equity-based incentives and corporate governance work as substitutes for a large 
pay gap. We then examine the relationship between pay gap and firm value. Our model 
clearly indicates that the effect of pay gap on firm output is a function of the parameters 
that capture key firm and executive characteristics. More specifically, the effect of pay 
gap on firm output is larger when the marginal benefit of reducing manager moral hazard 
problems is large, such as when managers have higher marginal productivity of effort. On 
the other hand, the effect of pay gap on firm output is reduced by the damage caused by 
counter-productive executive rivalries. The effect of pay gap on firm output is also found 
to fall when a firm’s equity returns are riskier. 
Using data on executive compensation for US public firms from 1996 to 2005,
43
 
we find strong support for the predictions derived from our model. The pay gap is larger 
when managerial moral hazard problems are more severe, and the pay gap is smaller 
when the expected cost of counter-productive executive rivalries is more serious. 
Examining the relationship between pay gap and firm performance, we find that the 
effect of pay gap on firm performance is significantly positive when the firm has greater 
manager-shareholder agency conflicts, creating a large managerial moral hazard problem. 
On the other hand, the effect of pay gap on firm performance is greatly diminished and 
can even be negative, when managerial shirking concerns are small, while improving 
collaboration and management team productivity is a first order of magnitude issue. 
                                                          
43
 The public firms in our data are S&P 500 large cap firms, S&P 400 mid cap firms, and S&P 600 small 
cap firms, that are reported in the Execucomp database. 
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These relationships provide evidence that the pay gap’s impact on firm performance is 
not uniform across all firms. Instead, this relationship is largely conditional on firm 
characteristics. 
We measure the pay gaps among top executives as the logarithm of dollar 
difference between CEO’s total compensation and the median total compensation of non-
CEO executives that are reported in a firm’s proxy statement. We evaluate firm value by 
looking at its industry-adjusted Q, both in the immediate future (a year ahead) and longer 
term (three years ahead). Examining the univariate statistics on the pay gap, we document 
several noteworthy findings. First, substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity exists in firm 
pay gaps, which is highlighted by a bottom quartile pay gap of $542,423, compare to that 
in the top quartile of $3,427,720.
44
 The pay gap rises over our sample period, with the 
median pay gap rising from $935,530 in 1996 to $1,948,430 in 2005. Alternatively, we 
use the CPS (CEO pay slice constructed by Bebchuk et al 2011) to measure pay gap. It is 
measured by the ratio of the CEO total compensation over the aggregate compensation of 
the top five executives.  We also find an upward trend over time using this measure. 
Second, pay gap is highly firm specific, with firm fixed effects explaining more 
than half of the cross-sectional variation.  Pay gap is also strongly correlated with firm 
level characteristics. Large firms have significantly larger pay gap than otherwise similar 
firms. This is consistent with several model predictions. Large firms tend to be more 
difficult to monitor and can have more severe moral hazard problems, which calls for a 
higher pay gap to provide additional incentives. Moreover, marginal productivity of 
                                                          
44
 Our pay gap distribution is similar, though slightly higher than that reported in Kale et al (2009), 
probably because our sample period is several years later than theirs. Our pay gap distribution appears to be 
same as Kale et al (2009) if we use their sample period. 
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executive effort increases with firm size and complexity (i.e. Rosen 1981, Rosen 1982, 
Gabaix and Landier 2008), and our model predicts a positive relation between marginal 
productivity of executive effort and pay gap. We also find that pay gap rises as firms 
become risker, which is consistent with the idea that high risk firms are more difficult to 
monitor and hence face larger managerial moral hazard problems. On the other hand, pay 
gap declines as managerial moral hazard becomes less of a concern.  For example, the 
pay gap is lower, when either firm corporate governance is strong or non-CEO top 
executive financial interests are better aligned with shareholders through a higher equity 
delta.   
One of our hypotheses is that pay gap should be smaller when team production is 
critical to firm performance and when reducing counter-productive sabotage is a top 
priority.  Siegel and Hambrick (2005) argue that top management collaboration is 
particularly important in technology-intensive firms, because of the substantial amount of 
information processing required and the need for frequent reassessments and adjustments 
in corporate strategies in the face of a rapid changing marketplace.
45
  We find that pay 
gap decreases with R&D expenditures only when overall firm corporate governance is 
strong. When both managerial moral hazard and expected costs of competing manager 
sabotage are of major concern, a higher pay gap can be expected. 
                                                          
45
 There is a long stream of research and field studies in the management literature that looks at the 
environmental uncertainty and the degree of task interdependence, i.e. Thompson (1967), Galbraith (1973), 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) , Hambrick (1994) and etc.  Siegel and Hambrick (2005) argue that 
among various forms of environmental uncertainty,  R&D intensity has the most pronounced effect on top 
management interdependence and collaboration , because first high R&D intensive firms have large 
information processing requirements and second, innovations requires frequent negotiations and mutual 
adjustments. 
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The third set of findings uncovers a relationship between pay gap and firm 
performance. The effect of pay gap on industry adjusted Tobin’s Q averaged over the full 
sample is negative, but it is not statistically significant. In contrast to Aggarwal et al 
(2010), we do not find a hump-shape relation using our pay gap measure. Neither does 
the effect of the pay gap-firm performance relationship depend on whether the large pay 
gap is due to high CEO compensation or low non-CEO executive compensation. In fact, 
we find that the pay gap-firm performance relationship is conditional on firm 
characteristics. The effect of pay gap on firm performance is positive and significant 
when monitoring costs are higher and managerial moral hazard is potentially more 
serious. For instance, the pay gap increases industry-adjusted Q significantly in large, 
complex firms, suggesting that such firms benefit more from having a larger pay gap.  On 
the other hand, the marginal effect of pay gap on industry-adjusted Q declines and even 
becomes negative, as the level of managerial moral hazard falls. We find that pay gap has 
a significant negative correlation with firm performance in firms with strong corporate 
governance and a higher median non-CEO executive equity delta.  
The relation between pay gap and firm performance also depends on how harmful 
employee sabotage is likely to be for firm performance. Our model predicts a low pay 
gap level and a low pay gap-firm performance relationship when team production is 
important and the expected cost of employee sabotage is large. We find that the 
coefficient on pay gap significantly falls with firm technology-intensity, measured by 
R&D expenses over total assets. We also find that the marginal effect of pay gap on 
industry-adjusted Q declines with firm risk, measured by volatility of stock returns, with 
an effect that is statistically significant at 1 percent level. This result complements the 
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findings in Bloom and Michel (2002), who document that a large pay gap is associated 
with higher management turnover and shorter manager tenure and that this impact is 
exacerbated under more volatile operating conditions. 
We use a quasi-natural experiment as our first approach to testing causality 
between pay gap and firm performance.  The exogenous event we use as a quasi-natural 
experiment is the Bush Administration’s 2003 Dividend Tax Cut. Chetty and Saez (2010) 
and Chetty and Saez (2005) theoretically and empirically show that dividend tax cut 
increases managers’ after-tax wealth obtained from their equity holdings and hence 
effectively increases the sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm value.  This exogenous 
tax reform legislation results in improved alignment of manager interests with 
shareholders and reduces the managerial moral hazard problem. Consequently, the 
benefit of having a large pay gap in order to reduce the managerial moral hazard problem 
becomes less attractive. Therefore, we expect firms to reduce their pay gaps following the 
dividend tax cut in 2003, and the effect of pay gap level on firm value should also 
decrease after the tax cut. Indeed, we find that on average the pay gap declines 
significantly after the tax reform, controlling for other firm characteristics and a time 
trend. The magnitude of the pay gap drop is especially large for firms having high 
managerial ownership and paying out dividends regularly. Furthermore, we find the pay 
gap effect on firm value also falls after 2003 and the reduction is especially large for 
riskier and high R&D intensive firms.  
We also use a conventional IV-GMM approach to address potential endogeneity 
to further establish the causality of the pay gap-firm performance relationship. The 
exogenous instrumental variables for the pay gap are the industry’s median pay gap level 
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and the number of internal CEO successions by industry firms over the prior year. A 
firm’s pay gap is highly correlated with industry pay gap since many firms tend to 
benchmark to industry peers in setting executive compensation. Furthermore, industry 
trends concerning hiring internal CEO candidates can significantly influence CEO 
succession decisions of firms within the industry, and hence affect a firm’s pay gap level. 
However, economically, there is no clear reason to expect these two industry specific 
variables to be directly related to an individual firm’s industry-adjusted Q. Formal 
statistical tests, including Hansen’s J statistic and the Cragg-Donald Wald test, indicate 
that the two instrumental variables both meet the exclusion and relevance requirements 
for statistically valid IVs. Importantly, we find that our main findings regarding the 
relationship between pay gap and firm value continue to hold under the IV-GMM 
specifications. 
Our paper is organized as follows. We present a simple model in Section 2 to 
motivate our empirical analysis. The data and sample construction are presented in 
section 3. We report our primary empirical evidence in section 4.  The quasi-natural 
experiment using 2003 tax cut is presented in section 5. We report our robustness tests in 
section 6 and conclude in section 7. 
 
Model 
We adopt a simple model to illustrate how the choice of pay gap level reflects a 
tradeoff between the benefit of reducing managerial moral hazard and the expected cost 
of inducing lower level employee sabotage. Our model is similar to the framework in 
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Lazear (1989), with our primary innovation being the inclusion of other incentive 
mechanisms to help align manager interests with those of shareholders. We emphasize 
the purpose of this model is purely to illustrate the relationship that inspires the later 
empirical tests, rather than to identify a specific structural equation system. 
Consider two agents j and k who are competing to become the next CEO. The 
agent’s productivity ( , )q    is a positive function of his/her own effort  , and is a 
negative function of the rival’s sabotage activity  . The agent also bears a cost ( , )c   , 
which is a positive function of the agent’s individual effort to improve productivity and to 
sabotage the rival. The firm’s output Q  depends on the collective effort and sabotage 
levels of the two agents: 
                                                                              (1)
                                                                 (1a)
                 
j k
j j k j
k k j k
Q q q
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The parameter  reflects the agent’s marginal productivity of effort, which may 
be a function of firm risk 2 , as well as other sources of heterogeneity in firm and agent 
characteristics. The parameter   represents the marginal reduction in productivity from a 
competitor’s sabotage activities. Effort is unobservable by the principal, but all other 
parameters are common knowledge. Denote a linear sharing rule between the principal 
and the agents, which aligns the interests of the agents and principal, S sQ  .  The 
agent receives a pay package of 1w  if he/ she wins promotion, otherwise the agent 
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receives a pay package of 2w  if he/she loses the competition and stays on the current 
position or is forced to leave the firm and search for another position. The agent cares 
about his/ her total pay less the costs involved, and has exponential utility with constant 
absolute risk aversion . The agent j  then maximizes 
2 2
1 , , 2 , , , , , { ( ; ) [1 ( ; )] ( ) ( ; ) }max
2,
j j k k j j k k j j j j j j k kw p w p c S s

              
 
    
                                                                                                                 (3) 
The promotion probability p  depends not only on an agent’s own productivity, 
but also on that of its rival and it indirectly depends on the two agents’ sabotage activities.  
This is formally stated as 
, ,( ; ) ( )
[( ) ( ) ]
j j k k j k
j k k k k j
p prob q q
prob
G
   
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
                             (4) 
where G is the distribution function of the random variable 
k j  , the random shocks on 
firm production and the agents’ idiosyncratic production. 
Solving the first order condition, we obtain the levels of productive effort and 
sabotage of agent j  given 1 2 ,  , and  w w s : 
1 2
1 2
[( ) (.) ]                                                     (5a)
2
[( ) (.) ]                                                      (5b)
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j
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A
w w g s
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Because the two agents are symmetric, the level of productive effort and sabotage chosen 
by agent k are determined in the same way. We can clearly see that both effort and 
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sabotage increase as the pay gap gets larger. Moreover, the alignment of an agent’s 
interests with that of the principal, s , helps to constrain the two agents’ sabotage behavior. 
Hence, a better way to induce effort and lower the level of sabotage is to maintain a 
relatively low pay gap ( 1 2w w ) and a better alignment of manager and shareholder 
interests through equity-based manager compensation. 
The competitive firm must maximize the two agents’ expected rents subject to a 
zero-profit constraint by choosing 1 2, ,w w s . Solving the first order condition, we get the 
following equilibrium pay gap 1 2w w    and the sharing rule s : 
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Substituting (5a) and (5b) back into (1), we obtain the relationship between firm 
output Q and the pay gap level 
 
2 2 2 2
( ) (.) ( )Q g s
A B A B
   
                                             (8) 
Several implications emerge by examining equation (6). The pay gap is 
determined by the tradeoff between the marginal benefit of improving manager 
incentives and thereby reducing moral hazard ( 2 / A ) and the marginal cost of 
encouraging strong rival competition, which induces potential sabotage behavior 
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(
2 / B ). Notice that marginal benefits and marginal costs are highly related to the firm’s 
environment that influences managers’ marginal productivity of effort , the costs of 
undertaking sabotage B, and the damage brought about by agents’ sabotage  . Moreover, 
when managerial interests are better align with those of principals through other 
governance arrangements, the moral hazard problem is less severe, and the benefit of the 
pay gap is lower. Hence, the optimal pay gap decreases with the quality of the firm’s 
corporate governance and the managers’ equity delta. Thus, the optimal pay gap is highly 
firm specific. Given this analysis, we form the following hypotheses: 
1. / 0   . Pay gap increases in a manager’s marginal productivity of effort. 
Hence, pay gap should be larger in large and more complex firms, because a manager’s 
marginal productivity of effort is high in such firms (i.e. Rosen 1982, Gabaix and Landier 
2008). 
2. / 0    . Pay gap decreases in the damage associated with agent sabotage. 
Hence, given that Siegel and Hambrick (2005) find that team production is more 
important in high-tech firms, we expect pay gap to be lower in technology-intensive firms.  
3. / 0s   . Pay gap should be lower when managers have better incentives due 
to their equity holdings and other firm governance mechanisms that align their interests 
with those of the principals. 
4. / 0
g
g


 
   
 
. Pay gap increases in the variance of the random 
production shocks, which is our measure of firm risk.  
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The relationship between pay gap and firm output is also largely conditional on 
firm characteristics as indicated by equation (8).  The coefficient of pay gap is increasing 
in the marginal benefit of improving manager incentives and reducing moral hazard 
(
2 / A ) and the marginal cost of encouraging greater manager competition, which can 
lead to agent sabotage (
2 / B ). In light of the model predictions, we form the following 
testable hypotheses with regard to the relationship between pay gap and firm value: 
5. / 0Q     The effect of pay gap on firm value increases in marginal 
productivity of managerial effort. Hence, we expect a greater effect of pay gap on firm 
value in large and complex firms. 
6. / 0Q     The effect of pay gap on firm value decreases in the expected 
damage associated with agent sabotage. Therefore, we expect the effect of pay gap on 
firm value to fall with the level of R&D intensity, which requires greater agent 
cooperation.  
7. / 0Q     The effect of pay gap on firm value also falls with rising firm 
risk. 
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Data and Sample Description 
 
Data Source 
We obtain top executive officer names and compensation data from Compustat’s 
Execucomp. Since FAS123R substantially changed the reporting rule on equity based 
compensation starting in year 2006,
46
 our sample ends in 2005 to allow equity-based 
compensation to be estimated on a consistent basis. Identification of the CEO is primarily 
based on the Chief Executive Officer code (CEOANN=CEO). The sample only includes 
firms with a clearly identified CEO and at least three non-CEO senior executives reported 
in Execucomp. Firm accounting information and stock return information are taken from 
Compustat and CRSP respectively. Boards of directors and other corporate governance 
characteristics are obtained from RiskMetrics. Because RiskMetrics begins reporting 
board of director information in year 1996, our sample begins in that year.  Thus, our 
major tests are based on the 10-year sample period from 1996 to 2005.  
 
                                                          
46
 Specifically, the FASB began requiring that the public entities report the cost of all employee stock 
options and other equity based compensation based on their current fair value. 
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Figure 1 Time Series Trend of Pay Gap 
 
Variable Definition 
The pay gap is measured as the difference in total compensation between the CEO 
and median total compensation of the other top executives who are reported in the proxy 
statements. We then scale the difference by taking the natural logarithm.  Following Kale 
et al (2009), due to the existence of cases where a CEO’s total compensation is less than 
the median non-CEO executive’s total compensation, which results in a negative pay gap, 
we monotonically transform all observations by adding a constant equal to the absolute 
value of the minimum gap to each observation. The pay gap measure is based on the total 
compensation of each top executive, including salary, bonus, other annual pay, the 
market value of restricted stock granted that year, the Black-Scholes value of stock 
options granted that year, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation 
elements (as reported in Execucomp item TDC1).  The sample mean and median of pay 
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gap is $3,023,210 and $1,380,640, respectively, and we observe a large cross-sectional 
variation. The bottom quartile of pay gap is $542,424 and the top quartile is $3,427,720. 
Meanwhile, there is a significant upward trend over time as shown in Figure 1. The 
median pay gap is $935,530 in 1996 and it increases to $1,948,430. We also use several 
alternative pay gap measures, including the CPS (CEO pay slice) studied by Bebchuk et 
al (2011), the coefficient of variation of the total compensation for the top executives and 
the Gini coefficient of total compensation among the top executives. We find a similar 
upward trend over our sample period when we use these alternative measures, reported in 
Table 1.
47
 These alternative pay gap measures have significant positive correlations, 
although they are far from perfectly correlated.  
 
Table 1 Time Series Trend of Pay Gap (000$) 
Panel A: Pay Gap ($000) = CEO total compensation –median non-CEO executive total 
compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation over the aggregate total compensation of all top 5 executives. 
Coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of total compensation for all top executives divided by the 
mean value of total compensation for all top executives.  The equation to calculate Gini coefficient is:  
1
1 2
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where P is the rank of total compensation and X is the amount of total compensation for person i. 
Year Mean Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile 
1996 1943.71 394.82 935.53 2026.07 
1997 2358.5 458.56 1113.94 2557.25 
1998 2555.9 468.077 1186.52 2809.53 
1999 3079.04 470.06 1253.38 3333.16 
2000 3493.99 528.07 1407.66 3761.61 
2001 3618.82 547.75 1586.83 4302.45 
2002 3196.96 590.91 1578.23 3829.78 
2003 3015.95 612.86 1536.24 3616.8 
2004 3359.86 774.19 1890.7 3988.75 
2005 3538.75 800.2 1948.43 4288.38 
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Panel B: Alternative Measures 
Sample Median Year by Year 
Year CPS Coefficient of Variation Gini Coefficient 
1996 0.35 0.56 0.31 
1997 0.36 0.576 0.326 
1998 0.362 0.582 0.329 
1999 0.365 0.604 0.335 
2000 0.368 0.611 0.342 
2001 0.375 0.618 0.345 
2002 0.378 0.62 0.345 
2003 0.38 0.612 0.338 
2004 0.385 0.614 0.337 
2005 0.39 0.634 0.345 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
    Lower 
Quartile 
  Upper 
Quartile Variable Name Mean Median 
Key Variables         
Adjusted Q 0.59 -0.14 0.15 0.79 
Pay gap (thousand $) 3023.21 542.42 1380.64 3427.72 
Log (Pay gap) 7.82 7.31 7.76 8.38 
Total Assets (million $) 5427.17 434.40 1157.72 3633.65 
Number of Business Segments 2.22 1 2 3 
Governance Index Score 0.10 -1.63 -0.07 1.70 
RD/Total Assets 0.03 0 0 0.04 
Firm Risk 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.16 
Log (CEO Equity Delta) 12.64 11.60 12.45 13.45 
Log (Median Non-CEO Equity Delta) 10.20 9.11 10.21 11.25 
     
Firm Characteristics         
CEO Tenure 6.31 2 4 9 
CEO Chairman Dummy 0.63 N/A N/A N/A 
Board Size 9 7 9 11 
Board Independence 0.65 0.55 0.66 0.79 
Percentage of  Busy Independent Director 0.1 0 0 0.20 
Presence of  IDB 0.10 N/A N/A N/A 
Entrenchment Index 1.75 1 3 4 
Market Leverage 0.22 0.04 0.17 0.35 
Capx/Total Assets 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 
 
Alternative Measures of Pay Gap         
CPS 0.37 0.29 0.37 0.44 
Coefficient of Variation 0.65 0.45 0.61 0.79 
Gini Coefficient 0.35 0.25 0.33 0.43 
 
Correlation among Alternative Pay Gap Measures 
 
 
Pay Gap CPS 
Coefficient of 
Variation Gini Coefficient 
Pay Gap 1 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 
CPS 
 
1 0.58*** 0.54*** 
Coefficient of Variation 
 
1 0.97*** 
Gini Coefficient 
  
1 
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We measure firm value using Tobin’s Q, approximated by book value of assets 
minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, all divided by book value of 
assets. Each firm’s Tobin’s Q measure is industry adjusted by subtracting the industry 
median Q, where the industry is defined by FF 49 industries using the Compustat 
Universe (excluding the firm in question). We examine both industry adjusted Q at year 
(t+1) (termed the one-year adjusted Q) and the average industry adjusted Q over the next 
three years (termed the three-year adjusted Q). The median one-year adjusted Q and 
three-year adjusted Q are 0.128 and 0.125, respectively. 
We evaluate the overall strength of corporate governance based on five 
dimensions: (1) board composition and board monitoring; (2) blockholder monitoring; (3) 
anti-takeover provisions that measure the strength of the market for corporate control; (4) 
a CEO’s formal positions and power inside the firm; (5) industry competition. To be 
specific, (1) includes board size (median=9), percentage of independent directors 
(median=0.66), percentage of busy independent directors who serve on more than three 
boards (mean=0.1, median=0). For (2), we use an indicator for the presence of 
independent blockholder (IDB) on the board (frequency=0.10).
 48 
For (3), we use the 
entrenchment index (E index) of Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell (2009) (median=2). For (4), 
we use an indicator for CEO-chair duality (frequency=0.65), while for (5) industry 
competition is measured by a Herfindahl index for the firm’s main 4 digit SIC 
(median=0.03).  Due to the correlation among those governance mechanisms and the 
potential substitution (Fahlenbrach 2009) and complementarity effects (Hartzell and 
Starks 2003) among them, we construct a single governance index score to capture the 
                                                          
48 Following Agrawal and Nasser(2010), I define independent director blockholders (IDB) as independent 
directors holding more than one percent of total shareholdings or of total votes.  
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overall strength of a firm’s governance. To be specific, each of the above variables is 
standardized by demeaning it and scaling it to have a unit standard deviation. Variables 
negatively associated with governance quality, i.e. percentage of busy independent 
directors, the E index, CEO-chair duality indicator and the Herfindahl index, are 
multiplied by -1. The governance index score is then calculated as the linear combination 
of those transformed variables, where a high score indicates a firm with better overall 
level of governance. The mean and median values of the governance index score are 0.06 
and -0.05, respectively. Firms whose score falls below the 25 percentile level (score=-
1.63) are considered to have extremely weak corporate governance (captured by a weak 
governance indicator). On the other hand, firms whose score is above the 75 percentile 
level (score=1.70) are considered well governed, which is represented by a strong 
corporate governance indicator.  
The median firm in our sample has total assets of $1157 million dollars and 
operates in two business segments. Firms operating in multiple business segments and 
with above-median size are regarded as complex in the nature of its business and 
organizational structure, in contrast to small firms operating in single segment, which is 
similar to the definition used in Coles et al (2008). Technology-intensity is captured by a 
firm’s investment in R&D activities.  We define firms that have R&D to total assets ratio 
greater than or equal to the 75 percentile level (R&D/ total assets=0.04) to be technology-
intensive. Note that the R&D intensity of the sample firms is highly right skewed. We 
assess firm risk by looking at its stock return volatility, measured as the standard 
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deviation of its 60-month stock returns over the past five years.
49
 The sample mean and 
median of stock return volatility is 0.13 and 0.11, respectively. We measure an 
executive’s alignment of interest with shareholders using the executive’s equity delta, 
which is defined as the dollar change in his or her accumulated stock and option 
portfolios for a 1% change in stock price, following the approach of Core and Guay 
(2002). Haubrich (1994), Hall and Liebman (1998), and Core and Guay (1999) argue that 
a wealth-constrained and risk-averse manager can obtain powerful incentives from a 
large dollar equity portfolio. Our sample of CEOs has an median equity delta of $256,199, 
while the median non-CEO executive‘s equity delta is substantially lower with a median 
of $25,233. We report the sample statistics in Table 2 and all continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile levels. 
Negative Pay Gap 
Sometimes, the CEO is paid less than the median level of the non-CEO top 
executives and this leads to a negative pay gap.  About 5.34% of our firm-year 
observations (892 out of 16699) have a negative pay gaps. Some firms only have 
negative pay gaps occasionally, while some firms persistently have CEO paid less than 
other top executives, i.e. Franklin Resources, Southwest Airlines, Safeguard Scientifics, 
Biomet, and etc. Table 3 compares negative-pay-gap firms with positive-pay-gap firms. 
Firms having negative pay gaps are smaller, invest significantly more in R&D expenses, 
and have more volatile stock returns. Their overall corporate governance mechanisms are 
also much stronger. A higher portion of such firms have CEOs who are founders or 
                                                          
49
 For firms that have less than 5 years of public history, we use the monthly observations of stock returns 
that are available. However, we require a minimum of 12 consecutive months observations. 
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founding family members. In terms of industry representation, about half of the firms 
with negative pay gaps are in business services (FF industry 34), chips and electronic 
equipment (FF industry 36), Retail (FF industry 42), and Transportation (FF industry 40).  
The descriptive statistics is largely consistent with our predictions (1)-(3).
50
  
 
Table 3 Negative Pay Gap Firms vs. Positive Pay Gap Firms 
 
Firms with Positive Pay 
Gap   
Firms with Negative Pay 
Gap 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Total Assets (million 
dollars) 5430.63 1186.29 
 
5367.8 758.37 
Number of Business 
Segments 2.23 1 
 
2.06 1 
RD/Total Assets 0.03 0 
 
0.06 0 
Firm Risk 0.13 0.11 
 
0.17 0.15 
Log (CEO Equity Delta) 12.63 12.45 
 
12.88 12.45 
Log (Median Non-CEO 
Equity Delta) 10.21 10.21 
 
10.12 10.08 
Governance Index Score 0.08 -0.11 
 
0.78 0.54 
CEO is the Founder 6% 
  
17% 
 CEO is Founder Family 
Member 3% 
  
4% 
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 Prior studies generally do not treat firms with negative pay gaps separately. The descriptive statistics in 
this section shows .that firms with negative pay gaps could have different characteristics from those with 
positive pay gaps. Therefore we exclude them from our sample in robustness tests to make sure our main 
results are not purely driven by this subgroup of firms, though negative gaps are always possible under 
some bonus schemes. 
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Empirical Results 
 
Pay Gap Level and Firm Characteristics 
We first examine the relationship of pay gap and firm characteristics. We find that 
pay gap is highly firm-specific and it is significantly correlated with factors reflecting the 
marginal benefit of managerial effort and the marginal costs of rival manager sabotage. 
The results in column one of Table 4 show that firm size has a significant positive 
correlation with pay gap, consistent with the prediction that pay gap should increase with 
a manager’s marginal productivity of effort. The pay gap is negatively correlated with 
other top executives’ median equity delta and the coefficient is statistically significant at 
1 percent level, suggesting that when non-CEO top executive incentives are better 
aligned with shareholder interests, a lower pay gap is optimal. Similarly, we find pay gap 
decreases with the firm’s corporate governance score, suggesting that when the overall 
corporate governance is strong enough to substantially lower manager-shareholder 
agency problems, the benefit of having large pay gaps is also reduced. This result is also 
in line with argument in Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2010) that internal incentives can 
substitute for other corporate governance mechanisms. Consistent with our prediction (4), 
we find that pay gap increases with firm risk. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that pay 
gap is related to firm R&D level in any significant way, which stands in contrast with the 
prediction that high technology-intensive firms that bear large costs of productivity-
reducing competing manager sabotage should have low pay gaps. One possible reason is 
that although high-tech firms generally suffer greatly from uncooperative rival 
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competition, they are also generally hard to monitor due to their high technology-
intensity, which requires larger pay gap to control for a potential manager moral hazard 
problem. Therefore, we further examine whether high-tech firms significantly reduce pay 
gap when the overall corporate governance mechanisms are strong enough to control 
managerial moral hazard. As predicted, this is indeed what we find:  pay gap is 
negatively related to R&D intensity when moral hazard is kept low by strong corporate 
governance, thus causing managerial collaboration to be a priority for these firms.   
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Table 4 Determinants of Pay Gap 
 
                                      (1) (2) 
 
                (3) 
Log (Firm Size) 0.15 
***
 
  
0.15 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
   
(0.03) 
 R&D/Total Assets 0.35 
 
0.4
   
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.31) 
   R&D/Total Assets* Governance Index Score 
   
       Volatility of Stock 
Returns 0.85 
**
 0.65 
**
 0.85 
***
 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.3) 
 
(0.3) 
 Log (Median Non-CEO Equity) -0.03 
**
 -0.02 
**
 -0.03 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.010) 
 Governance Index Score -0.03 
***
 -0.02 
***
 -0.03 
***
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 Number of Business Segments -0.006 
   
-0.006 
 
 
(0.008) 
   
(0.008) 
 Complex Firm Indicator 
  
0.017
***
 
  
   
(0.003) 
   High-Tech Indicator 
    
0.06
 
     
(0.06) 
 Market Leverage -0.25
**
 -0.19
*
 -0.24 
**
 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.11) 
 Tobin Q 0.03 
**
 0.015 
 
0.03 
**
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 CEO Above 62 
Dummy -0.004 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.005 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 Log (CEO Tenure) -0.09 
***
 -0.09 
***
 -0.09 
***
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
 Log (CEO Equity 
Delta) 0.35 
***
 0.37 
***
 0.35 
***
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
       Firm Fixed Effects Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of 
Observations 10142 
 
10142 
 
10142 
 R-Squared 0.5 
 
 0.49 
 
 0.49 
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Table 4, continued 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6   
Log (Firm Size) 0.15 
***
 0.14 
***
 0.14 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 R&D/Total Assets 0.35 
 
0.33 
 
0.22 
 
 
(0.3) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.32) 
 R&D/Total Assets* Governance Index Score 
 
-0.61 
**
 
     
(0.30) 
 Volatility of Stock Returns 0.87 
***
 
  
0.86 
***
 
 
(0.34) 
   
(0.33) 
 Log (Median Non-CEO Equity) 
 
-0.03 
***
 -0.03 
***
 
   
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 Governance Index Score -0.03 
***
 -0.03 
***
 -0.03 
***
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 Number of Business Segments -0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 High Non-CEO Equity Delta Indicator -0.068 
**
 
    
 
(0.029) 
     High Risk Firm Indicator 
  
0.014 
***
 
  
   
(0.003) 
   Market Leverage -0.23 
**
 -0.23 
**
 -0.25 
**
 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 Tobin Q 0.028 
**
 0.028 
**
 0.028 
**
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 CEO Above 62 Dummy -0.005 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.036) 
 Log (CEO Tenure) -0.09 
***
 -0.095 
***
 -0.095 
***
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 Log (CEO Equity Delta) 0.35 
***
 0.35 
***
 0.35 
***
 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
       Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 10142 
 
10142 
 
10142 
 
R-Squared 0.49  0.49  0.49   
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Our results from using indicator variables in place of continuous variables are 
similar to the regression results in column one. We find that large and complex firms 
have larger pay gaps than small and single segment firms. High risk firms also have 
significantly larger pay gaps than low risk firms. Firms with above-median equity deltas 
for non-CEO executives have an average 6 percent lower pay gap than firms with non-
CEO executive equity deltas below the sample median. Firms with strong corporate 
governance have an average pay gap that is 12 percent lowers than firms with weak 
governance.  
Pay Gap Level and Firm Value 
We next test the effect of pay gaps on firm value measured by one-year and three-
year industry-adjusted Tobin’s Qs. Table 5 reports the regression results of one-year and 
three-year industry-adjusted Q on pay gap, controlling for other factors that earlier 
studies document to affect firm performance. Although we find pay gap is negatively 
correlated with firm performance, it is statistically insignificant once we include firm 
fixed effects. This result is in line with equation (8) in our model: the effect of pay gap on 
firm value is conditional on firm specific parameters, and both the sign and magnitude of 
the coefficient are determined by the marginal benefit of reducing managerial moral 
hazard and the marginal costs of non-CEO manager sabotage. We also include a 
quadratic term on pay gap to test if there is an invert-U relationship. We find that neither 
pay gap, nor its squared value, are significantly related to firm performance (measured by 
short term or long term performance), contradicting the findings reported by Aggarwal et 
al (2011).  
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Table 5 Effect of Pay Gap on Firm Value: Full Sample 
  
  One-Year Adjusted Tobin's Q (t+1)     
 
    (1)      (2)       (3)      (4) 
Log (Pay Dispersion) -0.018 
**
 -0.009 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.013 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 Log (Pay Dispersion)
2
 
    
-0.0001 
   
     
(0.002) 
   Log (Pay Gap)* Positive CEO Abnormal Pay 
    
-0.001
 
       
(0.02) 
 Log (Pay Gap)*Negative non-CEO Abnormal Pay 
   
0.002 
 
       
(0.017) 
 Positive CEO Abnormal Pay 
      
0.02 
 
       
(0.17) 
 Negative non-CEO Abnormal Pay 
     
-0.03 
 
       
(0.13) 
 Log (Total Assets) -0.03
***
 -0.62
***
 -0.63
***
 -0.62 
***
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 Adjusted Q 0.71 
***
 0.33 
***
 0.33 
***
 0.33 
***
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 Leverage -0.17 
***
 0.14 
*
 0.14 
*
 0.15 
*
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 Volatility of Stock Returns -0.29 
*
 -0.41 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.4 
 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.26) 
 RD/Total Assets 0.83 
***
 0.74 
***
 0.74 
***
 0.74 
***
 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.24) 
 CAPX/Total Assets -0.43 
***
 -0.11 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.11 
 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.19) 
 Diversified -0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 Log (CEO Tenure) -0.014 
 
0.012 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 Log (CEO Equity Delta) 0.022 
**
 0.01 
 
0.014 
 
0.011 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 Log (Median Non-CEO Equity) 0.03 
***
 0.006 
 
0.003 
 
0.007 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 Governance Index Score 0.001 
 
0.01 
***
 0.013 
***
 0.013 
***
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
         Firm Fixed Effects No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 9643 
 
9643 
 
9643 
 
9643 
 R-Squared 0.64 
 
 0.76 
 
 0.77 
 
 0.77 
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Table 5, continued 
  
Three-Year Adjusted Tobin's Q (t+1, t+3)  
  
 
(5)      (6)      (7)      (8) 
Log (Pay Dispersion) -0.02 
***
 -0.004 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.008 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.007) 
 Log (Pay Dispersion)
2
 
    
0.0001 
   
     
(0.001) 
   Log (Pay Gap)* Positive CEO 
Abnormal Pay 
      
0.006 
 
       
(0.01) 
 Log (Pay Gap)*Negative non-
CEO Abnormal Pay 
      
-0.004 
 
       
(0.01) 
 Positive CEO Abnormal Pay 
      
-0.02 
 
       
(0.12) 
 Negative non-CEO Abnormal Pay 
      
0.03 
 
       
(0.09) 
 Log (Total Assets) -0.03
***
 -0.63
***
 -0.64
***
 -0.63 
***
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 Adjusted Q 0.57 
***
 0.13 
***
 0.13 
***
 0.13 
***
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 Leverage -0.18 
***
 0.33 
***
 0.33 
***
 0.33 
***
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 Volatility of Stock Returns -0.23 
*
 -0.12 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.13 
 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.19) 
 RD/Total Assets 1.05 
***
 0.33 
*
 0.32 
*
 0.32 
*
 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.17) 
 CAPX/Total Assets -0.4 
***
 0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 Diversified -0.03 
**
 0.016 
 
0.016 
 
0.016 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 Log (CEO Tenure) -0.013 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 Log (CEO Equity Delta) 0.03 
***
 0.02 
**
 0.02 
**
 0.02 
**
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 Log (Median Non-CEO Equity) 0.03 
***
 -0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 Governance Index Score -0.002 
 
0.009 
***
 0.009 
***
 0.009 
***
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
         Firm Fixed Effects No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 9643 
 
9643 
 
9643 
 
9643 
 R-Squared 0.59 
 
 0.84 
 
 0.77 
 
 0.77  
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Since firms could have large pay gaps either because CEO pay is very high or 
non-CEO manager pay is relatively low, we test if the pay gap-firm performance 
relationship depends on the source of the large pay gap. We first estimate the abnormal 
CEO pay using the residual from regressing total CEO compensation on firm size, market 
to book ratio, year and industry fixed effects. The abnormal compensation for median 
non-CEOs is calculated in the same way. We observe that 42.35% of firm-year 
observations have positive abnormal CEO compensation, while 59.22% of firm-year 
observations have negative abnormal median non-CEO compensation. We then interact 
the pay gap with an indicator for positive CEO abnormal pay and an indicator for 
negative non-CEO abnormal pay in model 4 and model 8 of Table 5. Once again, we find 
statistically insignificant relationship between pay gap and firm performance. 
Furthermore, the relationship is not related to whether CEO pay is too high or non-CEO 
pay is too low.  
Our hypotheses in section 2 suggest that the relationship between pay gap and 
firm value relies on the marginal benefit of reducing managerial moral hazard, which is 
closely related to manager marginal productivity. Following this logic, we test the effect 
of pay gap on firm performance conditional on firm complexity. As modeled in Rosen 
(1982) and Gabaix and Landier (2008), marginal productivity of manager effort increases 
with firm size and complexity. We test prediction (5) by interacting pay gap with a 
complex-firm indicator, with the results reported in Table 6. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find a significant positive coefficient on the interaction term in both the 
one-year and three-year industry-adjusted Q regressions, suggesting that complex firms 
reap greater benefits from having larger pay gaps. The effect of pay gap on firm  
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Table 6 Effect of Pay Gap on Firm Value Conditional on Firm Type 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1 Y Adj. Q 3 Y Adj.Q 1 Y Adj. Q 3 Y Adj.Q 
1 Y Adj. 
Q 3 Y Adj.Q 
Log (Pay gap) -0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
0.007 
 
0.002 
 
0.04 
 
0.098 
***
 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.038) 
 Log (Pay gap)* Complex Firm 0.044 
***
 0.06 
***
 
        
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
         Log (Pay gap)* Corporate Governance Index 
    
-0.002 
**
 -0.005 
***
 
    
     
(0.0025) 
 
(0.002) 
     Log (Pay gap)*  Non-CEO Equity Delta 
        
-0.005 
\
 -0.01 
***
 
         
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 Complex Firm Dummy -0.42 
***
 -0.58 
***
 
        
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.10) 
         Corporate Governance Index 
    
0.033 
*
 0.05 
***
 
    
     
(0.02) 
 
(0.014) 
     Non-CEO Equity Delta 
        
0.046 
 
0.07 
***
 
         
(0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
 
             Firm Level Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 9709 
 
9709 
 
9709 
 
9709 
 
9713 
 
9713 
 R-Squared 0.75 
 
0.82 
 
 0.77   0.84   0.78   0.87   
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performance also depends on the severity of a firm’s moral hazard problem. In firms 
where strong corporate governance tightly limits the moral hazard problem, the marginal 
benefit of reducing CEO moral hazard is lower and so is the benefit of raising pay gap on 
firm value. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the marginal effect of pay gap on 
firm value significantly falls with the overall strength of a firm’s corporate governance. 
The magnitude is economically large: the marginal effect of pay gap on one-year industry 
adjusted Q falls by 70% if the firm’s corporate governance moves from the bottom 
quartile to the top quartile, while the marginal effect of pay gap on three-year industry 
adjusted Q becomes negative when a firm’s corporate governance index score is in the 
top quartile.  Similarly, we find that the marginal benefit of having a large pay gap to 
improve managerial incentives and hence raise firm value is greatly reduced when non-
CEO executives have high equity deltas.  The marginal effect of pay gap on three-year 
industry adjusted Q falls from a significantly positive to a significantly negative 
coefficient, if non-CEO executive equity deltas move from the bottom quartile to the top 
quartile for our sample. 
 We test hypothesis (6) by interacting pay gap with R&D intensity.  Consistent 
with the hypothesis that the effect of pay gap on firm value decreases with the potential 
cost of competing manager rivalry, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of pay 
gap and R&D intensity is negative and significant. The marginal effect of pay gap on 
one-year adjusted Q is 84 percent lower for high R&D-intensity firms than for firms 
without significant R&D expenditures.  The coefficient of pay gap in the firm value 
regressions also depends on firm riskiness. Specifically, the estimates in the last two 
columns of Table 6 indicate that the marginal effect of pay gap on firm value 
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significantly falls as firm risk increases. The coefficient of pay gap is 0.038 for firms in 
the bottom quartile of stock return volatility, compared to -0.014 for firms in the top 
quartile. This is strongly consistent with prediction (7) that riskier firms suffer more from 
large pay gaps. Our result complements the findings in Bloom and Michel (2002), which 
documents that large pay gaps are associated with higher manager turnover and shorter 
manager tenure, and this impact can be intensified under more volatile operating 
conditions. 
Predicted Pay Gap and Firm Value 
We test the relation between pay gap and firm value in Table 7 using the fitted 
value for pay gap. The reason for using predicted pay gap instead of the actual level is 
that the actual pay gap can be affected by random shocks from time to time and hence, 
the relationship we document in Table 6 could be spuriously driven by those random 
shocks. Using fitted values helps to control for the effects from these random shocks. 
Our results remain the same under this specification. Predicted pay gap 
significantly reduces firm value in small and single segment firms, while it significantly 
increases firm value in large, multi-segment firms (conglomerates). The positive effect of 
predicted pay gap on firm value significantly falls if overall corporate governance is 
strong or if non-CEO top executives have high equity deltas. The effect of predicted pay 
gap on firm value even becomes negative if the firm has a corporate governance score 
above 0.5 or the median non-CEO top executive has an equity delta that is high enough 
(above the  95 percentile of the sample). The effect of predicted pay gap on industry-
adjusted Q also falls with R&D intensity, and its effect is reduced by almost 70% if a  
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Table 7 Pay Gap and Firm Value: Using Predicted Pay Gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 
Log (Predicted Pay gap) 2.71 
***
 -4.05 
***
 0.05 
**
 0.34 
***
 0.13 
***
 0.23 
***
 
 
(0.74) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.03) 
 Log (Predicted Pay gap)* Complex Firm 
  
0.1 
***
 
        
   
(0.02) 
         Log (Predicted Pay gap)* Corporate Governance Index 
    
-0.1 
**
 
      
     
(0.04) 
       Log (Predicted Pay gap)*  Non-CEO Equity Delta 
      
-0.026 
***
 
    
       
(0.005) 
     Log (Predicted Pay gap)* R&D/TA 
        
-2.24 
***
 
  
         
(0.18) 
   Log (Predicted Pay gap)* Volatility of Stock Return 
          
-1.42 
***
 
           
(0.19) 
 Complex Firm Dummy 
  
-0.79 
***
 
        
   
(0.16) 
         Corporate Governance Index 
    
0.074 
***
 
      
     
(0.02) 
       Non-CEO Equity Delta 
      
0.2 
***
 
    
       
(0.045) 
     R&D/TA 
        
0.19 
***
 
  
         
(0.014) 
   Volatility of Stock Return 
          
1.92 
***
 
           
(0.154) 
 Firm Level Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 9709 
 
9709 
 
9709 
 
9713 
 
9713 
 
9700 
 R-Squared 0.84  0.84 
 
 0.84   0.84   0.84 
 
0.84   
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firm with no material R&D expenditures begins to invest heavily in R&D and moves its 
R&D intensity level to the top quartile of the sample (R&D/total assets= 0.04). Similarly, 
the positive effect of predicted pay gap on firm value also falls significantly as a firm’s 
risk level rises.  
 
2003 Tax Reform as a Quasi-Natural Experiment 
 
The Impact of Dividend Tax Cut 
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 drastically cut the 
dividend tax to a flat rate of 5 or 15 percent
51
 from the previous progressive tax schedule 
with a top rate of 35 percent. The agency model of dividend tax in Chetty and Saez (2010) 
shows that a dividend cut leads to lower agency problems, because it increases manager 
after-tax wealth obtained from their equity holdings and thus, results in a better alignment 
of interest between managers and shareholders. We term this as an increase in effective 
ownership, because its effect is equivalent to an increase in manager share ownership. 
Empirical evidence has shown that corporate behavior changes around the 2003 dividend 
tax cut. For instance, Chetty and Saez (2005) find that regular dividends rose sharply 
right after the 2003 tax cut. Cheng, Hong and Shue (2012) find that after this dividend cut, 
managers are less likely to push pet projects such as “corporate goodness”. 
                                                          
51
 More precisely, taxpayers in the bottom two income tax brackets face a new dividend tax rate of 5 
percent, while taxpayers in the top four brackets face a new dividend tax rate of 15 percent. 
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 In addition to dividend tax cut, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation of 
2003 also cuts the capital gains tax significantly. The capital gains tax decreased from 
rates of 8%, 10%, and 20% to 5% and 15%. The drop in capital gains tax shifts executive 
preferences towards more stock based compensation, which can also result in increased 
managerial ownership. We use the 2003 tax reform as a largely exogenous event, which 
increases managers’ alignment of interest with shareholders and hence, reduces 
managerial moral hazard incentives. We then study the corresponding changes in pay 
gaps and the effect of pay gaps on firm performance. 
The intuition behind the Chetty and Saez (2005) model is straightforward. The 
manager can do three things with a firm’s cash X: pay out dividends D, invest I in a 
productive project that generates net profits f(I) for shareholders, or invest J in a pet 
project that gives the manager private benefits of g(J). Assuming the manager holds α 
percent of the firm’s total shares outstanding, the manger’s payoff  has the following 
structure: 
( ) ( )
(1 )[ ]
1 1
d
f I X D g J
V t D
 
 
   
                                          (9)
 
The manager’s effective ownership stake (1 )dt  increases with a drop in the dividend 
tax rate, dt . Meanwhile, the marginal cost of pet projects / (1 ) /dg I t f I       
increases as the dividend tax rate dt is lowered. Hence, after the tax reform, we expect a 
decrease in manager’s investment in pet projects, and an increase in real investment I or 
dividend payment D, depending on whether the initial investment I is at the first-best 
level. Moreover, large shareholders also effectively have larger shareholdings after the 
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dividend tax cut that encourage them to monitor managers more closely, which reduces 
the agency problems further.  
 
 
Figure 2a De-trended Pay Gap ($000) Before and After 2003 Tax Reform  
 
Figure 2b CEO Total Compensation (De-trended) vs. Total Compensation (De-Trended) 
for Median Non-CEOs 
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The Change of the Pay Gap Level 
We expect a decrease in pay gap following the 2003 tax cut, because the marginal 
benefit of having a large pay gap is reduced due to the increase in effective managerial 
ownership.  Figure 2 (a) shows the change in the pay gap around 2003, after taking out 
the time trend. Consistent with our expectation, there is a clear drop in the de-trended pay 
gap in year 2003, and the drop is across the whole distribution of individual firm pay 
gaps.  The drop is most pronounced for firms whose pay gaps are in the top quartile. 
Figure 2 (b) further shows that both CEO total compensation and median non-CEOs’ 
total compensation drops following the 2003 dividend tax cut, and the CEO total 
compensation falls significantly more than non-CEO managers’ total compensation.  We 
then investigate whether different firms respond to this tax cut differently. Figure 3 plots 
the changes in the de-trended pay gap over time, conditional separately for firms with 
different characteristics. Simple firms (i.e. small and single segment firms) cut their pay 
gaps more aggressively than complex (large and conglomerate) firms.  High R&D firms 
also reduce their pay gaps more dramatically than firms with little investment in R&D.  
In addition, high risk firms cut their pay gaps more aggressively than low risk firms.  We 
then examine the changes in pay gaps based on a firms’ dividend payout status. We 
investigate firms that do not pay a dividend over the whole sample period, firms that pay 
out dividends over the entire sample period, and firms that start to pay dividends after 
2003. We find that firms that initiated dividend payouts after 2003 cut their pay gaps 
most significantly, suggesting that these firms’ behavior was affected most by the tax cut.  
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a. Low R&D vs. High R&D Firms                                     b. Low Risk vs. High Risk Firms 
             
c. Dividend Paying Status                                                    d. Bad vs. Good Governance Firms 
              
e. Simple vs. Complex Firms 
 
Figure 3 De-trended Pay Gap ($000) Before and After 2003 Conditional on Firm Types 
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We next formally test whether the pay gaps change on average after the 2003 
dividend tax cut using the following specification:  
1 2 3log(  ) ( 2003) ( 2003)it it it it it it itpay gap post t post t X             
 (10) 
where post is defined as an indicator variable for the post-tax-cut 2003-2005 period, t-
2003 captures the time-series trend, and Xit is a vector of firm level controls. We also 
include firm fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant firm level factors.  
Table 8 column 1 displays the result of this regression. Although the pay gap has 
an overall upward trend ( 2 0  ), it decreases significantly after the 2003 dividend tax 
cut, controlling for the time series trend. The coefficient 1  is significantly negative at the 
one percent level. In terms of economic magnitude, the pay gap declines by 10 percent 
for the average firm ($302,321 dollars) in the post-tax-cut period (2003-20050, relative to 
the pre-tax-cut period (1996-2002). Column 2 and column 3 of Table 8 show that both 
the level of CEO compensation and median non-CEO executive compensation decline 
after 2003 tax cut, but the level of CEO compensation appears to decline more than the 
level of median non-CEO compensation. The model of Chetty and Saez (2005) in 
equation (9) further suggests that firms most affected by the tax reform are those having 
higher managerial stock ownership ( )  and paying out dividends (D>0). Hence, we test 
whether these firms tend to cut their pay gaps more than other firms. The three-way 
interaction term of the post-tax reform indicator, CEO’s aggregate shareholding as a 
percentage of total shares outstanding (CEO ownership) and a firm’s dividend payout 
status prior to the tax reform in column 4 of Table 8 is negative and significant at the one  
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Table 8 Change of Pay Gap Before and After 2003 Tax Cut 
 
Y= Log (Pay 
Gap) 
Y= Log (CEO 
Pay) 
Y= Log (Median non-
CEO Pay) 
Y= Log (Pay 
Gap) 
Y= Log (Pay 
Gap) 
Y= Log (Pay 
Gap) 
Post Indicator -0.1 
***
 -0.13 
***
 -0.12 
***
 -0.14 
***
 -0.11 
***
 -0.14 
***
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.04) 
 Post * CEO Ownership* Dividend Payer 
Indicator 
      
-0.024 
***
 
    
       
(0.008) 
     Post * Median Non-CEO Ownership* Dividend Payer 
Indicator 
      
0.005 
   
         
(0.12) 
   Post* Ownership Difference* Dividend Payer Indicator 
         
-0.023 
***
 
           
(0.008) 
 Post* CEO ownership 
      
0.015 
***
 
    
       
(0.005) 
     CEO Ownership* Dividend Payer Indicator 
      
0.028 
***
 
    
       
(0.008) 
***
 
    Post* Median Non-CEO ownership 
        
-0.089 
   
         
(0.08) 
   Median Non-CEO Ownership* Dividend Payer Indicator 
       
-0.03 
   
         
(0.07) 
   Post * Ownership Difference 
          
0.016 
***
 
           
(0.005) 
 Ownership Difference * Dividend Payer 
Indicator 
          
0.03 
***
 
           
(0.008) 
 Trend 0.046 
***
 0.08 
***
 0.06 
***
 0.07 
***
 0.07 
***
 0.07 
***
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 Firm Level Controls and Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 10184 
 
10184 
 
10184 
 
10202 
 
10064 
 
10064 
 R-Squared 0.49  0.78 
 
 0.84 
 
 0.46 
 
 0.46  0.46  
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percent level. This is consistent with the prediction that firms that pay out dividend and 
have CEOs with large ownership positions respond to the tax reform more strongly than 
other firms and cut their pay gaps more aggressively. In unreported regressions, we find 
that such firms reduce their pay gaps by cutting CEO compensation more aggressively 
than cutting median non-CEO compensation, relative to the remaining firms. In column 5, 
we replace CEO ownership with median non-CEO executive ownership, and the three-
way interaction term is also negative, suggesting that when non-CEO top executives have 
larger ownership positions in dividend-paying firms, these firms also cut their pay gaps 
more aggressively, but the effect is not statistically significant. Finally, we look at the 
ownership difference between the CEO and median non-CEO top executive and interact 
it with an indicator for a firm’s dividend payout status in column 6. We find that firms 
having a large ownership differences between the CEO and other top executives and 
regularly paying cash dividends prior to the tax reform reduce their pay gap significantly 
more than other firms.  
We next examine whether the magnitude of the pay gap reduction is conditional 
on firm characteristics by estimating the following regression model: 
1 2 4
5 6
log(  )   
( 2003) ( 2003)
it it it it it
it it it it it
pay gap post post firm type firm type
t post t X
   
   
    
      
                              (11) 
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Table 9 Change of Pay Gap Before and After Tax Cut Conditional on Firm Type 
 
Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Post Indicator -0.08 
**
 -0.1 
***
 -0.11 
***
 -0.05 
 
-0.04 
 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 Post* Complex 0.02 
**
 
        
 
(0.008) 
         Post * High-Tech  
  
-0.004 
       
   
(0.04) 
       Post * High-Risk 
Firm 
    
0.007 
     
     
(0.04) 
     Post* Dividend Payer 
     
0.04 
   
       
(0.08) 
   Post * Strong Governance 
Indicator 
       
-0.03 
 
         
(0.04) 
 Complex Indicator 0.01 
         
 
(0.03) 
         High-Tech Indicator 
  
0.06 
       
   
(0.07) 
       High-Risk Firm 
Indicator 
    
-0.019 
     
     
(0.04) 
     Dividend Payer Indicator 
     
0.39 
   
       
(1.02) 
   Strong Governance Indicator 
       
-0.1 
 
         
(0.03) 
 Trend 0.041 
***
 0.046 
***
 0.046 
***
 0.041 
***
 0.05 
***
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 Post*Trend -0.003 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
           
           Firm Level Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of 
Observations 10184 
 
10184 
 
10184 
 
10184 
 
10184 
 R-Squared 0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47 
 
 
 
 
The results are reported in Table 9. Consistent with the diagram in figure 3 (b),  
we find a smaller decrease in the pay gaps of complex firms compared with simple firms, 
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after controlling for a time trend and other firm characteristics, and the difference in pay 
gap reductions is statistically significant at 5 percent level. High R&D firms and high risk 
firms reduce their pay gaps more than other firms, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. Similarly, the difference in pay gap reductions by firms with good 
and bad corporate governance is not statistically significant. We also look at the average 
change of pay gaps based on firm dividend payout status. Without taking into account the 
level of managerial ownership, we find no significant difference in the pay gap changes 
of dividend and non-dividend paying firms. When we use the predicted probability of 
paying a cash dividend, instead of the firm’s actual dividend payout status,52 we find no 
evidence suggesting that changes of pay gaps around the 2003 tax reform is related to the 
dividend payout propensity.  
The Relation between Pay Gap and Firm Value Before and After Tax Cut 
In this section, we examine whether the effect of pay gaps on firm performance 
changes after an exogenous rise in effective managerial ownership caused by the 2003 
dividend tax cut.  Managers have greater incentives to put in more effort after the 
dividend tax reform act because their wealth is more closely tied to firm value after the 
exogenous increase in their effective ownership. Meanwhile, for the same reason, 
managers are less willing to sabotage their colleagues, everything else being equal. Thus, 
we expect firm value to increase after the tax cut.  Moreover, the marginal effect of the 
pay gap on motivating executives to put in more effort and thereby reducing moral hazard 
declines, because the marginal productivity of effort falls with the level of effort, but the 
                                                          
52 The probability of paying out dividends is estimated using a logistic model following Denis and Osobov 
(2008). Specifically, the independent variables are  firm size measured by logarithm of total assets, market 
to book ratio, percentage change of total assets, retained earnings/book value of equity and  EBIT/total 
assets.  The independent variables are measured at one year before the dividends are paid out. 
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marginal cost of effort increases with the level of effort. Therefore, we expect the 
marginal effect of pay gap on firm value to decline after the 2003 tax reform act, relative 
to the pre-tax-cut period.  We formally test this prediction by estimating the following 
regression: 
0 1 2 3
1 2
 log(  ) ( - 2003)
[ log(  ) ( - 2003) ]
it it it
it it it
it it
industry adjustedQ pay gap post t
pay gap t post
X
   
 
 
   
  
                        (12) 
The results are reported in Table 10. We find that 1  is positive and statistically 
insignificant, consistent with our findings in Table 5 that on average pay gap does not 
have a significant impact on firm value. 1  is negative and statistically significant and 
1 1 0   , suggesting that a larger pay gap reduces firm value after the 2003 tax reform, 
and the impact is statistically significant. This is consistent with our prediction that the 
marginal effect of pay gap declines after an exogenous increase in managerial ownership. 
2 is significantly positively, consistent with our prediction that firm value on average 
increases after the dividend tax cut.  
We next use a difference-in-difference approach and compare the changes in pay 
gap coefficients across firms with different characteristics. Specifically, we compare 
complex versus simple firms, high versus low R&D intensity firms, high versus low risk 
firms, and good versus bad governance firms. Formally, the regression specification is as 
follows:  
0 1 2 3 4
1 2 3
  log(  ) log(  )  ( - 2003)
[ log(  ) log(  )  ( - 2003) ]
it it it it it
it it it it it
it it
industry adjusted Q pay gap pay gap firm type post t
pay gap pay gap firm type t post
X
    
  
 
     
    
  (13)
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The coefficient 2  shows us the average change in the pay gap effects for high 
minus low-type firms. The results are reported in the Table 9. While the effect of pay gap 
on firm value generally falls after the tax reform ( 1 0  ), there is significant cross-group 
heterogeneity. Complex firms experience a much smaller decline in the marginal effect of 
pay gap relative to simple firms ( 2 0  ). On the other hand, high-risk firms and high-
tech firms have a much larger decline in the pay gap effect on firm value, compared to 
low-risk firms and low R&D intensity firms respectively ( 2 0  ). Similarly, the decline 
in the marginal effect of the pay gap after the tax reform is also larger for well-governed 
firms compared to weakly-governed firms ( 2 0  ). These cross-group comparisons are 
all statistically significant. 
The unexpected dividend tax cut provides us with a quasi-natural experiment 
which gives us new insights into how firms adjust senior manager financial incentives in 
the face of an exogenous change in the contracting environment. We find that firms 
appear to respond to such changes by adjusting their executive compensation 
arrangements to take into account the changing incentives due to taxes. Moreover, the 
effect of one incentive mechanism on improving firm value becomes weaker if other 
incentive mechanisms are reinforced by changes in government regulatory or tax policies.  
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Table 10 Pay Gap and Firm Value Before and After Tax Cut 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1 Y Adj. Q 3 Y Adj.Q 1 Y Adj. Q 3 Y Adj.Q 1 Y Adj. Q 3 Y Adj.Q 
Log (Pay gap) 0.004 
 
0.009 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.005 
 
0.034 
***
 0.033 
***
 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.008) 
 Log (Pay gap)*Post -0.03 
**
 -0.026 
***
 -0.03 
**
 -0.033 
***
 -0.022 
*
 -0.016 
*
 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.009) 
 Log (Pay Gap)*Complex Firm 
    
0.03 
**
 0.05 
***
 
    
     
(0.014) 
 
(0.01) 
     Log (Pay Gap)*Complex Firm *Post 
    
0.003 
 
0.01 
***
 
    
     
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
     Log (Pay gap)* High-Tech Firm  
        
-0.06 
***
 -0.05 
***
 
         
(0.015) 
 
(0.01) 
 Log (Pay gap)* High-Tech Firm*Post 
        
-0.03 
***
 -0.03 
***
 
         
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
             Firm Level Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 9709 
 
9707 
 
9707 
 
9707 
 
9707 
 
9707 
 R-Squared 0.76 
 
 0.84 
 
 0.76 
 
 0.84 
 
 0.77 
 
 0.84 
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Table 10, continued 
 
7 8 9 10 
 
1 Y Adj. Q 3 Y Adj.Q 1 Y Adj. Q 3 Y Adj.Q 
Log (Pay gap) 0.03 
**
 0.02 
**
 0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 Log (Pay gap)*Post -0.03 
**
 -0.026 
***
 -0.005 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 Log (Pay gap)* High-Risk Firm  -0.035 
**
 -0.02 
*
 
    
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.011) 
     Log (Pay gap)* High-Risk Firm*Post -0.001 
 
-0.01 
***
 
    
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
     Log (Pay Gap)*Good Governance Firm 
    
0.017 
 
0.004 
 
     
(0.014) 
 
(0.01) 
 Log (Pay Gap)*Good Governance Firm*Post 
    
-0.01 
**
 -0.013 
***
 
     
(0.005) 
 
(0.003) 
 Firm Level Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 9700 
 
9700 
 
9700 
 
9700 
 R-Squared 0.77 
 
 0.84 
 
 0.73   0.82   
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Table 11 IV-GMM Estimation of the Effect of Pay Gap on Firm Value 
  Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4   Model 5 
Endogenous Variables 
            Log (Pay Gap) -0.03 
**
 -0.001 
  
0.09 
 
0.05 
  
0.09 
 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.55) 
  
(0.58) 
 
(0.52) 
  
(1.13) 
 Log (Pay Gap)* Complex Firm Dummy 0.07 
***
  
        
 
(0.02) 
 
  
        Log (Pay Gap)* Corporate Governance Index 
  
-0.003 
*** 
 
  
   
   
（0.001） 
         
             Log (Pay gap)*  Non-CEO Equity Delta 
    
-0.02 
***
 
   
 
      
(0.003) 
      Log (Pay gap)* R&D/TA    -0.95 
***
  
        (0.11)     
Log (Pay gap)* Volatility of Stock Return           -0.33 
***
 
           (0.12)  
             
Control Variables Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
             Statistical Tests for the Validity and Relevance of Instrumental Variables 
        First Stage F-Statistics 29.95 
***
 27.23 
***
 
 
29.83 
***
 27.44 
***
 31.56 
***
 
 
1489.73 
***
 1383.9 
***
 
 
715.64 
***
 657.19 
***
 2569.16 
***
 
             Cragg-Donald Wald test for weak instruments 31.51 
 
29.11 
  
31.26 
 
28.69 
  
32.84 
 
             Hansen J statistics 1.11 
 
1.67 
  
0.78 
 
1.68 
  
3.6 
 P-value of J statistics 0.57  0.43   0.59  0.4   0.16  
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Robustness 
 
Instrumental Variable Regressions Using GMM 
Our quasi-natural experiment presented in section 5 is one approach to controlling 
for endogeneity in our results. We next use a conventional approach for taking 
endogeneity into account, namely using instrumental variable regressions. To implement 
this approach, we use annual industry median pay gap level and industry number of 
internal CEO successions to instrument for a firm’s pay gap level. The interactions of pay 
gap with indicators for various classes of firms are instrumented by interactions of the 
two exogenous instruments with these firm class indicators. For instance, the interaction 
of pay gap with the complex firm indicator is instrumented by two exogenous 
instruments:  the interactions of industry median pay gap and the industry number of 
internal CEO successions with the complex firm indicator. 
The instrumental variable regression model is estimated with GMM.  The IV-
GMM estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS estimator when the number of exogenous 
instrumental variables is more than the number of endogenous variables and thus, the 
model is overidentified. Table 11 reports the main results of estimating this model. The 
findings are qualitatively the same as those found in Tables 5. The Hansen’s J statistics 
for testing the overidentifying restriction has insignificant P-value, indicating that the null 
hypothesis that the exogenous variables are appropriately independent of the error 
process cannot be rejected, which is to say the exclusion requirement is met. Both the F-
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statistics and the Cragg-Donald Wald test used to detect a weak instruments problem 
indicate that the instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous regressors.  
Other Examinations for Robustness 
Finally, alternative measures of pay gap are used to check the robustness of the 
main results. Three alternative measures of pay gap we explore are: 1) CPS, defined as 
the slice of CEO total compensation as a percentage of the aggregate total compensation 
of the top five executives, which is used in Bebchuk et al (2011); 2) the Gini-coefficient 
of total compensation among the top five executives, which is used in Kale et al (2009), 
Aggarwal et al (2011), and Bebchuk et al (2011); 3) the coefficient of variation of the 
total compensation among the top five executives. The major findings of the study 
continue to hold under these alternative specifications.   
As further robustness analysis, we delete financial and utility firms, due to their 
heavy regulatory burden and distinctly different structures of their balance sheets.  We 
also delete firms whose CEO is also a founder, because their incentives may be very 
different from those of professional managers. Lastly, we exclude firms with negative 
pay gaps. Again, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Horizontal Pay Gap 
We also look at pay gaps among non-CEO executives. The reason for this 
procedure is that executives are more likely to compare themselves to other executives 
with similar positions and status. Hence, non-CEO top executive incentives are more 
likely to be affected by the compensation of other non-CEO executives. Moreover, a 
hierarchical structure could well exist among non-CEO executives. These executives may 
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first need to be promoted to a core-executive position, for example holding the COO 
position, before they can compete for the CEO position.  We define the pay gap among 
non-CEO executives as the horizontal pay gap, and it is calculated as the dollar difference 
between the 75
th
 percentile and the 25
th
 percentile of total compensation of all non-CEO 
executives. The distribution of the horizontal pay gaps is reported in the summary 
statistics of Table 12. The horizontal pay gap is significantly lower than the pay gap 
between the CEO and the median non-CEO executive. 
Our results using the horizontal pay gap are largely similar to our earlier results 
using our primary pay gap measure. On average, large horizontal pay gaps significantly 
increase firm value based on an analysis of the full sample. This effect is significantly 
reduced as firm R&D intensity and stock return volatility rise, which is largely consistent 
with our prior findings.  The effect of the horizontal pay gap on firm value is greater for 
large and complex firms, relative to small and single segment firms, but the difference is 
not statistically significant. The effect of the horizontal pay gap on firm value also falls 
with the quality of the firm’s corporate governance and the median non-CEO executive’s 
equity delta, but again the difference is not statistically significant. This result also holds 
even if we include the pay gap between the CEO and the median non-CEO executive as 
an additional control variable.
53
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 The results are available upon request.  
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Table 12 Horizontal Pay Gap and Firm Value 
Panel A 
      Mean Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile 
Horizontal Pay Gap (000$) 872.27 166.14 392.96 944.71 
Log (Horizontal Pay Gap) 5.96 5.11 5.97 6.85 
Panel B 
            
 
3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 3 Y Adj.Q 
Log (Horizontal Pay Dispersion) 0.02 
***
 -0.001 
 
0.021 
***
 0.06 
**
 0.03 
***
 0.075 
***
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.012) 
 Log (Horizontal Pay Dispersion)* Complex 
Firm 
  
0.0015 
         
   
(0.01) 
         Log (Horizontal Pay Dispersion)* Corporate Governance 
Index 
   
-0.001 
       
     
(0.001) 
       Log (Horizontal Pay Dispersion)*  Non-CEO Equity 
Delta 
     
-0.004 
 
-0.27 
***
 
  
       
(0.003) 
 
(0.07) 
   Log (Horizontal Pay Dispersion)* R&D/TA 
                         Log (Horizontal Pay Dispersion)* Volatility of Stock 
Return 
         
-0.39 
***
 
           
(0.07) 
 Firm Level Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 9709 
 
9709 
 
9709 
 
9713 
 
9713 
 
9700 
 R-Squared 0.84  0.84 
 
 0.84   0.84   0.84 
 
 0.84   
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Conclusion 
We use the often-neglected importance of team production in our empirical study 
to shed new light on the relationship between pay gap and firm performance. Given that 
large pay gaps can unintentionally invite value-reducing office politics and non-
cooperative behavior by competing managers, we posit a simple principal-agent model 
that predicts that the pay gap level is determined by the tradeoff between reducing 
managerial shirking and improving team production incentives. Moreover, the 
relationship between pay gap and firm value also largely depends on a firm’s marginal 
benefit of reducing managerial moral hazard and the marginal cost of inducing non-
cooperative manager behavior. 
In particular, our analysis highlights that the pay gap decision should be highly 
firm specific. It is more beneficial in larger, more complex firms and conglomerates, 
where the marginal productivity of manager effort is higher and hence, a board’s main 
goal is to find ways to induce more managerial effort. The pay gap is lower, when other 
firm governance mechanisms in place are strong enough to ensure that managerial efforts 
are close to the first-best level and consequently making a large pay gap unnecessary. 
The pay gap level is also related to the likelihood of competing manager sabotage of each 
other and the potential loss of firm value from sabotage. We find pay gaps to be lower 
when increasing team production and eliminating non-cooperative managerial behavior is 
a firm’s major concern, such as for high R&D intensity firms with strong corporate 
governance.  
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We then test the relationship between firm value and pay gap. This relationship is 
clearly conditional on firm specific characteristics. We find that the effect of pay gap on 
improving firm performance is significantly positive when a firm has potentially more 
manager-shareholder agency problems and the moral hazard problem associated with 
shirking or excessive perquisite consumption is large. On the other hand, the effect of pay 
gap on firm performance is largely reduced and can even become negative, when 
managerial shirking is not a major concern, while improving team collaboration and 
productivity is a first order of magnitude issue. To be specific, large pay gaps 
significantly increases firm value in complex firms. Its effect significantly falls and can 
even become negative when a firm has large R&D investment, or when a firm has high 
risk, or when senior manager incentives are better aligned with shareholders through 
either large equity deltas or well-constructed corporate governance systems. 
Our primary finding is further reinforced by using the 2003 tax reform as a quasi-
natural experiment, an event which increases manager after-tax wealth obtained from 
their equity holdings and lowers the managerial moral hazard problem. We find firms on 
average reduce their pay gap following this exogenous tax code change. Moreover, the 
size of the pay gap reduction is heterogeneous across different classes of firms.  Also, the 
marginal effect of pay gap on firm value significantly falls after the tax reform act, 
suggesting that managerial compensation arrangements that improve firm value are 
weakened when existing financial incentive mechanisms are reinforced by exogenous 
external shocks. 
Our empirical results help explain the apparently contradictory findings in the 
existing research that report significant positive and negative relationships between pay 
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gap and firm value.  We find that there is no simple relationship between pay gap and 
firm value across the full sample of publicly listed firms. Instead, we find that the level of 
pay gap and its effects on firm value depend on firm characteristics and these effects can 
change over time with major changes in a firm’s contracting environment. Thus, no 
simple rule of thumb exists to determine whether a large or small pay gap is value 
enhancing for all firms. It follows that pushing pay gap in one direction is likely to 
benefit some firms, while at the same time harming others. 
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APPENDIX A Variable Definitions 
 
Compensation Variables  
Pay Gap 
CEO total compensation (TDC1) –median 
total compensation of non-CEO executives 
Equity Delta 
Dollar change in executive’s stock and option 
portfolios for a 1% change in stock price. 
Calculated follow Core and Guay (2002) 
Positive CEO Abnormal Pay Indicator 
CEO Abnormal Pay is the residual from 
regressing total CEO compensation on firm 
size, market to book, year and industry fixed 
effects. Positive CEO abnormal Pay indicator 
equals one if CEO abnormal pay is greater 
than zero. 
Negative non-CEO Abnormal Pay Indicator 
Non-CEO Abnormal Pay is the residual from 
regressing total compensation of median non-
CEO on firm size, market to book, year and 
industry fixed effects. Negative non-CEO 
abnormal Pay indicator equals one if CEO 
abnormal pay is less than zero. 
Horizontal Pay Gap 
75th percentile of total compensation for all 
non-CEO executives – 25th percentile of total 
compensation for all non-CEO executives 
CEO Ownership 
The aggregate shares held by CEO over the 
total shares outstanding 
Non-CEO Ownership 
The median number of shares held by all non-
CEO executives over the total shares 
outstanding 
Firm Characteristic Variables  
One-year Adjusted Q 
Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q measured at the 
end of year t+1 
Three-year Adjusted Q 
Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q averaged over 
year t+1 to t+3 
Firm risk 
The standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over the prior five years 
Governance index score 
A linear combination of a set of transformed 
variables that capture the corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Diversified 
A indicator variable which equals one if the 
firm has more than on business segments 
Leverage 
Market Leverage = (debt in current liability + 
long term debt )/( debt in current liability + 
long term debt+ market value of equity) 
Complex Firm Dummy 
Equals one if the firm’s total assets are  above 
sample median and has more than one 
business segments 
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High-Tech Firm Dummy 
Equals one if the firm’s R&D/ total assets 
ratio is above 0.04, and zero otherwise 
High Risk Firm Dummy 
Equals one if the firm’s stock return volatility 
over the prior five years is above the sample 
median 
Strong governance dummy 
Equals one if the firm’s governance index 
score is above 
1.71 
Dividend Payer Indicator 
Equals one if the firm pays out dividend prior 
to the tax reform in 2003 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND DEBT FINANCING 
 
Introduction 
Debt is a major source of capital for firms worldwide. The extant literature has 
studied firm debt financing patterns, such as debt placement choice (i.e. public vs. private 
debt) and debt financing costs (i.e. measured by debt yield). These studies find debt 
financing decisions are related to characteristics that reflect a firm’s credit quality, the 
conflicts of interest between debtholders and equityholders, the firm’s level of 
information asymmetry, and issue flotation costs (Krishnaswami, Spindt, and 
Subramaniam 1999, Hadlock and James 2002, Denis and Mihov 2003). The implicit 
assumption of these studies is that capital markets are competitive and perfectly elastic, 
and hence, debt financing decisions reflect the outcomes of a firm solving an 
optimization problem based on its fundamentals (Baker 2009).   
To the extent that external capital markets are not fully efficient and perfectly 
competitive, firm debt financing patterns are likely to be affected by supply side 
constraints.  Using a novel cross-country dataset, we are able to identify the effects of 
outside institutional constrains on firm debt financing decisions, above and beyond the 
effects of firm fundamentals. Specifically, we examine whether and how institutional 
arrangements systematically influence a firm’s debt financing choice between public and 
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private debt, and its financing costs, measured by the yield on the issue date of a specific 
debt instrument. Our sample includes 26 countries, both developed and developing 
countries, and spans a 14-year period from 1995-2008.
54
 The major institutional features 
we focus on are: the level of development of the economy and various capital markets, 
the extent and strength of creditor legal protections, and the availability and transparency 
of financial information. We expect these institutional features to affect firm debt 
financing decisions by altering the relative advantages or disadvantages of public and 
private debt. Three mechanisms can be at work, which help explain these relationships. 
First, institutional arrangements can have a significant impact on the size and 
development of debt markets (La Porta et al 1997), which is correlated with the liquidity 
and systematic risk of public debt. Second, creditor legal protections and their 
enforcement can alter investor preference between privately negotiated and public debt 
contracts. Lastly, the transparency and comprehensiveness of financial information 
available to outside investors is an important factor that directly affects the informational 
efficiency of the public debt market. 
We first look at a firm’s debt financing choice between public and private 
placement bonds, and show that the country level institutional environment in which a 
firm operates is at least as important as the firm’s own characteristics in determining its 
debt financing decisions. Using a logit regression framework, major firm characteristics 
in combination explain 20 percent of the variation in firm debt placement choices. In 
contrast, country fixed effects alone have a pseudo R-squared of 22 percent and explain 
more of these debt issue choices than firm characteristics do. Regardless of firm level 
                                                          
54
 The sample countries are listed in in Table 1. 
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heterogeneity, a firm that resides in a developed country is much more likely to issue 
public debt than a firm that resides in a developing country, and a firm that resides in a 
common law country is much less likely to issue public debt than a firm that resides in a 
civil law country.
55
  
Our analysis continues by investigating several possible channels through which 
country level institutional arrangements can measurably influence individual firm debt 
placement choice. Private lending by financial institutions is the primary source of capital 
for firms that have no access to public financing. Firms that bear substantial costs 
because of high debt agency and information asymmetry problems would find it optimal 
to borrow privately, either by selling private placement bonds to financial institutions or 
by obtaining bank loans.
56
 From this perspective, bank loans and private placement bonds 
can act as potential substitutes.  Consistent with this prediction, we find that the volume 
of credit provided by the banking sector is positively associated with the probability of 
issuing public bonds and is negatively associated with the probability of issuing privately 
placed bonds. Similarly, equity and publicly issued bonds are the two primary sources of 
public financing. It follows that a well-developed equity market could lower a 
corporation’s likelihood of issuing public bonds. Firms that do not find it prohibitively 
costly to issue public bonds can nevertheless find it attractive to issue equity when the 
domestic equity market is well developed.  Indeed, we find that a large domestic equity 
market is associated with a low likelihood of public debt issuance.  
                                                          
55
 In a related paper, Ellis et al (2011) explores the effects of global factors and a country’s governance on 
firm investment decisions. 
56
 Severe debt agency problems and information asymmetry dramatically increase the cost of issuing public 
debt, as argued in Galai and Masulis (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Leland and Pyle 
(1977), Diamond (1984, 1991), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), among others. 
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Both the strength of a country’s legal protection of creditors and the quality of its 
law enforcement has important impacts on firm financing decisions. In countries with 
weak legal protection and enforcement, financial instruments that allow investors to 
actively monitor managers, limit manager discretion and are contractually easier to 
interpret, have a higher likelihood of being issued. Sufficient legal protection of 
debtholders is associated with less managerial self-dealing and more efficient debt 
renegotiation and bankruptcy procedures (La Porta et al 1997, Djankov et al 2008). This 
lowers the risk of investing in public debt. Thus, we expect the probability of issuing 
public debt to increase with the strength of a country’s creditor rights protection laws and 
the level of their enforcement. Our empirical findings are largely supportive of this 
prediction. Lastly, a more transparent financial reporting system and the existence of 
reliable sources of credit information on individual firms play critical roles in mitigating 
the information asymmetry between firms and outside investors, especially for firms that 
borrow in international debt markets. From this perspective, we expect that greater scope, 
accessibility and quality of credit information to raise the likelihood of a firm issuing 
public debt. However, the evidence we uncover only partially supports this prediction.  
We also find results that institutional arrangements in the local economy can 
affect firm debt financing indirectly by lowering the sensitivity of the debt issuance 
choice to debt agency problems exacerbated by firm idiosyncratic risk, information 
asymmetry, and its ex-ante bankruptcy probability. We find a firm’s choice between 
issuing public or private bonds is less sensitive to its asset tangibility, technological 
intensity, and current leverage ratio if it is located in a country with strong creditor legal 
protections and better access to credit information. 
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Issuing debt in international capital markets has become a more common practice 
in the last decade, especially after the creation of euro and the rapid development of 
Eurobond market. In fact, almost 30 percent of debt issuance in our sample is placed 
internationally. Our evidence indicates that a firm’s ability to access to international debt 
markets is significantly affected by an issuer’s nationality as well.  Firms from countries 
with more developed economies, better creditor protections, and investor access to higher 
quality creditor financial information are more likely to borrow in international debt 
markets. In contrast, firms from developing countries generally issue domestic debt. 
Investors in international debt markets are more concerned about country level 
institutional factors, such as the level of managerial self-dealing and systematic 
corruption in the society. We find that the debt issuance choices of firms from countries 
where such problems are more serious are more strongly affected and these firms are less 
likely to issue public debt in international capital markets. Instead, they tend to rely on 
private borrowing where investors can more closely monitor issuer managers to minimize 
their self-dealing behavior. Moreover, we find evidence that better access to credit 
information and comprehensive accounting information significantly increases a firm’s 
probability of issuing public debt in international bond markets. 
We next explore the impact of major institutional factors in the domestic economy 
on the cost of debt financing measured by bond yield. We find that economy-wide 
institutional factors not only affect overall debt financing costs for both public and 
private bonds, they also affect the yield spread between public and private bonds.  
Adding institutional factors into the yield spread regressions increases the R-squared by 
about 1.5 to 2 times. Higher GDP per capita, larger banking sector and equity market are 
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all related to lower bond yields. Better creditor rights protection and more transparent 
credit information also reduce debt financing costs. Moreover, we find that the yield 
spread between public and private bonds is significantly lower in developed countries, 
and it also falls with stronger creditor legal protections and better investor access to 
reliable credit information. Moreover, the decrease in yield spread is mainly due to the 
reduction in public bond yield. Possible ways for major institutional factors to affect yield 
spreads are by improving overall financial development and the condition of the public 
debt market, which is generally correlated with higher market liquidity and lower market 
risk.  
This study is directly related to an emerging literature that explores the supply 
side effects of corporate financing and capital structure decisions. Schaller (2008), 
Greenwood et al (2008), Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2012) analyze the effect of 
monetary and fiscal policies on corporate capital structure through the channels of bank 
lending, credit conditions, and government deficit. Stohs and Mauer (1996), Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005) test the effect of interest rate on firm capital 
structure decisions.  
This study is also closely related to a large literature that explorers the effect of 
legal origins and institutional factors on economics and finance. King and Levine (1993) 
document the relationship between the level of financial development and economic 
growth.  La Porta et al (1997,1998), and Djankov et al (2008) find that legal origins, legal 
rules and level of enforcement that protect investors and constrain managerial self-
dealing, are associated with the size, breadth and depth of financial markets.  Booth et al 
(2001) find that these institutional factors can also affect firm capital structure decisions. 
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Doidge et al (2007) find that laws and institutions strongly affect corporate governance. 
We find evidence that these domestic institutional factors affect individual firm debt 
financing decisions. There are three potential channels for these major institutional 
factors to affect corporate financing. First, the stage of development of various financial 
markets determines the availability of capital and accessibility of different capital 
markets, which is a supply-side effect that strongly influences a firm’s debt financing 
choice and cost of financing in equilibrium. Secondly, the quality and strength of creditor 
legal protections determine how effectively debt contracts can be enforced when a debt 
covenant violation occurs. It also significantly affects the efficiency of the bankruptcy 
process, which directly affects investor recovery rates.  These two institutional features 
can alter an investor’s assessment of a firm’s bankruptcy risk. The third channel affects 
the financial transparency of borrowers. The accounting standards used in reporting 
corporate financial information defines the level of financial transparency of domestic 
firms, which directly affects the level of information asymmetry and a lender’s expected 
risk of loss. 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate borrowing as well. It tests 
theories of firm debt financing in an international setting. Studies using US data find 
evidence supporting flotation cost explanations for debt financing choice (i.e. Blackwell 
and Kidwell 1988), debt agency cost theories developed by Galai and Masulis (1976) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), firm information asymmetry effects modeled in Leland and 
Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984, 1991), and the ease of debt renegotiation explanation 
proposed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994).  We find that firm attributes capturing the 
various costs mentioned above significantly influence both the choice of public versus 
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privately placed bond issuance and the bond yield for firms outside the United States. 
Interestingly, firms in both developing and developed countries show largely similar 
patterns. The only notable difference is that debt financing choices in developing 
countries are more heavily influenced by firm size and its credit rating, while in 
developed countries debt issuance size and maturity are more important factors.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset 
and properties of the sample, and then reviews the main institutional features in these 
countries. In Section 3, we review the existing theories explaining the choice between 
public and private debt issuance, and hypothesized effects of major country level 
institutional arrangements on such choices. In section 4, we empirically examine the 
effects of institutional factors on the choice between public and private debt, while in 
Section 5 we focus on the effect of institutional factors on bond yields.  In section 6, we 
examine the effects of market conditions (i.e. hot vs. cold issuance market) on debt 
placement choice and bond yields. Conclusions and implications are discussed in Section 
7.  
 
Data and Sample 
 
Public Bonds vs. Private Placement Bonds 
The two debt instruments we analyze are publicly issued and privately placed 
corporate bonds. Corporate bonds consist of a non-negligible share of a typical firm’s 
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outstanding debt and provide an important source of debt financing.
57
 Publicly issued and 
privately placed bonds are similar in terms of their basic contract structure, though they 
differ in the sense that privately placed bonds are offered to a limited number of 
sophisticated institutional investors through private negotiations, which makes contract 
renegotiation easier. These bonds are also subject to stricter debt covenants and direct 
monitoring by these sophisticated investors. This feature of private placement bonds 
allows us to test theories predicting a firm’s debt financing choice between private and 
public debt, while at the same time avoiding the need to control for major differences in 
debt structure, due to the comparability in contract structure to public bonds. 
Bank loans are another major source of capital for the majority of firms which is 
not explicitly examined in this study. This is due to several concerns.  First, bank loans 
have very different debt structure and banks have much better access to information on 
firm financial conditions.  This makes bank loans difficult to be compared to corporate 
bonds. Second, bank lending usually takes place between firms and banks that are 
geographically nearby, and rarely goes beyond national borders. Hence, the decisions to 
borrow and lend are less related to country level institutional arrangements than they are 
to firm specific factors. Corporate bonds, on the other hand, are often placed nationwide 
or even internationally, especially for corporations that are constrained by the small size 
of a domestic bond market or when large amounts of foreign capital are needed. 
Data Source and Sample Construction 
Information on newly issued private placements and public bonds is obtained 
                                                          
57
 According to the statistics published by Bank For International Settlements (BIS), at the end of 2009 , the 
total amounts outstanding of international corporate bond worldwide is about 3.05 trillion US dollars, and 
the total amounts outstanding of domestic corporate bond worldwide is 6.197 trillion US dollars. 
146 
 
from SDC Global New Issuances database for the years 1995-2008. All variable rate 
bonds, convertible bonds, and bonds with equity features, such as bonds with warrants or 
rights are eliminated, leaving only fixed-rate, straight bonds in our sample. All Rule 
144A-private placements are also excluded because, unlike traditional private placements, 
Rule 144A-private placements are structured to facilitate inter-institutional trading in the 
secondary market and therefore they tend to resemble public offering bonds more than 
traditional, non-144A private bonds.
58
 Bonds issued by financial companies (SIC 6000-
6999) are excluded from the sample, because these bonds (such as mortgage-backed and 
asset-backed bonds) and their issuers tend to have more complicated capital structures 
with high leverage and use more complicated contract features. Accounting information 
on bond issuers are primarily obtained from the SDC and WorldScope databases. 
A country can be included in the sample only if it has at least three private 
placements and three public bond offerings during the sample period. We have 26 non-
US countries that meet this requirement in our sample, including 8 developing countries 
and 18 developed countries. Of this sample, 8 countries are common law countries, while 
the remainder are civil law countries. We have 16 OECD countries, and 6 of the G8 
Countries, with the U.S. and Russia being the two exceptions. Geographically, there are 
10 Asian countries, 11 European countries, one North American country, two South 
American countries, and two Oceania countries.  A list of the sample countries is given in 
Table 1.  
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 See Fenn (2000) for a detailed description of the unique characters of 144 A private placement bonds. 
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Table 1 List of Sample Countries 
Nation 
Numbe
r of 
Public 
Bonds 
Number 
of 
Private 
Placeme
nt 
Aggregate 
Size of 
Issuer Over 
Equity 
Market Cap 
Developed 
Country OECD  Continent G8  
Legal 
Origins 
Australia 43 36 
11% 
1 1 Pacific 0 Common 
Austria 23 14 
9% 
1 1 Europe 0 Civil 
Brazil 80 14 
14% 
0 0 
South 
America 0 Civil 
Canada 30 51 
2% 
1 1 
North 
America 1 Common 
China 17 44 
2% 
0 0 Asia 0 Civil 
Finland 33 4 
14% 
1 1 Europe 0 Civil 
France 341 37 
47% 
1 1 Europe 1 Civil 
Germany 92 21 
35% 
1 1 Europe 1 Civil 
Hong Kong 30 19 
6% 
1 0 Asia 0 Common 
India 157 144 
18% 
0 0 Asia 0 Common 
Indonesia 54 17 
10% 
0 0 Asia 0 Civil 
Italy 58 5 
34% 
1 1 Europe 1 Civil 
Japan 3825 229 
37% 
1 1 Asia 1 Civil 
Luxembourg 19 12 
8% 
1 1 Europe 0 Civil 
Malaysia 9 196 
11% 
0 0 Asia 0 Common 
Netherlands 144 35 
18% 
1 1 Europe 0 Civil 
New Zealand 5 6 
7% 
1 1 Pacific 0 Common 
Peru 117 3 
62% 
0 0 
South 
America 0 Civil 
Philippines 3 28 
20% 
0 0 Asia 0 Civil 
Singapore 46 80 
6% 
1 0 Asia 0 Common 
South Korea 67 35 
87% 
1 
1(After 
1996) Asia 0 Civil 
Spain 27 3 
14% 
1 1 Europe 0 Civil 
Sweden 63 14 
22% 
1 1 Europe 0 Civil 
Switzerland 111 11 
7% 
1 1 Europe 0 Civil 
Thailand 149 67 
50% 
0 0 Asia 0 Civil 
United 
Kingdom 441 36 
23% 
1 1 Europe 1 Common 
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Table 1, continued 
Nation 
GDP Per Capita 
($) 
Domestic 
credit provided 
by bank/GDP 
Market 
Cap/GDP 
Depth of 
Credit 
Info 
Accounting 
Standard 
Index 
Australia 30037.22 108.47% 99.42% 5 75 
Austria 32291.77 125.59% 25.06% 6 54 
Brazil 8311.75 75.67% 40.74% 5 54 
Canada 33481.88 183.23% 109.38% 6 74 
China 5059.26 131.10% 127.56% 2 n/a 
Finland 27247.8 65.06% 123.06% 5 77 
France 29412.63 109.29% 75.01% 4 69 
Germany 31024.78 137.50% 46.90% 6 62 
Hong Kong 31911.95 140% 348.68% 4 69 
India 2230.78 61.80% 51.33% 2 57 
Indonesia 3127.24 50.06% 26.64% 2 n/a 
Italy 28023.41 105.24% 47.31% 6 62 
Japan 28982.32 297.92% 73.66% 6 65 
Luxembourg 49083.33 101.04% 153.20% n/a n/a 
Malaysia 11442.21 149.33% 149.17% 6 76 
Netherlands 33242.61 152.21% 111.67% 5 64 
New Zealand 23930.24 122.15% 33.93% 5 70 
Peru 5932.25 20.66% 28.44% 6 38 
Philippines 2873.87 60.99% 41.80% 3 65 
Singapore 42174.62 81.81% 176.82% 4 78 
South Korea 19540.20 89.69% 49.14% 5 62 
Spain 26105.55 143.28% 88.36% 5 64 
Sweden 28857.47 105.77% 109.41% 4 83 
Switzerland 34610.07 176.45% 239.97% 5 68 
Thailand 6679.90 134.26% 59.66% 4 64 
United Kingdom 29497.33 142.52% 149.26% 6 78 
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Table 1, continued 
Nation 
Credit Rights 
Protection Index 
Tax 
Evasion 
Anti-Self 
Dealing 
Index 
Control of 
Corruption 
Depth of 
Credit 
Info 
Australia 3 5.78 0.76 1.99 5 
Austria 3 5.69 0.21 1.83 6 
Brazil 1 2.89 0.27 0.0067 5 
Canada 1 6.93 0.64 2.27 6 
China 2 3.81 0.76 -0.183 2 
Finland 1 7.38 0.45 2.39 5 
France 0 4.54 0.38 1.5 4 
Germany 3 4.6 0.28 1.85 6 
Hong Kong 4 6 0.96 1.5 4 
India 2 2.21 0.58 -0.22 2 
Indonesia 3 2.73 0.65 -0.84 2 
Italy 2 3.13 0.42 0.77 6 
Japan 3 6.36 0.5 1.28 6 
Luxembourg n/a 7.63 0.28 1.96 n/a 
Malaysia 3 6.09 0.95 0.47 6 
Netherlands 3 5.84 0.21 2.27 5 
New Zealand 4 7.29 0.95 2.32 5 
Peru 0 n/a 0.45 -0.12 6 
Philippines 1 2.03 0.21 -0.4 3 
Singapore 3 8.54 1 2 4 
South Korea 3 4.63 0.47 0.38 5 
Spain 2 4.82 0.37 1.32 5 
Sweden 1 3.97 0.33 2.35 4 
Switzerland 1 6.84 0.26 2.25 5 
Thailand 3 3.74 0.81 -0.25 4 
United Kingdom 4 6.69 0.95 2.09 6 
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As reported in Table 2, there are 5984 new public bond issues in the sample, and 
5398 of these issues are by firms in developed countries, while 586 of these public bond 
issues are by firms in developing countries. The total number of new private placement 
bond issues in the sample is 1158, and 645 of these bond issues are by firms from 
developed countries and 513 of them are by firms from developing countries. This 
statistics suggests that issuers from developed countries are much more likely to issue 
bonds publicly. Moreover, the majority of public bonds are issued by firms in civil law 
countries (5223 out of 5984). The number of private placement bonds is split more 
evenly between common law countries and civil law countries. Of course, the bond issues 
can differ substantially in other dimensions, which we take into account in our later 
multivariate analysis. 
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Table 2 Cross-Country Difference of Institutional Arrangements 
 
Full 
Sample 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Common 
Law 
Countries 
Civil 
Law 
Countries 
Total Number of Public 
Issuances 6171 5562.00 609.00 827.00 5344.00 
Total Number of Private 
Placements 1166 651.00 515.00 572.00 594.00 
Average GDP Per Capita ($) 21812.45 29465.49 5549.73 25137.81 20247.57 
 
Average Domestic credit 
provided by bank/GDP 1.18 1.33 0.85 1.24 1.16 
Average Market 
Capitalization/GDP 0.99 1.14 0.66 1.40 0.82 
Average Credit Rights 
Protection Index 2.24 2.41 1.88 3.00 1.88 
Average Tax Evasion 5.21 5.93 3.36 6.19 4.74 
Average Anti-Self-Dealing 
Index 0.54 0.52 0.59 0.85 0.41 
Average Control of 
Corruption 1.18 1.80 -0.19 1.55 1.02 
Average Depth of Credit 
Information 4.68 5.12 3.75 4.75 4.65 
Average Accounting 
Standard Index 66.43 69.06 59.00 72.13 63.40 
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Institutional Arrangements 
The size and development of a country’s banking sector is measured by the ratio 
of domestic credit provided by the banking sector divided by GDP. Annual measures of 
this ratio are obtained from the WDI database. The average of the annual ratios for each 
country in our sample is reported in Table 1. Among the countries in our sample, Japan 
has the largest banking sector, with domestic bank credit representing almost three times 
GDP. Peru has the smallest banking sector with domestic bank credit representing only 
about 20% of GDP. The statistics in Table 2 shows that the banking sector is more 
important in developed countries than it is in developing countries (the ratio is 132.62% 
vs. 85.48%). It is also on average slightly larger in common law countries than in civil 
law countries. Hong Kong has the largest stock market, measured by total equity market 
capitalization over GDP (obtained from WDI database annually), and Austria has the 
smallest stock market capitalization. The equity market is clearly larger and more 
important in developed countries and in common law countries than it is in developing 
countries and civil law countries. Annual GDP and GDP per capita (both measured in 
year 2000 US dollars) are obtained from the WDI database as well. 
The extent to which creditors have legal protection is measured by the Creditor 
Rights Index constructed by La Porta et al (1998). This index summarizes the legal rules 
that “cover the respect for the security of a loan contract, the ability of a lender to take 
possession of assets in a loan default, and the ability of management to seek protection 
from creditors unilaterally”.59 The index ranges from zero (weak protection) to four 
(strong protection), and is constructed in year 1995. In robust regressions, we also use the 
same index constructed in year 2000. Common law countries have better creditor rights 
                                                          
59
 Refer to La Porta et al (1998) 
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protection, with an average index score of 3, while civil law countries have relatively 
weak creditor rights protection, reflected in an average score of 1.88. 
We measure the strength of law enforcement by looking at control over 
managerial self-dealing, control of corruption, and prevalence of tax evasion.  The anti-
self-dealing index (Djankov et al 2008) is a numerical measure of the intensity of public 
and private enforcement of regulations on managerial self-dealing. Higher scores indicate 
stronger enforcement. Common law countries in the sample on average have significantly 
higher scores than civil law countries. The extent to which public power is exercised to 
gain private benefit (corruption) is negatively associated with a country’s legal 
enforcement. A country with better enforcement of its laws and regulations generally has 
a better control of corruption. We obtain the control of corruption index from Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. This index ranges from -0.84 to 2.39 in our sample, where a 
larger score represents stronger legal enforcement. This index is constructed biannually 
before 2002 and annually after 2002. On average, developed countries and common law 
countries have better control over corruption, based on the statistics in Table 2. The 
frequency of tax evasion is a measure of the enforcement of tax laws, which is correlated 
with corporate self-dealing.   We include the tax evasion index of the World Economic 
Forum as the third measure of a country’s legal enforcement level. This index ranges 
from 2.03 to 8.54 in our sample, and a higher score indicates higher tax evasion and 
weaker tax law enforcement. Based on this index, tax evasion seems to be more prevalent 
in developed countries.  
The World Bank Development Indicator (WDI) provides an index which 
measures the rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and the quality of credit information 
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available through public and private credit registries. Based on this index, Peru, Malaysia, 
Italy, Japan, Austria, Germany, UK, and Canada have good quality credit information, 
while the accessibility and quality of credit information is low in Indonesia, India and 
China. We also use the Accounting Standard Index of La Porta et al (1998) to measure 
the quality and comprehensiveness of financial information for each sample country. This 
index is created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their 
inclusion or omission of 90 financial items. A high score indicates a high accounting 
standard.  
Bond and Issuer Characteristics 
Table 3 exhibits the major characteristics of public and private placement bonds. 
Public bonds differ significantly from private placement bonds in that they generally have 
larger total proceeds, longer term to maturity, and lower yield to maturity. The average 
issue size is $265.59 million and $104.28 million for public and private bonds 
respectively, all measured in $US dollars. Average term to maturity is 85.47 months for 
public bonds, and 60.94 months for private placements. The yield to maturity at issuance 
averages 3.34% for public bonds and 5.22% for private bonds. In terms of bond seniority, 
most of public and private placement bonds are classified as senior debt claims. In 
contrast to the typical U.S. corporate bond issues, we find that bonds issued in our sample 
countries rarely have call provisions. 
Issuers vary substantially across the two types of bonds. Public bonds issuers are 
much larger than private bond issuers: the average (median) firm total assets value is 
$22,694 ($10,816) million for public bond issuers, compared to $8,791 ($1,033) million 
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for private bond issuers, all measured in 2002 US dollars. In terms of credit ratings, 
almost all the bonds included in our sample have investment grade ratings.13% of public 
issuers are classified as high-tech firms, compared to 10% of private issuers on average. 
Public bond issuers also have a higher level of tangible assets. The leverage ratio is 
similar across the two groups. The univariate statistics in Table 3 indicate that large 
issuances are more likely to be placed publicly, and that larger firms and firms with debt 
having lower default risk tend to issue public debt more frequently. 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics of Bond Issuances and Firm Characteristics 
Panel A Full Sample 
 
Public  Bond   Private Placement Bonds 
 
Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Proceeds($ millions) 265.59 127.5 5981 
 
104.28 31.6 1158 
Maturity (months) 85.47 72 5984 
 
60.94 60 1158 
Yield to Maturity at Issuance 
Date 
3.34% 2.36% 5882 
 
5.22% 4.80% 1117 
% of Callable Bonds 0.23% 
 
5984 
 
0.00% 
 
1158 
% of Senior Bonds 99.80% 
 
5984 
 
99.91% 
 
1158 
Firm Total Assets($ millions) 22649.34 10816.9 5515 
 
8791.66 1033.9 939 
Firm Leverage 0.45 0.44 4910 
 
0.46 0.43 723 
% of  Issuers with Investment 
Rating 
99% 
 
5984 
 
98% 
 
1158 
% of High Tech Firms 13% 
 
5984 
 
10% 
 
1158 
Industry Tangibility 0.48 0.42 5510   0.44 0.42 963 
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Panel B Developed Countries 
 
Public  Bond   Private Placement Bonds 
 
Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Proceeds($ millions) 282.6 140.7 5395 
 
108.9 26.6 645 
Maturity (months) 88.4 73 5398 
 
58.7 60 645 
Yield to Maturity at Issuance 
Date 
2.84% 2.2 5367 
 
3.46% 3.11% 616 
Firm Total Assets($ millions) 24569.34 12114.4 5019 
 
14096.86 3663.9 489 
Firm Leverage 0.46 0.44 4549 
 
0.43 0.42 392 
% of  Issuers with Investment 
Rating 
99% 
 
5398 
 
97% 
 
645 
% of High Tech Firms 13% 
 
5398 
 
12% 
 
645 
Industry Tangibility 0.47 0.41 5043   0.41 0.36 510 
 
Panel C Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public  Bond   Private Placement Bonds 
 
Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Proceeds($ millions) 109 43.8 586 
 
98.54 39 513 
Maturity (months) 58.4 60 586 
 
63.67 60 513 
Yield to Maturity at Issuance 
Date 
8.37% 8% 515 
 
7.38% 6.80% 501 
Firm Total Assets($ millions) 3221.04 1044.25 496 
 
3026.67 551.8 450 
Firm Leverage 0.43 0.42 361 
 
0.49 0.45 331 
% of  Issuers with Investment 
Rating 
97% 
 
586 
 
99% 
 
513 
% of High Tech Firms 13% 
 
586 
 
8% 
 
513 
Industry Tangibility 0.51 0.54 467   0.47 0.47 453 
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Panel D Common Law Countries 
 
Public  Bond   Private Placement Bonds 
 
Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Proceeds($ millions) 408.25 198.5 761 
 
74.31 27.6 565 
Maturity (months) 96.72 72 761 
 
58.74 60 565 
Yield to Maturity at Issuance 
Date 
6.24% 6.1 743 
 
5.99% 5.92% 547 
Firm Total 
Assets($ millions) 
17195.24 5864.65 540 
 
3299.16 594.4 476 
Firm Leverage 0.41 0.38 392 
 
0.48 0.44 325 
% of  Issuers with 
Investment Rating 
97% 
 
761 
 
99% 
 
565 
% of High Tech Firms 15% 
 
761 
 
5% 
 
565 
Industry Tangibility 0.51 0.53  678   0.48 0.51  463 
 
Panel E Civil Law Countries 
 
Public  Bond   Private Placement Bonds 
 
Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Proceeds($ millions) 244.8 124.4 5220 
 
132.84 41 593 
Maturity (months) 83.83 72 5223 
 
63.04 60 593 
Yield to Maturity at 
Issuance Date 
2.91% 2% 5140 
 
4.48% 3.60% 571 
Firm Total 
Assets($ millions) 
23241.35 11263.8 4975 
 
14438.37 3594 463 
Firm Leverage 0.46 0.45 4518 
 
0.44 0.42 398 
% of  Issuers with 
Investment Rating 
99% 
 
5223 
 
96% 
 
593 
% of High Tech Firms 13% 
 
5223 
 
15% 
 
593 
Industry Tangibility 0.47 0.41  4832   0.39 0.35  500 
 
  
158 
 
Hypothesis Development and Brief Literature Review 
 
Firm Characteristics and the Choice between Public and Private Debt 
Theoretical literature on firm financing decisions predicts that several factors can 
influence a firm’s choice between public and private debt issuance. Public issuance of 
debt securities typically involves higher flotation costs, which include investment 
banking fees, attorney fees, SEC filing fees, and other transaction costs. Private 
placement debt is generally free of securities filing fees. Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) 
provide evidence that public debt issues have a larger fixed cost than private issues and 
that private issues are relatively more cost effective for small firms and firms undertaking 
small debt offerings. 
The prevalence of debt agency problems also heavily influences a firm’s debt 
financing choice. Galai and Masulis (1976) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out 
that managers whose interests are aligned with shareholders have greater incentives to 
take on riskier projects and substitute riskier assets for existing lower risk assets, often 
termed an asset substitution problem. Galai and Masulis (1976) and Myers (1977) 
explore a second type of debt agency problem regarding manager incentives to forgo 
some low risk, positive NPV projects, leading to an underinvestment problem. Firms 
suffering from high contracting costs associated with these two debt agency problems are 
more likely to issue debt privately, because private debtholders can lower these agency 
costs by imposing strict debt covenants and are better able to closely monitor their 
enforcement. 
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Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984, 1991), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
(1984) emphasize information production by private lenders. These theories argue that 
lenders in private debt markets have information advantages over public lenders: first, 
because they typically have periodic access to proprietary firm information when the debt 
is up for renewal; and second, they also have superior skills over public debtholders in 
terms of evaluating firm specific information. Firms facing larger manager-investor 
information asymmetry tend to have poor access to public debt markets when the costs of 
information asymmetry are high. Hence, these firms tend to borrow privately. The last 
benefit of private debt is its flexibility in renegotiating contract terms. Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994) predict that access to debt financing is a function of both a borrower's 
probability of default and a lender's ability to efficiently renegotiate or else force a speedy 
liquidation. It follows that it is optimal for borrowers with a higher ex-ante probability of 
financial distress to borrow privately. 
Prior empirical research tests the above theoretical predictions primarily using US 
data, and finds the evidence is largely supportive of the theories. Krishnaswami, Spindt, 
and Subramaniam (1999) find firm size and average debt issue size are negatively 
correlated with the ratio of private debt over total debt outstanding. Both Krishnaswami 
et al. (1999) and Houston and James (1996) find evidence consistent with the debt agency 
problems and information asymmetry hypotheses: specifically, they find that firms with 
high growth opportunities are more likely to issue private debt. Hadlock and James (2002) 
and Denis and Mihov (2003) find that risky firms and firms with low credit ratings tend 
to borrow privately. 
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An important and as yet unanswered question is whether these theories have 
support using international data and whether the identified factors have similar 
explanatory power in predicting financing choice for firms headquartered outside the US. 
To the extent that a similar set of fundamental economic factors drives firm decisions, we 
expect to find that firm level characteristics, which affect debt financing choices of US 
firms also play significant roles in non-US firms. The second important questions is 
whether the factors affect firm decisions in a similar way across countries with 
fundamentally different institutional features, such as countries in different development 
stage and countries with different legal origins. By including a large number of countries 
in our sample, we are able to investigate these questions. 
Institutional Arrangements and the Choice between Public And Private Debt 
Economic agents, such as firms, investors, and financial institutions, are shaped 
by the institutional environment they face. This section discusses the potential impacts of 
institutional differences across countries on how firms are financed. In particular, we 
focus on institutional variables that reflect (1) the development of key financial markets, 
(2) the legal protection of creditors and the ability of creditors to enforce legal contracts, 
and (3) the transparency and comprehensiveness of firm financial statements and credit 
information. 
Firm debt financing choice reflects the interplay of a firm’s demand for capital 
and outside investors’ security preferences. Holding firms demand constant, the supply 
side factors can significantly alter a firm’s choice between different financing instruments. 
For example, in countries where the banking sector is dominant, the market for private 
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placement bonds may be very undeveloped or even non-existent. In this situation, bank 
loans may be the first choice of firms seeking private financing. To some extent, bank 
loans and private placement bonds can represent substitutes. Thus, the amount of banking 
credit available to the private sector could lower a firm’s likelihood of issuing private 
placement bonds. Similarly, when the stock market is highly developed, more firms are 
likely to have access to the public capital markets, potentially at relatively low costs, 
which can raise their likelihood of issuing equity rather than bonds.  Therefore, firms in 
general are less likely to issue public bonds in countries with large domestic equity 
markets.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that firm can be viewed as a nexus of a set of 
contracting relationships among firm stakeholders. To mitigate the inherent conflicts of 
interests among these different stakeholders, explicit and implicit contracts are used. As 
argued by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and a large literature 
hereafter, the effectiveness of these contracts in controlling stakeholder conflicts of 
interests largely depends on the external quality and strength of the legal system. Fan, 
Titman, and Twite (2012) report that firms tend to rely on financial instruments that limit 
managerial discretion in countries with weak laws and enforcement of creditor rights. 
When there are strong laws and enforcement, monitoring by private lenders becomes less 
common. Therefore, the external legal protection of creditors acts as a substitute for close 
monitoring of a firm by private lenders.   
When the legal protection of creditors is strong and can be credibly enforced, 
bankruptcy proceedings triggered by covenant violations tend to be more efficient and 
creditors expect a higher recovery rate, which substantially lowers the risks associated 
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with lending. Consequently, close monitoring and flexible renegotiation available in a 
private lending relationship is less attractive in these countries compared to countries 
with weak creditor protection. Everything else equal, this suggests a higher probability of 
issuing public bonds when firms operating in countries with stronger legal protections of 
creditors. Beyond the formal legal protection for creditors, the integrity and 
enforceability of these laws is also critical. Firms are more likely to issue bond publicly 
when the legal protections of creditors are strongly enforced.  
The last dimension of the institutional arrangements affecting creditors that we 
examine is the availability of transparent firm financial information and credit 
information. Such information helps to resolve the information asymmetry problem 
between a firm and its outside investors, which lowers the costs of adverse selection and 
moral hazard that are made more serious as information asymmetry rises. Therefore, we 
expect to see firms issue public bonds more frequently when their financial reporting 
standards are high and the quality of credit information available to investors is good. 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
The Effects of Firm Characteristics 
The first question we explore is whether the determinants of debt financing choice 
documented in US studies are also relevant in explaining this choice outside the US, and 
if they are relevant, whether they affect non-US firms in the same way they affect US 
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firms. We estimate a firm’s choice between public and private placement bonds using a 
logit model.  
The results of the logit estimation are reported in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 report 
regression estimates using the full sample. Column 1 includes only firm and issuance 
characteristics, while column 2 also takes into account the effect of global business cycles 
by including year fixed effects.  Large bond issues60 and those with longer maturities are 
more likely to be placed publicly. Large firms are generally regarded as having fewer 
debt agency problems (Smith and Warner 1979), and they also have less information 
asymmetry due to extensively public scrutiny. Consistent with this argument, we find 
firm size has a significant positive association with a firm’s probability of issuing public 
bonds. High tech firms tend to have greater growth opportunities than other 
manufacturing firms and we find they are less likely to issue public bonds, supporting the 
debt agency problem hypothesis.61 Firms with investment grade ratings are more likely to 
issue public bonds than non-investment grade firms. Firm leverage is negatively 
associated with the probability of issuing public bonds. Industry tangibility does not 
affect debt placement decisions in any significant way.62  Bonds issued internationally are 
more likely to be privately placed than domestic issues, as shown in column 9. The full-
sample regressions suggest that the theories that explain firms financing decisions also 
apply internationally and that the key firm specific factors affecting US firm financing 
choices also drive firm financing choices outside the US.  
                                                          
60
 As a robustness check, we include the squared term of log (proceeds) in column 9. It does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the choice between public and private bond issuance. 
61
 In robustness test, I use market to book ratio as another proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities. This 
variable is missing fairly frequently, which reduces my sample size.  
62
 Due to data limitation, we use industry median tangibility ratio rather than individual firm’s tangibility 
ratio, in order to preserve our sample size.  
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Table 4 Logit Regression: Firm Characteristics and Choice between Public and Private 
Bonds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable=1 if firm issues a public bond 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
All Countries 
All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
 Log (Proceeds) 0.72 
***
 0.85 
***
 -0.06 
 
1.74 
***
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.08) 
 (Log Proceeds)
2
 
        
         Log (Term to Maturity) 0.22
*
 0.16
*
 -0.26
*
 0.28
**
 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.13) 
 Investment Grade Rating 1.62 
***
 1.66 
***
 0.47 
**
 4.43 
***
 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.44) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.56) 
 High Tech Indicator -0.37 
***
 -0.51 
***
 0.21 
 
-1.11 
***
 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.21) 
 Log (Book Assets) 0.34 
***
 0.31 
***
 0.28 
***
 -0.09 
*
 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.05) 
 Firm Leverage -0.42 
*
 -0.7 
***
 -1.07 
**
 -0.09 
 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(0.41) 
 Industry Tangibility -0.12 
 
0.16 
 
0.52 
 
0.18 
 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.37) 
 International Issue 
Indicator 
        
         Constant -6.3
***
 -6.29
***
 -1.06
 
-9.53
***
 
  (0.57)   (0.61)   (20.87)  (0.87)   
Year Fixed Effects No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes` 
 Number of Observations 5333 
 
5333 
 
624 
 
4709 
 Pseudo R-Squared 0.17  0.2  0.15  0.2  
165 
 
Table 4, continued 
Dependent variable=1 if firm issues a public bond 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Common 
Law 
Countries 
Civil Law 
Countries 
All 
Countries 
w/o Japan Japan 
All 
Countries 
 Log (Proceeds) 0.55 
***
 1.18 
***
 0.41 
***
 3.44 
***
 0.94 
***
 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.20) 
 (Log Proceeds)
2
 
        
-0.01 
 
         
(0.02) 
 Log (Term to Maturity) 0.09
 
0.16
 
0.06
 
0.1
 
0.21 
**
 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.09) 
 Investment Grade Rating -0.53 
 
3 
***
 0.88 
***
 -5.21 
 
1.6 
***
 
 
(0.74) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(10.75) 
 
(0.41) 
 High Tech Indicator -0.53 
 
-0.73 
***
 -0.23 
 
-0.57 
 
-0.49 
***
 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.15) 
 Log (Book Assets) 0.49 
***
 0.04 
 
0.23 
***
 -0.36 
***
 0.49 
***
 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.03) 
 Firm Leverage 0.34 
 
-1.07 
***
 -0.71 
**
 -1.58 
*
 -0.87 
***
 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.90) 
 
(0.26) 
 Industry Tangibility -0.41 
 
0.73 
**
 -0.35 
 
2.89 
***
 -0.09 
 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.89) 
 
(0.24) 
 International Issue 
Indicator 
        
-2.46 
***
 
         
(0.14) 
 Constant -5.82
***
 -6.32
***
 -2.76
***
 -2.55
***
 -5.32 
***
 
  (1.14)   (0.79)   (0.60)   (10.75)   (0.74) 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 691 
 
4643 
 
1594 
 
3739 
 
5333 
 Pseudo R-Squared 0.38  0.15  0.22  0.26  0.25 
 
 
 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report estimates for subsamples of developing and 
developed countries, respectively.  Some interesting patterns are uncovered when 
comparing the estimates across the two subgroups. First, firm characteristics are more 
important than bond issue characteristics in developing countries. To be more specific, 
firm size plays a much more important role.  Variables that capture a firm’s risk profile, 
namely its credit rating and current leverage ratio are both significant in column 3, riskier 
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firms are less likely to issue bond publicly. The issue size does not significantly affect a 
firm’s choice.  Term to maturity is negatively related to the likelihood of issuing publicly, 
although its effect is barely significant. Second, the contracting terms of a bond, such as 
its size and maturity, are clearly more important factors in developed countries than they 
are in developing countries, suggesting that flotation costs are a major driver of a firm’s 
debt choice in developed countries.  Third, firm size has a much larger effect in 
developing countries, in that larger firms are much more likely to issue public bonds. 
Surprisingly, firm size has a marginally significant negative relation with public bond 
issuance in developed countries. Columns 5 and 6 examine subsamples of common law 
and civil law countries, respectively. We find that firm size lowers a firm’s likelihood of 
issuing public bonds primarily in civil law countries. 
Japanese firms account for a large part of our sample. To insure that our results 
are not heavily influence by a single country, we re-estimate the logit model using the full 
sample, excluding Japanese firms. The results are shown in Column 7 of Table 4 and they 
are qualitatively the same as the full sample regression in Column 2. A regression using 
only Japanese firms suggest that the negative effect of firm size in developed countries 
and civil law countries reported in prior regressions may be due to the effect of bonds 
issued by Japanese firms. In column 8, we find that firm size significantly reduces 
Japanese firms’ probability of issuing public bonds. After dropping Japan from the 
sample, the negative coefficients of firm size in columns 4 and 6 become positive. 
However, the cause for why firm size is negatively correlated with public bond issuance 
in Japan remains a puzzle. 
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Table 5 Logit Regression: Institutions and Choice between Public and Private Bonds 
 
Dependent variable=1 if firm issues a public bond 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Developed Country Indicator 
 
1.87 
***
 
  
   
(0.07) 
   Common Law Indicator 
    
-1.81
***
 
     
(0.07) 
 Log (GDP Per Capita) 
      
       Development of Banking Sector 
     
       Development of Stock Market 
     
       Creditor Rights Protection 
      
       Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
      
       Control of Corruption 
      
       Tax Evasion 
      
       Depth of Credit Information 
     
       Accounting Standard 
      
       Constant 
  
0.29
***
 2.22
***
 
    (0.06)   (0.04)   
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 7142 7142 7142 
 
7142 
 Pseudo R-Squared 0.23 0.24 0.11  0.11  
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Table 5, continued 
Dependent variable=1 if firm issues a public bond 
  
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Developed Country Indicator 
      
        Common Law Indicator 
       
        Log (GDP Per Capita) 
 
0.56
***
 1.05
***
 0.89
***
 
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.05) 
 Development of Banking Sector 0.27 
**
 0.59 
***
 0.21 
***
 
  
(0.05) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.06) 
 Development of Stock Market -0.89 
***
 -0.12 
 
-0.35 
***
 
  
(0.07) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 Creditor Rights Protection 
   
0.26 
***
 
  
    
(0.058) 
   Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
   
0.04 
   
    
(0.32) 
   Control of Corruption 
   
0.36 
**
 
  
    
(0.12) 
   Tax Evasion 
   
-0.91 
***
 
  
    
(0.08) 
   Depth of Credit Information 
    
-0.17
***
 
      
(0.05) 
 Accounting Standard 
     
-8.73 
***
 
      
(0.65) 
 Constant 
 
-3.42
***
 -5.54
***
 -0.27 
    (0.29)   (0.70)   (0.38)  
Country Fixed Effects 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 
 
7067 
 
6947 
 
6935 
 Pseudo R-Squared 
 
0.14  0.18  0.16  
 
 
The Effects of Institutions 
Table 5 shows the effect of country level institutional arrangements on the 
financing choices of domestic firms. Country level fixed effects alone explain 23% of the 
variation in firms’ bond issuance choices. A logit model based on issue and firm 
characteristics has a pseudo R-squared of 17%. Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Tables 4 
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and 5, we conclude that country level factors are at least as important as firm level factors 
in determining the choice between public and private bond issuance.  
The remainder of this section explores the key institutional factors that potentially 
affect firm financing decisions and how they affect individual firms at the microeconomic 
level. The stage of economic development in a country certainly affects its firms 
financing decisions: we find that firms in developed countries are more likely to access 
the public bond market.  Examining regression 3 of Table 5, we see that the developed 
economy indicator alone explains 11% of the cross-sectional variation in firm debt 
financing choices. Firms located in countries with high GDP per capita are more likely to 
issue public bonds.  Model 4 tests the effect of legal origins. Given that common law 
countries have better investor protection than civil law countries (LLSV 1998 and 
LLSV2002), we expect firms in common law countries to issue public bonds more 
frequently than firms in civil laws countries, based on the argument in section 3.2. 
However, we find that the common law origin indicator is negative and statistically 
significant at one percent level. This result, on the surface, seems to contradict the 
prediction that better investor protection encourages public financing. However, given 
that legal origins affect a variety of legal and economic aspects of a country, it is 
premature to interpret this result as strong evidence against this prediction.  To test this 
prediction more rigorously, we examine the specific legal rules that are directly relevant 
to creditor protection when we reexamine the relationship between creditor protection 
and firm financing decisions later in this section. 
The development of other financial markets clearly affects the bond issuance 
behavior of firms. We find that in countries with large and powerful banking sectors, 
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firms are less likely to tap the private placement bond market.63 We also find that the 
larger the size of the stock market, the lower firm’s frequency of issuing public bonds. 
The results are consistent with our predictions that bank loans act as potential substitutes 
for private placement bonds, while public equity acts as a partial substitute for a public 
bond issues. 
In column 6 of Table 5, we test the effect of creditor protection and legal 
enforcement on individual firm financing decisions. The result suggests that stronger 
statutory creditor protection, measured by the creditor rights protection index, 
significantly increases a firm’s likelihood of issuing in the public bond market. 
Furthermore, if a country has strong public and private enforcement of anti-corporate-
self-dealing laws, its firms have a higher likelihood of issuing debt publicly. This 
prediction follows because the agency cost of debt financing arising from managerial 
self-serving behavior is likely to be low. Thus, investors in these countries find it less 
risky to invest in public bonds than investors in countries with a high risk of managerial 
self-dealing. Therefore, firms have greater access to public bond market because of the 
relatively low agency costs associated with public bonds. Similarly, firms in countries 
with better control over corruption issue public bonds more frequently. Lastly, weak legal 
enforcement, measured by the prevalence of tax evasion, lowers a firm’s likelihood of 
issuing bonds publicly.  
The effects of credit information availability and higher quality accounting 
standards are tested in column 7 of Table 5. Surprisingly, better access to credit 
                                                          
63 The size of banking sector is measured by the ratio of domestic credits provided by the banking sector 
divided by GDP, on a 0-1 scale. 
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information and a more comprehensive financial reporting system tends to lower the 
frequency of firms issuing public bonds. This result contradicts the prediction that a 
better information system lowers information asymmetry between the firm and outside 
investors and hence increases a firm’s access to the public bond market.  
Table 6 tests the relative importance of firm characteristics and institutional 
factors in explaining firm debt financing choice by pooling these explanatory variables 
together. Model 1 of Table 6 is a regression that includes all firm and country level 
factors and has a pseudo R-squared of 0.32. The results concerning associations of debt 
financing decisions and firm characteristics still hold. Beyond these firm characteristics, 
country level institutional arrangements continue to have significant associations with 
individual firm bond issuance decisions.   
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Table 6 Logit Regression: Interaction of Institutions and Firm Characteristics 
Dependent variable=1 if firm issues a public bond 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm Characteristics 
             
Log (Proceeds) 1.59 
***
 1.12 
***
 1.11 
***
 1.09 
***
 1.12 
***
 1.1 
***
 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 Log (Term to Maturity) -0.22 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.07 
 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.09) 
 Investment Grade Rating 1.57 
***
 1.18 
**
 1.34 
***
 1.33 
***
 1.69 
***
 1.33 
***
 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.50) 
 High Tech Indicator -0.78 
***
 -0.37 
**
 -0.41 
**
 -0.6 
 
-2.07 
*
 -0.34 
**
 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.43) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.16) 
 Log (Book Assets) 0.19 
***
 -0.02 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 Firm Leverage -0.58 
**
 -0.49 
*
 -0.7 
**
 -0.51 
*
 -0.65 
**
 -1.86 
*
 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.97) 
 Industry Tangibility 1.11 
***
 3.31 
***
 3.1 
***
 0.9 
***
 1.06 
***
 0.88 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(0.83) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.27) 
 Institutional Arrangements 
            Log (GDP Per Capita) 0.91
***
 0.71
***
 0.61
***
 0.69
***
 0.58
**
 0.68
***
 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 Development of Banking Sector 1.79 
***
 0.38 
***
 0.11 
 
0.39 
***
 0.08 
 
0.41 
***
 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.10) 
 Development of Stock Market -0.14 
 
1.22 
***
 -0.89 
***
 -1.25 
***
 -0.89 
***
 -1.23 
***
 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.13) 
 Creditor Rights Protection 0.09 
 
-0.03 
   
-0.53 
***
 
  
-0.69 
***
 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.16) 
   
(0.08) 
   
(0.14) 
 Anti-Self-Dealing Index 2.56 
**
 
  
-1.44
**
 
  
-3.64
***
 
  
 
(1.07) 
   
(0.77) 
   
(0.36) 
   Control of Corruption 1.38 
***
 
          
 
(0.33) 
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Table 6, continued 
 
 
Tax Evasion -0.81 
***
 
          
 
(0.14) 
           Depth of Credit Information -0.92 
***
 
          
 
(0.14) 
           Accounting Standard -13.35 
***
 
          
 
(2.77) 
           Interaction Terms 
            Industry Tangibility*Creditor Rights Protection -0.87
*
 
        
   
(0.27) 
         Industry Tangibility* Anti Self-Dealing Index 
   
-3.31
***
 
      
     
(1.20) 
       High Tech Indicator * Creditor Rights Protection
    
0.09
     
       
(0.15) 
     High Tech Indicator* Anti Self-Dealing Index 
      
2.87
***
 
  
         
(0.79) 
   Firm Leverage*Creditor Rights Protection 
         
0.47
 
           
(0.35) 
 Firm Leverage*Depth of Credit Information 
           
             Constant -0.8
 
-6.04
***
 -7.72
***
 -8.79
***
 -6.37
***
 -8.26
***
 
  (2.48) 
 
 (1.06) 
 
 (1.01) 
 
 (0.87) 
 
 (0.93)   (0.96)   
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 5131 
 
5299 
 
5299 
 
5299 
 
5299 
 
5299 
 Pseudo R-Squared 0.32  0.26  0.27  0.26  0.27  0.27  
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Firms that face high costs associated with debt agency problems tend to have 
poorer access to public bond markets, and they are the firms that appear to benefit most 
from stronger legal protections of creditor rights. A firm’s choice between public and 
private bond is less sensitive to its proportion of tangible assets versus embedded growth 
options, when it resides in a country with stronger creditor protection laws and when the 
law can be effectively enforced. As reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6, the 
interaction terms of industry tangibility with creditor rights protection and the anti-self-
dealing index are negative and significant, suggesting that firms with fewer tangible 
assets are more adversely affected by weaker legal protections of creditor rights in terms 
of their propensity to issue public debt. In contrast, the interaction of the high-tech 
indictor with creditor rights protection and the anti-self-dealing index are positive and 
significant, suggesting that high-tech firms have better access to the public bond market 
when creditors have better legal protections. This is consistent with the argument that 
when managerial self-dealing behavior is tightly constrained by law, closer monitoring of 
firms by creditors is less critical.  
International Bond Issues  
With increasing integration of global financial markets, more firms are choosing 
to issue debt internationally, especially after the creation of euro in 1999.64 The 
percentage of bonds issued internationally before and after 1999 is 25% and 29%, 
respectively. Panel A of Table 7 shows the prevalence and distribution of international 
bonds.  Of the 7142 bond issues in the sample, 26.30% of them (N=1878) are issued 
outside their own country, and the remaining 73.70% are issued domestically. Of the 
                                                          
64
 Most international issued bonds are either US dollar denominated or euro denominated. 
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international bonds, 76.20% (N=1431) are public bonds, which is a lower proportion than 
the 86.49% of domestic debt issues that are public bonds.  Firms from developed 
countries issue substantially more international bonds, and they account for 1802 of the 
1878 international issuances in the sample. In terms of a firm’s choice between 
international bonds and domestic bonds, firms from developed countries are much more 
likely to issue international bonds than are firms from developing countries. The ratio of 
international bond issues to domestic bond issues is 1 over 2.35 for developed countries 
and 1 over 13.46 for developing countries. Similarly, international bond issues of firms 
located in common law countries also appear more attractive to investors than bond 
issues of firms located in civil law countries.  The ratio of international bond issues over 
domestic bond issues is 1 over 3.72 for civil law countries and 1 over 1.05 for common 
law countries. The ratio of international bond issues over domestic bond issues rises to 
3.27 over 1 if we focus on common law countries that have well developed economies. 
 
Table 7 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Internationally Issued Bonds 
Domestic Bonds International Bonds 
 N= 5264 N=1878 
 73.70% 26.30% 
 
Public Bonds 
Private 
Placement Public Bonds Private Placement 
 4553 711 1431 447 
 86.49% 13.51% 76.20% 23.80% 
 
     
  
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Common Law 
Countries 
Civil Law 
Countries 
Domestic 
Bonds 
4241 1023 680 4584 
70.18% 93.08% 51.28% 78.82% 
International 
Bonds 
1802 76 646 1232 
29.82% 6.92% 48.72% 21.18% 
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The statistics in last paragraph indicates that a country’s institutional 
characteristics largely affect domestic firm access to the international debt market, and 
this conclusion is further supported by multivariate regression estimates. A logit model 
estimating a firm’s likelihood of issuing international bonds is reported in Column 1 of 
Table 7. We find that firms in more developed countries, measured by GDP per capita, 
are more likely to issue debt internationally. If a country has a large domestic debt market, 
measured by the size of its banking sector, then its firms are less likely to sell bonds in 
the international debt market. On the other hand, a well-developed domestic equity 
market increases a firm’s likelihood of borrowing internationally. Furthermore, we find 
that country level indices of creditor rights protection, anti-self-dealing and control of 
corruption also have a significant positive association with the probability of a firm 
issuing bonds internationally. A high prevalence of tax evasion significantly lowers a 
firm’s probability of issuing bonds internationally. Access to reliable credit information 
has a significant positive association with the probability of international bond issuance.  
We test the choice between public issuance and private placement for the 
subsample of internationally issued bonds in model 2 and model 3 of Table 7. In contrast 
to the regression estimates in the full sample, we find that a larger banking sector is 
associated with a lower probability of issuing public bonds internationally. Moreover, the 
effects of legal constraints on managerial self-dealing and control of corruption are 
statistically significant in the subsample of international bonds. Consistent with the 
predicted effect of the quality of financial accounting information, we find that better 
access to accounting information largely increases a firm’s probability of issuing public 
bonds internationally. Compared with the results in model 7 of Table 5 where the effects 
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of having reliable firm credit information and financial accounting information are both 
negative, the evidence in Table 7 suggests that access to reliable financial accounting 
information is given much more weight by foreign investors than by domestic investors. 
Our evidence suggests that country level factors are more important in determining firm 
issuance choice between public and private debt when firms are tapping the international 
bond market. Because institutional characteristics represent a different set of risk factors, 
independent of firm level risk factors, investors are more concerned with risks arising 
from country-specific institutional characteristics when they invest in foreign companies. 
 
Table 7 Panel B Likelihood of Issuing International Bonds 
Dependent variable =1 if firm issues an international bond 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    Log (GDP Per Capita) 1.83 
*** 
0.63 
*** 
0.53 
*** 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.14) 
 
Development of Banking Sector -2.51 
*** 
-0.96 
*** 
-1.31 
*** 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.13) 
 
Development of Stock Market 0.69 
*** 
-0.01 
 
-0.1 
 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(-0.12) 
 
Creditor Rights Protection 0.26 
*** 
0.13 
** 
 
 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 3.82 
*** 
2.01 
*** 
 
 
 
(0.61) 
 
(0.38) 
 
 
 
Control of Corruption 2.09 
*** 
0.72 
*** 
 
 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.19) 
 
 
 
Tax Evasion -2.07 
*** 
-0.66 
*** 
 
 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.13) 
 
 
 
Depth of Credit Information 1.43 
*** 
 
 
0.04
* 
 
(0.10) 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
Accounting Standard -7.31 
*** 
 
 
4.38 
*** 
 
(2.28) 
 
 
 
(1.16) 
 
Constant -11.11 
*** 
-2.41
* 
-5.08 
*** 
 
(1.73) 
 
(1.48) 
 
(1.23) 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Number of Observations 6418 
 
1761 
 
1757 
 Pseudo R-Squared 0.47  0.18  0.16  
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Institutions and Bond Yield 
In this section, we explore how key institutional factors can affect bond yields, an 
implicit channel through which they affect a firm’s choice between private debt market 
and public debt market. In particular, we study the yield spread between public bonds and 
private placement bonds at the date of issuance, and examine the effect of key 
institutional factors on the yield spread. Private placement bonds usually have a higher 
yield than similar public offering bonds, and the differentials capture a liquidity premium 
and the additional premium private lenders require to compensate them for the costs of 
closely monitoring borrowers (Carey et al 1994). We expect institutional factors to have a 
larger impact on public bond yields by affecting bond market conditions, including the 
size and development of public corporate bond market, the overall market risk, public 
bond market liquidity and even the existence of an active secondary corporate bond 
market. The yield on private placement bonds is largely determined by the private 
negotiation between the lenders and borrowers, and hence, is less likely to be strongly 
affected by institutional arrangements.  
Consistent with the prior studies using US corporate bond data, in Table 3 we find 
that public bonds on average have lower yields than private bonds (3.34% vs. 5.22%).  
Next we compare the bond yields in developed and developing countries. In developed 
countries, both the mean and median yield of public bonds is lower than that of private 
placement bonds. However, we find the exact opposite results in developing countries. 
Public bonds are on average more expensive than private placement bonds, in terms of 
bond yield, and for the median bonds, the yield spread of public bond over private bond 
can be as large as 1.2%. Moreover, we notice private bond issuers and public bond 
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issuers are of similar size in developing countries, whereas in developed countries private 
bond issuers are much smaller than public bond issuers.  The term to maturity and issue 
size of public bonds are comparable to that of private placement bonds in developing 
countries. These results are starkly different from the earlier findings for US firms that 
private placement bonds are generally issued by very small firms and with small total 
proceeds, at higher yields and much shorter maturities. We compare bond characteristics 
across common law and civil law countries as well. In common law countries, the mean 
and median yield of public bonds is slightly higher than that for private placement bonds. 
The maturity of public bonds on average is much longer than private placement bonds. In 
civil law countries, both mean and median yield is lower for public bonds than for private 
placement bonds, and public bonds also tend to have longer maturities and larger 
issuance size.  
We test the effects of key institutional arrangements on the yield spread of public 
bond over private placement bond in multivariate regression framework. Firms are not 
randomly assigned to issue bonds publicly or privately. Instead, they make this decision 
based on the particular circumstances they are facing and their own unique characteristics. 
Thus, the institutional factors that affect their issuance decisions can well affect the yields 
of their bond issues. Recognizing this, we adjust the OLS regressions on bond yield for 
firm self-selection. Following Campa and Kedia (2002) and Li and Prabhala (2007) we 
use a Heckman selection model.  We first model a firm’s decision of whether to issue 
public bonds or private placement bonds, and then calculate the inverse Mills ratio, which 
captures a firm’s private information used in making its bond issuance decision. We then 
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estimate the OLS regression on bond yield, including the inverse Mills ratio estimated 
from the first step to adjust for self-selection. Our econometric model is the following: 
                          
                         
                                  (   )      
where  
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D is an indicator variable, which equals to one if the firm chooses to issue a 
public bond.  The coefficient    captures the average yield spread of public bonds over 
private bonds. X is a vector of bond characteristics, W is matrix of country level 
institutional factors, 1  and 0  are the inverse Mills ratios calculated from the first step 
probit regression. The estimation results are reported in Table 8. We find that bond yield 
increases with its term to maturity. Bond yield decreases with issue size at a decreasing 
rate: bond yield is negatively related to issue size (i.e. log (total proceeds)) and is 
positively related to issue size squared. Bonds with call options generally have to pay a 
higher yield, while bonds with investment grade ratings pay a significantly lower yield 
than bonds that are below investment grade. High tech firms and highly levered firms on 
average pay a higher yield, and large firms are able to issue bonds at relatively low costs 
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(in terms of bond yield). High portions of tangible assets also lowers bond yield. Bonds 
issued internationally tend to pay a higher yield than those issued domestically. The 
inverse Mills ratio is always negative and significant in affecting bond yield, suggesting 
that firms tend to choose an issuance method with a lower yield.  Public bonds on 
average have a much lower yield than private placement bonds, after controlling for key 
bond contract terms and firm characteristics. The average yield spread of public bond 
over private placement bond for similar bonds issued by similar firms is -3.65%, based on 
the    estimate. Taking account of the potential heterogeneity among our sample 
countries by adding in country fixed effects, the yield spread falls to -1.98%.  
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Table 8 Bond Yield 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Log (Proceeds) 0.54 
***
 0.86 
***
 -0.55 
***
 -0.08 
***
 -0.03 
 
-0.81 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.08) 
 (Log Proceeds)
2
 
    
0.09 
***
 
    
0.07 
***
 
     
(0.01) 
     
(0.008) 
 Log (Term to Maturity) 0.33
***
 0.46
***
 0.47 
***
 0.75
***
 0.78
***
 0.78 
***
 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.03) 
 Callable 1.08 
 
0.41 
 
0.22 
 
-0.87 
*
 -1.08 
**
 -1.45 
***
 
 
(0.85) 
 
(0.79) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(0.45) 
 
(0.49) 
 Investment Grade Rating -4.44 
***
 -3.65 
***
 -4.66 
***
 -2.27 
***
 -1.98 
***
 -1.72 
***
 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.16) 
 Public Bond -5.02 
***
 -3.95 
***
 -0.68 
 
-0.47 
***
 -0.44 
***
 -0.40 
***
 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.14) 
 High Tech Indicator 
  
0.42 
***
 0.31 
***
 
  
0.09 
***
 0.084 
*
 
   
(0.08) 
 
(0.06) 
   
(0.04) 
 
(0.045) 
 Log (Book Assets) 
  
-0.57 
***
 -0.35 
***
 
  
-0.07 
***
 -0.07 
***
 
   
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
   
(0.12) 
 
(0.01) 
 Firm Leverage 
  
0.06 
 
0.15 
   
0.74 
***
 0.76 
***
 
   
(0.15) 
 
(0.11) 
   
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 Industry Tangibility 
  
-0.46 
***
 0.54 
***
 
  
-0.38 
***
 -0.36 
***
 
   
(0.13) 
 
(0.10) 
   
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 International Issue Indicator 
   
2.23 
***
 
    
0.43 
***
 
     
(0.06) 
     
(0.07) 
 Lambda -2.55
***
 -2
***
 -0.31 
***
 -0.26
***
 -0.25
***
 -0.73 
***
 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.10) 
 
 
Country Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.23  0.33  0.38  0.81  0.81  0.82  
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Table 9 Effect of Institutional Factors on Bond Yield 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Controls and Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Public Bond -0.7 
***
 -0.98 
***
 -0.93 
***
 -0.18 
 
0.16 
 
1.73 
***
 -0.4 
 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.26) 
 Lambda -0.41 
***
 -0.47 
***
 -0.43 
***
 -1.16 
***
 -0.26 
***
 -0.35 
***
 -0.46 
***
 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 Log (GDP Per Capita) -0.58 
***
 -1.93 
***
 
    
-1.98 
***
 -1.63 
***
 -1.94 
***
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
     
(0.026) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
 Developed Indicator 
      
-2.74
***
 
      
       
(0.14) 
       Development of Banking Sector -1.73
***
 
            
 
(0.04) 
             Development of Stock Market -0.07 
             
 
(0.05) 
             Common Law Indicator 
        
1.04
***
 
    
         
(0.12) 
     Creditor Rights Protection 
  
-0.2
***
 
        
-0.015
 
   
(0.02) 
         
(0.08) 
 Depth of Credit Information 
    
-0.47
***
 
    
-0.16
***
 
  
     
(0.03) 
     
(0.046) 
   Public*Developed Indicator 
      
-2.84
***
 
      
       
(0.18) 
       Public *Common Law 
        
1.06
***
 
    
         
(0.14) 
     Public* Depth of Credit 
Information 
          
-0.49 
***
 
  
           
(0.05) 
   Public*Creditor Rights Protection 
            
-0.21
**
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 (0.08) 
 
 
Number of Observations 5203 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 
5229 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.73 
 
 0.61 
 
 0.62 
 
 0.48 
 
 0.66 
 
 0.63 
 
 0.61 
 
 
184 
 
Table 9 presents the effect of institutional arrangements on bond yield and the 
yield spread between public and private bonds. The development of the economy, 
measured by GDP per capita significantly reduces bond yield for both public and private 
bonds. Moreover, bond yields are also significantly lower in countries with a larger 
banking sector and a larger stock market.  Strong credit rights protection and better 
access to credit information significantly lower overall corporate bond yields as well. 
Country level institutional differences have a direct impact on the yield spread of public 
bonds over private placement bonds. In column 4 of Table 9, we find that the interaction 
of the public bond indicator and the developed economy indicator is negative and 
significant at one percent level, and the public bond indicator itself is insignificant. The 
results suggest that the yield on public bonds is slightly below that on private placement 
bonds, but the difference is statistically insignificant for developing countries. The 
difference in yield averaged across all bonds with different contract terms becomes 
significantly negative for developed countries.  Column 5 tests the effect of legal origins 
on bond yield by interacting the public bond indicator with the common law indicator. 
We find that bond yield tend to be larger for both public and private bonds in common 
law countries compare to civil law countries’. In addition, after controlling for bond 
contract terms, public bonds have significantly higher yields than private placement 
bonds in common law countries, consistent with the univariate statistics in Table 3. Bond 
yield spread is statistically insignificant in civil law countries.  
 Column 6 of Table 9 tests the effect of credit information transparency on yield 
spread. The interaction of public bond indicator and the depth of credit information is 
negative and significant, while the public bond indicator itself is positive and significant. 
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This indicates that when it is difficult to obtain credit information through public 
available channels, public bonds have a higher yield than similar private placement bonds, 
suggesting that private debt market is likely to provide cheaper financing and hence has a 
comparative advantage over the public bond market when assess to creditor financial 
conditions is poor. The yield of public bond and its yield spread over private bonds are 
significantly lower when creditor financial information becomes more transparent. The 
result in column 7 of Table 9 suggests that stronger creditor rights protection also 
significantly lowers the yield spread, perhaps because stronger legal protections for 
debtholders is associated with a more developed and informationally efficient debt 
market, which lowers the overall market risk and improves the liquidity of public 
corporate bond market. 
 
Cold and Hot Security Markets 
Security issuance activity exhibits strong cyclical patterns. For example, Eckbo, 
Masulis and Norli (2007) show that the aggregate volume of equity issues fluctuates 
greatly over time and this cyclicality is generally categorized as there being a hot or cold 
new issue markets. In this section, we examine whether individual firm’s debt financing 
patterns are affected by overall market conditions and whether they are substantially 
different across hot and cold markets. 
Classifying security markets as being hot or cold is commonly determined by 
examining aggregate total proceeds of net issue activity of domestic securities of a 
particular category, in our case debt (both public and private) issued by domestic firms. If 
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the debt market issue activity is in the top quartile of the time series, then we define this 
as a hot market period. On the other hand, if the debt issue activity is in the lowest 
quartile of the time series, we define this as a cold market period.  We calculate this for 
the domestic debt market of each sample country for each year of our sample period. We 
obtain this data from the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).65 As reported in Table 
10, both the average bond proceeds (issue size) and aggregate annual total proceeds are 
larger in hot markets than in cold markets. This result holds for both publicly and 
privately issued bonds. The average term to maturity for public bonds issued during hot 
markets is slightly shorter than for bonds issued in cold markets, and the average yield is 
slightly higher in cold markets as well. This could reflect the fact that  during hot market 
period, smaller firms and higher risk firms that normally cannot issue public bonds are 
able to tap the public bond market, taking advantage of overall booming market 
conditions and investors optimism. On the other hand, we find the opposite patterns for 
private placement bonds: the private placement bonds issued in hot market have longer 
terms to maturity and lower yields than those issued in cold market, suggesting that firms 
are more likely to borrow cheaply from private lenders during hot market period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65
 We use the table “Domestic debt securities by financial institutions and corporate issuers. 
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Table 10 Hot Markets vs. Cold Markets 
  Hot Markets Cold Markets 
 
Public 
Bonds 
Private 
Bonds 
Public 
Bonds 
Private 
Bonds 
Average Proceeds ($ million) 274.04 124.52 247.92 114.72 
Total Annual Volume of Bond Issues  
($ million) 30144.39 3330.93 24668.29 2117.98 
Average Term to Maturity (Months) 82.33 63.68 85.57 59.5 
Average Yield 3.59 5.15 3.12 5.68 
 
 
We formally test the effect of market conditions on a firm’s choice between 
public and private placement bonds in Table 11 using a logit regression model. We find 
that the likelihood of issuing public bonds are higher during hot markets and are lower 
during cold markets, but the effect is not statistically significant. Thus, even after we 
control for the overall domestic debt market conditions, bond and firm level 
characteristics as well as country-level institutional arrangements continue to have 
significant impacts on a firm’s placement choice.  
We also examine whether the average bond yield is affected by domestic debt 
market conditions in Table 12. After controlling for other important factors, we find that 
bond yield is significantly lower in hot markets. The results concerning the effects of 
institutional arrangements documented in prior sections continue to hold.  
Market conditions in the international debt market are likely to affect a firm’s 
decision of borrowing internationally. To examine this question, we categorize 
international debt market conditions using aggregate total proceeds of net issues of 
international corporate debt issued worldwide. The data is obtained from the Bank for 
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International Settlements (BIS) as well.66 The market is considered as to be hot if the 
aggregate net issues are in the highest quartile of the annual time series and to be cold if 
the aggregate net issues are in the lowest quartile of the annual time series. Table 10 
column 2 reports the effect of international debt market conditions on a firm’s choice of 
issuing internationally or domestically. We find that the likelihood of tapping 
international market is significantly higher if the market is hot.  Moreover, the likelihood 
of issuing public bonds in the international debt market is also affected by the overall 
market conditions of the international debt market. It is significantly lower when the 
international debt market is cold. More importantly, after controlling for international 
market conditions, our key results with regard to the effect of institutional arrangements 
on debt financing choices continue to hold in these regressions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66
 We use the table “International debt securities by corporate issuers”. 
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Table 11 Market Conditions and Debt Issuance Choice 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Full Sample Full Sample 
Subsample of 
International 
Issues 
 
 
 
Public vs. 
Private 
International vs. 
Domestic 
Public vs. 
Private 
Hot  Domestic  Debt Market 0.17 
     
 
(0.18) 
     Cold Domestic Debt Market -0.11 
     
 
(0.19) 
     Hot International Debt Market 
  
0.56 
** 0.065 
 
   
(0.24) 
 
(0.38) 
 Cold International Debt 
Market 
  
-0.25 
 
-0.7 
** 
   
(0.28) 
 
(0.34) 
 Firm Characteristics 
      Log (Proceeds) 1.58 *** 
    
 
(0.07) 
     Log (Term to Maturity) -0.23 
     
 
(0.22) 
     Investment Grade Rating 1.58 *** 
    
 
(0.49) 
     High Tech Indicator -0.77 *** 
    
 
(0.19) 
     Log (Book Assets) 0.19 *** 
    
 
(0.046) 
     Firm Leverage -0.58 * 
    
 
(0.33) 
     Industry Tangibility 1.07 *** 
    
 
(0.32) 
     
 
Institutional Arrangements 
      Log (GDP Per Capital) 0.94 *** 2.02 *** 0.53 *** 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.19) 
 Development of Banking 
Sector 1.73 
*** -2.46 *** -0.75 *** 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.15) 
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Table 11, continued 
 
Development of Stock Market -0.18 
 
0.53 
*** -0.22 
 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.17) 
 Creditor Rights Protection 0.09 
 
0.37 
*** 0.07 
 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 Anti-Self-Dealing Index 2.66 *** 3.25 *** 3.37 *** 
 
(0.90) 
 
(0.62) 
 
(0.75) 
 Control of Corruption 1.35 
*** 2.4 
*** 1.14 
*** 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.23) 
 Tax Evasion -0.8 *** -2.47 *** -0.62 *** 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.13) 
 Depth of Credit Information -1 *** 1.26 *** -0.29 ** 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.13) 
 Accounting Standard -14.07 *** -0.6 
 
-4.81 
* 
 
(2.81) 
 
(2.49) 
 
(2.73) 
 Constant -0.81 
 
-14.33 
*** 2.01 
   (2.51)   (1.65)   (2.14)   
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 5131 
 
6815 
 
1813 
 Pseudo R-Squared 0.32   0.48   0.16   
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Table 12 Market Conditions and Bond Yield 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Hot Domestic Debt Market -0.03 
 
-0.24 
***
 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.07) 
 Cold Domestic Debt Market 0.027 
 
0.006 
 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.066) 
 Log (Proceeds) -0.02 
 
-0.06 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
 Log (Term to Maturity) 0.77 
***
 0.86 
***
 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.038) 
 Callable -1.07 
*
 0.94 
 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.62) 
 Investment Grade Rating -2.48 
***
 -3.51 
***
 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.27) 
 Public Bond -0.41 
**
 -0.52 
***
 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.12) 
 Lambda -0.27 
**
 -0.35 
***
 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.07) 
 Log (GDP Per Capita) 
  
-1.16 
***
 
   
(0.04) 
 Developed Indicator 
    
     Development of Banking Sector 
  
-1.63
***
 
   
(0.04) 
 Development of Stock Market 
  
-0.06 
 
   
(0.05) 
 Common Law Indicator 
    
     Creditor Rights Protection 
    
     Depth of Credit Information 
  
-0.6
***
 
   
(0.03) 
 Country Fixed Effects Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of Observations 5229 
 
5229 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.75 
 
 0.68 
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Conclusion 
Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that firm level factors drive a 
firm debt financing patterns, such as the choice between public and private debt and the 
cost of debt financing. The results in this study indicate that a firm’s debt financing 
decision is also significantly affected by conditions in the country in which it is located. 
The institutional environment of a country has a profound impact on a firm’s debt 
financing and its effect is at least as important as firm specific characteristics.  We find 
that the development of the overall economy and various capital markets, creditor rights 
protection and legal enforcement, the transparency of creditor financial information, all 
significantly alter a firm’s choice between private and public bonds, and the 
corresponding bond yield of the specific debt instrument they choose to issue. The results 
are robust after controlling for various firm level characteristics that are shown to be 
correlated with firm debt financing decisions both theoretically and empirically. 
Moreover, the results also hold even if we consider domestic and international debt 
market conditions and aggregate issuance activities on the bond market. 
Empirically, we find a significant association of domestic banking sector 
development and a firm’s choice between public and private bond issuance. A dominant 
banking sector appears to make private placement bond issuance less attractive for firms 
seeking to issue bonds.  This could be due to the fact that bank loans are close substitutes 
for private placement bonds and their contract features are even more flexible than 
private bonds to some extent. On the other hand, a well-developed equity market reduces 
a firm’s likelihood of issuing public bonds, which is also consistent with the prediction 
that equity issuance could crowd out public bond issuance. 
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Furthermore, we find that the public bond market is more accessible when the 
legal system provides stronger legal protections to creditor rights and these laws are 
effectively enforced.  Such an effect is particularly strong for firms that have potentially 
severe debt agency and information asymmetry problems. These legal arrangements 
constrain managerial self-dealing behavior and lead to more efficient bankruptcy 
proceedings. The result is lower expected default probability and an increase in the 
recovery rate conditional on a default.  The country level institutional arrangements also 
determine a firm’s access to the international bond market. Moreover, their effects on the 
choice between public and private bonds are more pronounced for firms borrowing in the 
international debt market. 
In terms of debt financing costs, highly developed economies with more 
developed banking sectors and equity market generally have lower bond yields for both 
public and private debt. Strong creditor protection and a transparent and reliable financial 
accounting system also lower debt financing costs. Moreover, we find that institutional 
factors also affect the bond yield spread of public debt over private debt. Developed 
countries have much lower yield spreads than underdeveloped countries, and civil law 
countries on average have lower yield spreads than common law countries. The yield 
spread also decreases with the strength of creditor legal protections and public 
availability of creditor financial information.  
This study shows that corporate financing decisions are likely to be jointly 
determined by both a demand side effect, which is the traditional corporate finance 
approach to focus on lender concerns about firm fundamentals, and the supply side effect, 
such as the constrains that exist in external capital markets. We document that key 
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institutional factors have large impact on individual firm’s debt financing choices and 
debt financing costs, perhaps through their impact on shaping the overall efficiency of the 
domestic capital markets that firms face.  The domestic debt market’s liquidity, 
informational efficiency and inherent risks associated with the strength of the legal 
system, each affects the relative financing costs across different markets, and also alters 
borrower and lender preferences over selling and buying bonds in different capital 
markets. 
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APPENDIX A Variable Definitions 
Date Item Definition 
Data 
Source 
Bond 
Characteristics 
  Issue size Total bond proceeds SDC 
Maturity Term to maturity in months SDC 
Call Provision Equals one if the bond is callable and zero if the bond is not callable SDC 
Investment Grade 
Rating 
Equals one if the firm has an investment grade credit rating before new 
bond issuance, and zero otherwise SDC 
Senior Bond Equals one if the bond is senior and zero if the bond is subordinate SDC 
Firm 
Characteristics 
  
Firm Size 
Natural Logarithm of a firm's total book assets at the end of fiscal year 
before bond issuance WorldScope 
Firm Leverage (Long term debt + short term debt)/Total assets WorldScope 
High Tech Firm 
Based on AeA's definition of high tech industries 
WorldScope 
and AeA 
Industry 
Tangibility The median of four-digit industry tangible ratio WorldScope 
Institutional 
Variables 
  
Developed 
Countries 
A zero or one dummy variable indicating whether the country is 
classified as developed according to World Bank classification based 
on countries' gross national income level World Bank 
GDP per Capita GDP per capita measured in year 2000 US dollars WDI 
Common Law 
A zero or one dummy variable indicating whether a country adopts the 
common law system LLSV 1998 
Domestic Credit 
Provided by the 
Banking 
Sectors/GDP 
Includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government. The banking sector 
includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as 
other banking institutions. WDI 
Market 
Capitalization/GD
P 
Market capitalization of domestic listed companies/ GDP 
WDI 
Creditor Rights 
Index 
 
 
 
 
 
Summarizes the legal rules from the bankruptcy and reorganization 
laws covering the following: 
(1) The country imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or 
minimum dividends to file for reorganization 
(2) Secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security 
once the reorganization petition has been approved 
(3) Secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm 
(4) The debtor does not retain the administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization 
 
 
La Porta et 
al (1998) 
Anti-self-dealing A numerical measure of the intensity of public and private enforcement Djankov et 
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Index on regulating managerial self-dealing al 2008 
Control of 
Corruption 
One dimension of Worldwide Governance Indicator, measures the 
strength of controlling corruption 
WGI of 
World Bank 
Tax Evasion Assessment of the prevalence of tax evasion. Higher scores indicate 
higher tax evasion.  The data is obtained in year 2002.   
 World 
Economic 
Forum  
Depth of credit 
information 
Index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of 
credit information available through public or private credit registries WDI 
Accounting 
Standard Index 
Index created by examining and rating companies'1990 annual reports 
on their inclusion or omission of 90 items LLSV 1998 
 
